

CAPS at Ten  
Community Policing in Chicago

An Evaluation of Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy

Prepared by  
The Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium

Wesley G. Skogan  
Lynn Steiner

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Claudia Benitez  
Jason Bennis  
Sarah Borchers  
Jill DuBois  
Rita Gondocs  
Susan Hartnett  
So Young Kim  
Sarah Rosenbaum

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## CAPS Report Contributors 1993-2003

Scott Althaus	Kimberly Lacker
Edward Anderson	Paul J. Lavrakas
Jonathan Anfinson	Justine H. Lovig
Claudia Benítez	Arthur J. Lurigio
Susan F. Bennett	Scott Medlock
Jason Bennis	Melissa Miller
Aaron Bicknese	Gail Musial
Richard L. Block	Gabriela Nava-Campos
Sarah Borchers	Jonathan Parker
Paula Brandao	Aaron Petty
Chelsea Brown	Saty Reddy
Katey Casper	Judee Richardson
Dana Cole	Dennis P. Rosenbaum
Jennifer T. Comey	Sarah Rosenbaum
Zachary Cook	Brandon Rottinghaus
Gail Dantzker	Betty Ruiz
Sirgulina Davidsdottir	Diana Ruiz
Jill DuBois	Rosie Ruiz
Aimee Fagan	Steve Ryan
Tulia Faletti	Wesley G. Skogan
Archon Fung	Jinney Smith
Aneta Galary	Jennifer Smith
Rita Gondocs	Lynn Steiner
Noelle Gonzalez	Cody Stephens
Lisa Graziano	Aaron Sumrall
J. Erik Gudell	Joseph Tan
Susan M. Hartnett	Negar Tekeei
Ricky Hazelwood	William Troutman
Lynn Higgins	Karla Twedt-Ball
Sheila Houmes	Raj C. Udeshi
Almas Hussein	Kimmy Van
Robert Jessen	Mai Van
Kayla Johnson	Robert VanStedum
Tabatha R. Johnson	Alice Virgil
Marianne Kaiser	Wuyi Wang
Katie Kaminski	Dominique Whelan
Emily Keebler	Sheri Wong
Tom Kelly	Norman Wyrroll
Jinha Kim	Alexander Young
So Young Kim	Lisa Zhao
Joel F. Knutson	

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## Executive Summary

This is the eighth report on Chicago's community policing program. The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) was inaugurated in April 1993. The program was expanded to encompass the entire city after testing in five police districts. Part of the plan was to renew the Police Department's turf orientation, so teams of officers now have relatively long-term assignments in each of the city's 279 police beats. They are expected to spend most of their time responding to calls and working on prevention projects in their assigned area; to enable them to do so, rapid response units are assigned excess or low-priority calls. The entire Department has been trained in a five-step problem-solving process, and problem-solving efforts of beat officers are supported by a coordinated system for delivering city services. A commitment to community involvement is reflected in beat meetings and district advisory committees. Monthly beat meetings became a regular feature of the program early in 1995. Beginning in 1996, the city mounted a substantial civic education effort for CAPS: media ads, billboards, brochures, festival booths, and rallies were used to promote awareness of CAPS and involvement in its activities.

City partnerships are a component of CAPS. In 1993, the city created the CAPS Implementation Office. Its staff is composed of civilian community outreach workers, some formerly employed by nonprofit community organizations, who are charged with assisting beat and district projects and sustaining participation in beat community meetings. The Implementation Office also supports court advocacy activities in every police district. It has also taken over the coordination of city services in support of CAPS-related projects. In addition, city attorneys work in the districts on gang and drug house issues, and police officers have joined multi-agency teams that conduct strategically targeted code violation inspections.

A new planning and management process was instituted in 2000. The districts are responsible for identifying local priorities, planning strategies to address them and then executing their plans effectively. District efforts are reviewed as part of the Department's accountability process. This management initiative is designed to focus the Department's resources on resolving chronic crime and disorder problems; it is Chicago's version of New York City's famous "Compstat." New information systems and computerized crime mapping capabilities developed by the Department deliver expanded and more timely information to assist district management teams in making their plans, while headquarters uses the same data to evaluate how well they are doing. Data terminals are installed in patrol cars, and the city's Office of Emergency Management and Communications manages police and fire calls using a sophisticated and highly computerized dispatching system.

This report examines CAPS progress through the end of 2003, more than ten years after its inception. The first section summarizes what we have learned about citizen involvement in the program, through an analysis of beat meetings and district advisory committees. The next section describes changes over time in Chicagoans' assessments of the quality of police service. Next is a description of trends in crime and fear in Chicago's neighborhoods, followed by a description of CAPS problem-solving efforts and trends in neighborhood problems. Then we present an in-depth look at conditions in the Latino community. The report concludes with an analysis of new management initiatives within the Police Department aimed at enhancing the implementation of Department priorities.

## Public Involvement

Our yearly surveys find that awareness of CAPS grew swiftly between 1996 and 1998. Awareness of the program among whites has since hovered at about 80, while it has continued to grow a bit among African-Americans. By 2003, 89 percent of African-Americans knew about CAPS. Awareness grew more slowly among Latinos, and it has been dropping since hitting its peak of 73 percent in 1999. In 2003, only 56 percent of Latinos preferring to speak Spanish knew about the program.

Television is the most common source of information about CAPS. In 1999, 70 percent of Spanish-speaking Latinos who knew about CAPS indicated that they had learned about it at least in part via television. The second most frequent way people recall hearing about CAPS is word of mouth, including from a neighbor or friend; the “buzz” surrounding CAPS has risen every year. Spanish-speaking Latinos were the least likely to report hearing about CAPS from other people. Over time there has been a noticeable increase in the extent to which people report receiving printed matter (brochures, flyers and newsletters) and seeing posters or signs about CAPS.

Participation in beat meetings has been rising slightly. In 1995, Chicagoans attended beat meetings on about 58,600 occasions. In 2002 (the last year for which complete information is available), 67,300 people attended a total of 2,916 beat meetings. Adding together all of the meetings between 1995 and June of 2003, Chicagoans have turned up 551,700 times for beat meetings. In the surveys, awareness of the meetings has been surprisingly stable, holding steady at 60 percent of adults. Homeowners, long term residents, older adults, and those with more education are more likely to know beat meetings are being held in their neighborhood. Awareness among African-Americans has consistently outpaced every other group, while it is lowest for Spanish-speaking Latinos. Two factors are particularly important in sustaining beat meeting attendance. One is the role played by community associations and local institutions in getting the word out and encouraging residents to attend. CAPS is importantly affected by the infrastructure of organizations in each neighborhood. The other is the special role played by a relatively small cadre of dedicated beat meeting activists. They come to meetings frequently, and their involvement drives both attendance rates and CAPS-related neighborhood activism.

At the beat level, attendance is generally highest where it is needed the most. Attendance rates are especially high in poor areas with bad housing, high levels of crime, and poor schools. Meeting attendance is highest there because it is driven by concern about crime and other neighborhood problems, and beat meetings give people a place to go to do something about them.

The report examines trends in the quality of beat meetings. Based on observational studies in 1995, 1998 and 2002, the meetings have improved on a number of important dimensions. The adoption of clear procedures, model agendas, informative materials to be distributed, training for officers and beat facilitators, special training for beat sergeants, and internal inspections, has increased the quality of beat meetings and standardized their operations. In 2002 we observed noticeably fewer very poorly run meetings. But at the same time, beat meetings have gotten dramatically shorter, fewer police officers are attending, and their effectiveness at mobilizing residents for action appears to be declining. Satisfaction with the

meetings among those who attend peaked in 1998, and has been declining since. Over time, fewer participants report that they have seen action taken in their neighborhood because of the meetings or that beat meetings are very useful for finding solutions to neighborhood problems. Beat meeting attendance is also not particularly representative of the community. Attendance is strongly biased in favor of more educated residents, homeowners, and older, long-term residents. Latinos are dramatically under-represented in most neighborhoods.

The report includes a number of recommendations for improving beat meetings. Beat meetings should meet frequently, regularly and in the same place, to provide Chicagoans with an opportunity for participation. Beat meetings work because someone is always responsible for organizing and conducting them, and they should continue to be held even during periods of low attendance. Residents attend meetings hoping to be able to speak freely and get home safely, but in about 20 percent of beats there is concern about getting involved because residents fear retaliation by bad elements in the community.

One reason residents attend is that they are concerned about their community but are not well informed about crime or the efforts being made by police and local activists to respond to it. Beat meetings do a good job at sharing information about the community, and there has been substantial improvement in reports by police to residents about what they have been doing about previously expressed concerns. The meetings could also provide a venue for residents to report on their own efforts, but they rarely do, and only about one-quarter of the meetings seemed to have any action component to them. One of the benefits of attending has been seeing problems written up as CAPS service requests, but it appears that the police have now virtually abandoned using this procedure to trigger the delivery city services. This may be undermining one of the central reasons why Chicagoans come to the meetings – to get something done.

Another vehicle for resident involvement in CAPS are the district advisory committees. Known widely as “DACs”, these are groups of residents, community organization leaders, business owners, representatives of local institutions, and others from the community who meet regularly with the commander and other police district leaders to discuss district affairs. They are supposed to assist the commander in establishing district priorities and developing strategies to address them, and to bring to the table community resources that could contribute to resolving local problems. However, members express frustration over their ill-defined mandate, their leadership problems, and their inaction on many important issues. Some focus on too-specific issues and become essentially another layer of beat meetings. While they are supposed to encourage the exchange of information, too many DAC meetings are dominated by the one-way flow of announcements by the police to those in attendance. In theory, DAC chairs should be involved in planning district strategies and assessing their effectiveness. They are supposed to represent the community’s interests and priorities, and their view of the effectiveness of police operations. However, it is virtually unheard of for DAC chairs to play any role whatsoever at the planning stage, and we have never observed a DAC chair making a significant contribution to discussions at accountability meetings at any level.

The DACs are often not very representative of the community. Officially, they are supposed to “. . . reflect the district’s social, ethnic and racial make-up, and include residents, youth, business people, representatives of community educational and religious organizations, and other stakeholders in the district.” However, our research indicates that the membership of

many DACs falls short of these goals. Many are also not providing an independent voice for the community; most simply respond to the agenda put on the table by district personnel, and they get more advice than they give. DAC membership is also very slow to turn over. Many members hang on for years, some regardless of their productivity as members. The lack of turnover on some DACs may exacerbate the representation issues facing the DACs, especially the inability of the police to find slots for the city's large and growing Latino population.

### **Public Confidence in the Police**

One goal of CAPS is to increase confidence in the fairness and effectiveness of the police. Our surveys find that opinions of the police improved steadily between 1993 and 1999, before leveling off at a new high in the 2000s. At the same time, it is also apparent that the gulf between the races in Chicago has not diminished at all. Partly this is good news, for it signals that improvement in the image of the police has been a general one, and not confined to one group. On every measure, changes in opinion have been apparent among whites, African-Americans and Latinos alike, but the 15-20 percentage point gap between the views of whites and those of other racial groups scarcely closed over 11 years. Chicagoans are happier about their police than they were a decade ago, but they are just as polarized in their views.

Chicago police have always done best in terms of their perceived politeness, helpfulness, and fairness, and in the concern they show for residents' problems. Even in 1993, a majority of Chicagoans believed that people in their neighborhood were treated well by the police, so there was little room for improvement. Over the years there has been a big increase in the percentage who see police in their area as dealing with the problems that concern residents and working with residents to solve them, both goals of CAPS. Police have rated most poorly on questions about their performance, including how effective they are at controlling crime, maintaining order, and (especially) helping crime victims.

### **Trends in Crime and Fear**

In Chicago, many categories of crime peaked in 1991 and then declined sharply. Over the 1991-2002 period, violent crime declined by 49 percent, and property crime by 36 percent. The largest decline in crime was in robbery, which dropped by 58 percent between 1991 and 2002. Murder was down the least over this period, by 30 percent. As in many cities, the ability of Chicago's police to solve homicides has waned. While other kinds of homicide have declined, the remaining core of gang and drug-related shootings has proven more difficult to counter. Over the period, rapes declined 45 percent, and aggravated assault and battery by 41 percent. In the property crime category, motor vehicle theft was down by 47 percent between 1991 and 2002. Burglary, which typically involves break-ins of businesses, homes or garages, went down 51 percent. Burglary just of residences and garages dropped by 46 percent. Simple property thefts declined 27 percent over the same period.

The report describes the findings of a study of why crime has declined so substantially. Factors such as improving neighborhood conditions, decreasing gun availability, changes in drug markets, changes in police effectiveness, and the growing capacity of the city's neighborhoods to

defend themselves, are linked to the declining level of violence in the city. Crime is down in almost all beats, but it has declined most dramatically in African-American communities. Crime rates have declined the least in predominately white areas, where they were not very high at the outset.

The surveys also included questions about the extent of neighborhood crime problems, and the findings point to the unique experiences of the city's large and growing Latino population. In the early 1990s, African-Americans and Latinos were equally concerned about crime in their neighborhood, but during the course of the 1990s their experiences diverged. Over time, more and more African-Americans reported that things were improving, and by 2003 their views about many problems had converged toward those of whites. But there was little good news for the city's Latinos. Reports of concern by Latinos did not decline during the 1990s, and they jumped to new highs during the early 2000s. By 2003, Latinos were three times more likely than whites or African-Americans to report that street crime, burglary and auto theft were big problems in their community. The report presents evidence that Latinos do not contact the police or report crimes as frequently as they should, so these trends do not show up in official statistics.

The report also examines trends in fear of crime. Fear of crime is an important social factor with real consequences for individuals, neighborhoods and the metropolitan area. In this light, the finding of a substantial decline in fear bodes well for the future of the city. Fear was down about 20 percentage points among the highest fear groups – African-Americans, women and older residents of the city. The city's Latinos made the fewest gains, especially if they were Spanish- rather than English-speakers. Because Spanish-speakers are the fastest growing component of the city's Latino population, there was little progress for the group as a whole.

Finally, this section puts crime trends in Chicago in comparative perspective. Compared to other large American cities, Chicago did fairly well. In general, the drop in crime paralleled trends in other big cities, and they were deeper than some. For robbery, Chicago compares favorably with the bulk of its peer communities. The city lagged in homicide. Since 1991, big-city murder has gone down quickly, ending at exactly half of its original level by 2002. This contrasts with Chicago's one-third decline, to 67 percent of its 1991 number. Chicago essentially matched the very substantial declines that took place in big-city burglary and auto theft during the course of the 1990s.

### **Tackling Neighborhood Problems**

The evaluation also tracks trends in the extent of neighborhood problems. The surveys ask about neighborhood conditions using categories that are readily understood by the public, and they include many concerns that are not easily gauged using agency statistics. All of the problems considered were targets of problem-solving projects and city service agencies.

In general, whites began with few serious concerns about physical decay issues, and not much changed. African-Americans began with many serious problems, but they reported sharp improvements in neighborhood conditions over time. Concern about abandoned buildings dropped by half, and concern about refuse-filled lots and graffiti declined by about 10 percentage

points. The city's Latinos, on the other hand, began with serious problems and saw little improvement. By 2003, whites and African-Americans were in closer agreement about improvements in their neighborhoods – although blacks certainly still had a way to go before they could claim parity. Nothing improved for Latinos, and in their eyes some problems even grew worse.

The social disorder category includes public drinking, loitering, and disturbances in and around schools. Few white Chicagoans reported serious disorder problems in the early 1990s, but over the ensuing decade they managed to witness a significant improvement in school-related problems. Big improvements in neighborhood order were registered by African-Americans. The percentage of African-Americans expressing concern about disruption in and around schools dropped, and concern about public drinking was down. On the other hand, Latinos saw few gains over the period. In the early years African-Americans and Latinos reported about the same level of concern about social disorder, but the experiences of the two groups again diverged dramatically. Latinos reported deteriorating conditions in and around the schools serving their neighborhoods, and concern about public drinking jumped considerably.

### **Trends in the Latino Community**

During the summer of 2003, the CAPS evaluation team conducted a study of Latino involvement in community policing, focusing on 15 predominately Latino beats. The issues that led to this study included the high level of perceived crime among Latinos, and the concern they express about the extent of social disorder and physical decay in their communities. At the same time, Latinos are generally under-represented in CAPS; they are least aware of the program and of beat meetings, and their awareness has been falling since the late 1990s. Involvement in beat meetings is generally driven by concern about crime and disorder, but Latinos do not turn out in expected numbers. They are particularly under-represented at beat meetings in racially diverse areas, and the Hispanic community lacks representation by frequent attenders. Latinos are also under-represented on the DACs, even though committee members are appointed by the Police Department. Demography works against them in this regard. Compared to whites and African-Americans, Latinos are younger and more likely to be working and have children at home, and least likely to be linked to their community through the organizational affiliations that promote involvement in CAPS. Their relations with the police are mixed. While they stand between whites and African-Americans on most measures of attitudes concerning the police, they are noticeably more critical than are the city's white residents. They are avoiding contact with the police, and may not even report crimes when they occur. And in virtually every instance these problems interact with language. Members of the city's large and growing Spanish-language community report more neighborhood problems, fewer contacts with the police, lower levels of CAPS awareness and involvement, and higher levels of fear, than do their English-speaking counterparts.

Regarding their relationship with the police, our informants identified three trouble topics: immigration-related issues, police attitudes and behavior towards neighborhood residents, and police relations with area youths. Three issues closely associated with immigration affected their views. First, newcomers reportedly arrive with two expectations about police that are

rooted in their home-country experience – that they are corrupt and abusive. Our survey data tell the same story. Spanish-speaking Latinos are vastly more likely than anyone else to believe that police in their neighborhood use excessive force and are corrupt. In our 2003 survey, 33 percent of them reported police corruption was a big problem in their neighborhood, and another 19 percent thought it was at least some problem. A second immigration issue is that, once here, newcomers face language and communication problems when they deal with the police. Third, fears about their legal status – some of which may be unfounded – lead immigrants to avoid contact with police, to not report crime, and to remain uninvolved in CAPS. Another issue that arose in the interviews was police demeanor. Many informants indicated that officers serving their area are sometimes rude or unresponsive to residents' concerns. A group with whom police apparently have difficult relations is Latino youths, especially young males. Our surveys document that they are frequently stopped by the police, and too often they feel mistreated.

People we questioned about CAPS awareness recommended specifically targeting Spanish-speaking Latinos through Spanish-language television and radio. Police should target Latinos where they live, work and play; flyers should be distributed in grocery stores, community organizations, schools and churches. There was agreement that personal contact is important to Latinos; printed materials do not have the same impact, and will not counteract the negative experiences Latinos have had with police. Much work is needed to break down stereotypes on both sides. Police and Latinos often meet in adverse situations, so opportunities need to be created for interactions of a more positive nature, where both can meet in a friendly and supportive environment and trust can be reestablished. Police need to develop partnerships with community organizations. In particular, efforts involving schools and churches need to be broadened, and officers need to work with key organizations and community leaders to bring more residents into the CAPS process. Beat meetings need more consistent Spanish-language translation, and bilingual officers. Otherwise, their other recommendations are relevant to all beat meetings; this includes facilitating problem-solving at meetings; seeing and reporting positive results of CAPS; keeping residents informed; and making meetings convenient for attendees. On their part, the Latino community must also take action. CAPS is a partnership and both sides must be active in order for the program to work. CAPS needs to be publicized by Latinos; they must continue to spread the word of its utility among family and friends, and explain why it should be a priority. They need to use their personal relationships to strengthen participation. Residents also need to be aware that CAPS is a process which takes time and they need to be patient, for complex problems do not have quick results. They need to come to meetings prepared to engage in problem-solving rather than voicing their problem and expecting something to be done about it.

## **Management Accountability**

The Department's focus on management accountability began in February 2000, with the creation of the Office of Management Accountability (OMA). OMA is charged with numerous responsibilities, but its main goal is to ensure that all of the Department's elements support and carry out strategies which address chronic crime and disorder problems that have been identified as priority problems. The process has been very successful. Signs point to the institutionalization of this new approach to managing the Department, and its specialized units have changed in response to new expectations. The process has successfully held specialized units accountable

for their efforts in the districts, and many have become district partners. The process has caused managers to be better managers, and it has helped foster communication and new partnerships in the Department. Accountability meetings at the area and headquarters level continue to be settings for discussion, explanation, analysis and strategizing, though some are more like status reports than problem-solving sessions. Accountability has evolved into a component of the regular business of the Department, and managers have grown with the process.

This new system is seen principally as an internal project, and there has been limited community involvement. There could be more, and community partners could even have responsibilities to be accountable for – for example, increasing beat meeting attendance – and the accompanying right to compete for resources. With the Department’s current reemphasis on traditional enforcement strategies, there is a risk of losing ground on the community side of community policing. OMA originally envisioned having a community analysis unit. Such a unit could take responsibility for monitoring community concerns and independently assessing the quality of beat meetings and the responsiveness of beat officers to resident input.

Accountability was originally touted as a “two way process.” That is, it was to provide a forum for analyzing the effectiveness of headquarters in supporting field operations. There is certainly much scope for examining (for example) how judiciously officers are redeployed from the districts or the availability of equipment and vehicles. There is a point on the agenda of each headquarters session for the district under review to make suggestions or comments, but there is little meaningful discussion of this item. The barriers that districts face in trying to address their priorities are seldom brought up, and on few occasions have managers brought forward issues that need attention by the top brass. There is also room for more constructive dialogue in the process. There are many missed opportunities for real analyses of what works and why, and how the Department can actually tell what programs are working.

The report advances a number of specific recommendations. Participation by senior Department executives needs to be strengthened. Headquarters review meetings are supposed to be dynamic and collaborative discussions involving of all the stakeholders, but there is not much of this. OMA needs more staff and better equipment. DAC chairs, CAPS Implementation Office staff, and drug and gang house attorneys frequently come to these meetings, but they are less familiar with the process and only learn what to expect after attending repeatedly. Some training for them might make it easier for non-police partners to contribute meaningfully at the meetings.

### **CAPS at Ten: Final Grades**

We have been monitoring Chicago’s community policing initiative since January 1993, before the program was even announced to the public. The evaluation was designed to encompass the entire city and all of its communities, and as a result we have gathered a great deal of data. Since the beginning we have surveyed about 48,500 residents, about two-thirds of them at home and one-third at beat meetings. Several thousand of these respondents were CAPS activists and DAC members, and another 5,000 were problem-solving training participants. We also surveyed about 13,600 police officers, either at roll call or when they gathered for training sessions or beat meetings. Over the years we held more than 1,000 in-depth personal interviews with police officers and residents, and our observers conducted detailed observations of 1,079

beat meetings. Our computers store more than 8 million crime reports and almost 37 million records of 911 calls (and that is only since 1999). More than 65 people have worked on the evaluation project.

We have been impressed by several things during the course of the evaluation. Perhaps most important is the dynamism of the city. Its people and their problems do not stand still, and our data collection has documented seismic shifts in both just since the early 1990s. Wherever big city policing is heading, Chicago is at the forefront. Another notable factor is the sheer difficulty of mounting any significant project in a city the size of Chicago. The task of making all of the many programs that make up CAPS come together in coordinated fashion is a huge one, particularly because it requires the commitment of neighborhood residents, the police and their many agency partners. An important point affecting everything that has happened is that CAPS is not simply the Police Department's program, rather it is the city's program. This is not true in most places, and community policing is vulnerable in many cities because of it. Here, every city agency pitches in, and the personal involvement of hundreds of thousands of citizens ensures that community policing is deeply embedded in the civic and political life of the city. This is important because there are distracting pressures on the city's leaders. Concern about terrorism is real, although what this city can do about it is not clear. Recent attention to violent crime has taken its share of energy that could be directed at responding to some of the program's weak spots. Finally, the Chicago Police Department is to be commended for its unwavering cooperation and interest in the evaluation over the past decade. Our evaluators were afforded broad access to the Department's documents, meetings and personnel. In addition, the CPD has been receptive to feedback, using evaluation findings to make enhancements to CAPS and to change Department policies and procedures to better support CAPS.

The following is our assessment of Chicago's first decade of community policing. Because CAPS is a sprawling collection of agencies and projects, we are giving its various parts individual ratings. Like graders everywhere, we tend to give a little extra for effort, and we recognize that some tests are harder than others. We also kept an eye on how other cities have done while making these judgments.

**Public Involvement:** This is one of the defining elements of community policing. Chicago's beat meetings are unique and the subject of intense scrutiny from around the world. Residents continue to turn out in large numbers, confirming that they see something in it for their community, and in many ways the meetings have improved over time. This notwithstanding, we were not able to assign a top mark to public involvement, because several issues plaguing CAPS for years have not been effectively addressed. The first such issue is the limited (and apparently declining) action component of beat meetings. As one community policing sergeant put it, "A lot of residents think that CAPS is like a laundry. Drop off the shirts, come back in a week and they are done." The turnover in officers attending the meetings continues to defeat one of the purposes of holding them, which is to build relationships between police and the public. We also found that the issues raised at beat meetings are not very well represented in the paperwork that officers later file, so no one above the beat level can monitor what citizens are really concerned about and what is being done about it. Another issue is the rudderless drifting of too many district advisory committees; they need new blood and a clear role. **Grade: B**

**Agency Partnerships:** Agency partnerships are another key feature of an effective program. In cities where community policing is the police department's program there is not much partnering going on. In those cities, police and residents typically address only a narrow range of issues, rather than broad range of problems that CAPS has taken on. In Chicago, CAPS is the city's program, and every relevant agency is making an effort to support problem-solving at the beat and district level. The CAPS Implementation Office provides the inter-agency coordination that is required to address the most significant problems. Past reports have documented the effectiveness of the city's anti-graffiti program. The Department of Law and a multi-agency inspection task force support district efforts to deal with bad buildings. **Grade: A**

**Reorganization:** Chicago also effectively reorganized to support community policing. The daily work of thousands of patrol officers was reshuffled so that newly formed beat teams could concentrate on their assigned neighborhoods, and a sergeant is assigned to generally supervise their problem-solving activities. A very smart management move concentrated responsibility for all aspects of CAPS management in the hands of a district lieutenant, the "CAPS management team leader." District community policing offices have taken on a lot more work. The management accountability system set in place in 2000, coupled with the newer Deployment Operations Center, has shifted the focus of headquarters to day-to-day crime fighting. This seems to happen everywhere when agencies adopt New York-style "Compstat" systems, but the focus of Chicago's management accountability process has remained broader than most. The headquarters review sessions continue to put some pressure on the districts to respond to the public's concerns, coordinate with the mobilization efforts of the CAPS Implementation Office, and sustain attendance at beat meetings. Internal inspectors routinely review community policing aspects of the Department's operations. **Grade: A**

**Problem-solving:** CAPS gets its lowest grade for problem-solving. To be fair, every police department has trouble making problem-solving work: it requires a great deal of training, close supervision, strong analytic capacity, and organization wide commitment. An analysis of hundreds of beat-level plans (the study was detailed in our January 2003 report) found that efforts to solve local priority problems have not been very effective. District-level priorities get more sustained attention, but the same problems, in about the same locations, persist year after year. Over time the effectiveness of beat meetings in setting problem-solving agendas for the public has declined. Officers have had no refresher training in problem-solving, and most of a decade has passed since resident activists were offered any training opportunities. Refocusing on problem-solving could provide an opportunity to re-engage the community in the active partnership promised by CAPS. **Grade: C**

## Introduction

This is the eighth report on Chicago's community policing program. The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) was inaugurated in April 1993. The program was expanded to encompass the entire city after testing in five police districts. Part of the plan was to renew the Police Department's turf orientation, so teams of officers now have relatively long-term assignments in each of the city's 279 police beats. They are expected to spend most of their time responding to calls and working on prevention projects in their assigned area; to enable them to do so, rapid response units are assigned excess or low-priority calls. The entire Department has been trained in a five-step problem-solving process, and problem-solving efforts of beat officers are supported by a coordinated system for delivering city services. A commitment to community involvement is reflected in beat meetings and district advisory committees. Monthly beat meetings became a regular feature of the program early in 1995. Beginning in 1996, the city mounted a substantial civic education effort for CAPS: media ads, billboards, brochures, festival booths, and rallies were used to promote awareness of CAPS and involvement in its activities.

City partnerships are a component of CAPS. In 1993, the city created the CAPS Implementation Office. Its staff is composed of civilian community outreach workers, some formerly employed by nonprofit community organizations, who are charged with assisting beat and district projects and sustaining participation in beat community meetings. The Implementation Office also supports court advocacy activities in every police district and has taken over the coordination of city services in support of CAPS-related projects. In addition, city attorneys work in the districts on gang and drug house issues, and police officers have joined multi-agency teams that conduct strategically targeted code violation inspections.

A new Department planning and management process was instituted in 2000. The districts are responsible for identifying local priorities, planning strategies to address them and then executing their plans effectively. District efforts are reviewed as part of the Department's accountability process. This management initiative is designed to focus the Department's resources on resolving chronic crime and disorder problems; it is Chicago's version of New York City's famous "Compstat." New information systems and computerized crime mapping capabilities developed by the Department deliver expanded and more timely information to assist district management teams in making their plans, while headquarters uses the same data to evaluate how well they are doing. Data terminals are installed in patrol cars, and the city's Office of Emergency Management and Communications manages police and fire calls using a sophisticated and highly computerized dispatching system.

This report examines CAPS progress through the end of 2003, more than ten years after its inception. The first section summarizes what we have learned about citizen involvement in the program, through an analysis of beat meetings and district advisory committees. The next section describes changes over time in Chicagoans' assessments of the quality of police service. Next is a description of trends in crime and fear in Chicago's neighborhoods, followed by a description of CAPS problem-solving efforts and trends in neighborhood problems. Then we

present an in-depth look at conditions in the Latino community. The report concludes with an analysis of new management initiatives within the Police Department aimed at enhancing the implementation of Department priorities.

### **Public Involvement**

While the definition of community policing varies from place to place, three elements lie at the core of the concept: public involvement, problem-solving and agency partnerships. This section of *CAPS at Ten* focuses on the first of these key elements, public involvement. Later sections address the other components of Chicago's program. This part examines trends in awareness of CAPS and trends in beat meeting participation. Some details are presented on who attends the meetings and how CAPS has been marketed to the public. An evaluation of the quality of beat meetings, public satisfaction with the meetings and their representativeness is included. We also make our own recommendations about how to improve them, and address the related issue of the effectiveness of district advisory committees.

This report makes extensive use of surveys that have been conducted regularly by the CAPS evaluation team. Parts also rely heavily on the findings of a study of meetings in a sample of 130 beats. Surveys were conducted by telephone in both English and Spanish, using randomized procedures to ensure that households not listed in the printed directory were included. Only residents 18 years of age and older were interviewed. No surveys were conducted in 2000 and 2002; the latest was completed in spring 2003.<sup>1</sup> On three occasions our observers attended samples of hundreds of beat meetings to observe what took place and to survey the residents and police officers who were there. The most recent study was conducted in summer 2002, when observers attended 291 meetings that took place in a sample of 130 police beats. At that time they surveyed 3,700 residents and 640 police officers, and completed observation forms detailing how meetings were conducted and what was discussed. In addition, we regularly collected and analyzed internal reports submitted by police officers who attend the meetings. Over the course of the CAPS evaluation, hundreds of personal interviews focusing on public-involvement issues have been conducted with police officers, city officials, and community activists throughout the city.

### **Trends in Awareness of CAPS**

Because it is a participatory program, CAPS depends on the effectiveness of campaigns to bring it to the public's attention and on the success of efforts to get the public involved in beat meetings and other district projects. The surveys enable us to track the public's awareness and involvement in community policing in Chicago. Table 1 presents results of surveys conducted

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<sup>1</sup> In households with more than one adult, one was chosen at random to represent the family. Interview results have been weighted to correct for multi-telephone homes and multi-adult families. During 1994-96 the surveys included 1,300 to 1,800 respondents. During 1997-99 they involved 2,800 to 3,000 respondents. In 2001 just over 2,500 individuals were interviewed, and 3,140 participated in 2003. The most conservative response rates for the surveys ranged between 35 and 60 percent, declining somewhat over time.

since 1996, the first year in which a complete set of awareness questions was included. It combines responses to two questions, the first asking if respondents were familiar with a “community policing program” in Chicago, and the second – only asked if they did not recognize that concept – if they were aware of CAPS.

As Table 1 documents, awareness of CAPS grew swiftly between 1996 and 1998, and then leveled off at 80 percent. Awareness among whites has since hovered at about that level, while awareness continued to grow a bit among the city’s African-Americans. By 2003, fully 89 percent of African-Americans knew about CAPS when questioned by survey interviewers. Awareness was lower and grew more slowly among Latinos, among whom it peaked at 73 percent in 1999. The 2001 survey documented an apparent 5 percent drop in awareness among Latinos, the first real setback for the program.

More details about these trends are found in Table 1. As it indicates, CAPS awareness dropped most among Latinos who preferred to be interviewed in Spanish rather than in English. In this report they are dubbed “Spanish-speakers,” a distinction that turns out to be important in many issues covered by the surveys. CAPS awareness in this group dropped by a full 12 percentage points, from 68 percent in 1999 to 56 percent in 2003. By contrast, awareness among Latinos who in 2003 were interviewed in English stood at 86 percent. Smaller but statistically significant drops in CAPS awareness are also apparent among younger adults, men, and lower income respondents.

Table 1  
Personal Background and Awareness of CAPS, 1996-2003


	1996	1997	1998	1999	2001	2003		1996	1997	1998	1999	2001	2003
Total percent	53	69	79	79	79	80	Number of cases	1,868	3,066	2,937	2,871	2,485	3,141
White	52	73	79	80	80	81	Non-graduate	42	54	62	68	64	65
Black	58	73	84	84	87	89	High school grad	56	73	83	82	82	83
Latino	50	60	72	73	68	70	Renter	50	66	75	75	72	74
Latinos Only							Homeowner	58	73	83	83	87	85
Spanish	48	52	65	68	58	56	Lower income	47	59	69	72	68	68
English	54	72	81	81	83	86	Moderate income	58	76	84	84	85	86
Age 18-29	46	56	76	76	71	69	Female	51	66	76	76	78	80
Age 30-49	61	73	83	83	83	84	Male	58	74	83	84	79	79
Age 50-64	54	74	79	80	83	86							
Age 65+	46	57	65	74	76	77							

Note: subgroup percentages for all but racial groups are based on data weighted to standardize the racial composition of the samples across years.

## Sources of Information About CAPS

How do people learn about CAPS? To probe this, the surveys included a follow-up question for everyone who is aware of the program. They are asked, “How did you hear about it?” “Did you receive some printed information on community policing?” “Did you hear about it on TV or the radio, did you see a sign or poster, or did you hear about it from someone else?” Respondents are encouraged to recall all of the ways they have heard about the program, and interviewers record up to the first five mentioned. The most common ways in which people have heard about CAPS are illustrated in Figure 1, which is based on all respondents and presents the percentage of Chicagoans who have heard of CAPS via the most frequently mentioned sources.

Figure 1  
Sources of CAPS Awareness, 1996-2003



Every year, the largest source of information about the program is television. At its peak in 1999, 46 percent of Chicagoans (and almost 60 percent of those who knew about CAPS) recalled hearing about CAPS on television, up from only 17 percent in 1996. CAPS is covered not only on news and public-affairs programs, but also on the city’s two public-access cable stations. The cable stations feature frequent replays of a half-hour “Crime Watch” series produced by the city, and there is occasional coverage of CAPS on other city cable programs. Since the 1990s the city also has been purchasing commercial time on English and Spanish-language radio and television stations. In 2003, for example, \$950,000 was spent on television advertising. Although almost every category of Chicagoan indicated that television was linked to

than others to do so. Fully 70 percent of Spanish-speaking Latinos who knew about CAPS indicated they had learned about it at least in part via television. Interestingly, the more involved people are in community organizations and institutions such as local school councils, the less likely they are to identify television as a source of information about CAPS.

The second most frequent way people recall hearing about CAPS is word of mouth, including from a neighbor or friend. The “buzz” surrounding CAPS has risen every year, as illustrated in Figure 1. In 2003 it reached 28 percent of all Chicagoans and was cited as a source of information by 35 percent of those who knew about the program. Personal conversations were cited more often by older residents and homeowners, and especially by people who are involved in community activities. Almost 55 percent of those involved in three or four community groups reported hearing about CAPS from other people, compared to only 29 percent of those not involved at all. Spanish-speaking Latinos were also particularly unlikely to report hearing about CAPS from other people.

There has also been a noticeable increase in the extent to which people report receiving printed matter (brochures, flyers and newsletters) about CAPS and seeing posters or signs. Printed matter was mentioned by 19 percent of those interviewed in 2003, and 15 percent of respondents indicated seeing posters or signs. The city’s civilian-staffed CAPS Implementation Office plays an important role in distributing program materials to community organizations, libraries, businesses, churches and schools. In 1998 the office mailed 130,000 newsletters in English and Spanish to city households, and it has received sponsorship for mailings in selected areas. City employees receive information about CAPS and beat meetings at work. Police districts distribute neighborhood watch signs and anti-panhandling posters that mention CAPS. During the 1990s the Implementation Office placed advertising on Chicago Transit Authority vehicles and platforms, and purchased billboard ads. A small but steady percentage of families reports receiving CAPS information carried home by their children from school.

Newspapers are less-cited as a source of information about community policing. In 2003, 13 percent of all adults indicated they had read about CAPS in a citywide or local community newspaper. Attentive newspaper readers tend to be older, better-educated, higher-income homeowners. In 2003, people over age 65 who had heard of CAPS were almost four times as likely to cite newspapers than were those under age 30. The difference between college graduates and those without a high school diploma was almost as large, and very few Spanish-speaking Latinos reported relying on newspapers for information on CAPS.

The city continues to sponsor events that promote the program. The CAPS Implementation Office conducts daylong workshops for community activists that feature seminars on topics ranging from running effective beat community meetings to court advocacy. An “appreciation night” event is held yearly for several thousand CAPS volunteers. On a smaller scale, CAPS outreach workers attend the festivals that flourish during the summer months in Chicago. Booths are set up where workers explain CAPS and encourage participation in beat community meetings and involvement in programs, such as court advocacy, that are organized through local district advisory committees. Organizers working for the Implementation Office

appear at community meetings and other public venues to encourage involvement in the program. Staff members are also involved in ongoing rounds of marches, rallies, prayer vigils and smoke-outs (group barbecues held at gang- or drug-infested sites). Each year, National Night Out is an occasion for events in all 25 police districts. Finally, a catalog of CAPS promotional materials is available for distribution, including magnets, pens, pencils, rulers, t-shirts and sticky notes.

So, the high level of CAPS recognition documented by the surveys is not an accident. It is instead the product of a sophisticated marketing campaign. It may seem unusual for a city to advertise its freely available public services so widely; however, governments at all levels recognize the importance of educating the public in tandem with legislating on their behalf. For example, in the health and safety arena, media campaigns pounding home the message that “smoking stinks” and that everyone should “buckle up for safety” play an important role in increasing the effectiveness of regulation and taxation as public-policy tools. Chicago’s slogans include “Get with the beat.” Community policing depends on active citizen involvement in beat meetings, district advisory committees, court advocacy groups and other action projects, so it is important to broaden the public’s awareness of new opportunities for participation. Because CAPS represents a departure from past practice, program marketing plays an important educational function. Traditionally, police have asked the public to be their “eyes and ears,” and to call them quickly when something bad happens. CAPS calls for residents’ active involvement in problem-solving and in helping set police priorities, and is more prevention-oriented. The public not only needs to turn out, but also to understand its role in problem-solving policing. Finally, residents must understand how the program changes “business as usual” in this important and very expensive public agency, because they pay the bills. The Police Department’s budget exceeds \$1 billion, and it depends on the community for financial as well as moral support. As taxpayers, the public needs to understand the Department strategy for which they are being asked to pay.


### **Participation in Beat Meetings**

Meetings between community residents and the police who work in their neighborhood have been a regular feature of CAPS since 1993. Beat community meetings were first held in the experimental areas where CAPS was developed, and in 1995 they spread to the remainder of the city. Beat meetings are one of the most unique aspects of Chicago’s community policing program. The meetings have several purposes: they provide a forum at which police and residents can exchange information and prioritize local concerns. As they have evolved, beat community meetings have become venues for regular reports by police to the public on what they have done since the last meeting in response to problems that were discussed. They can also be a vehicle for residents to organize their own problem-solving efforts. Finally, the meetings provide an opportunity for police and residents to get acquainted, and to build mutual respect and trust.

## Trends in Participation

Beat meetings are generally held monthly at a regular time and place. Attendance varies over time, as illustrated in Figure 2, which charts monthly attendance and the cumulative attendance total since January 1995, when beat meetings began to be held citywide. Data for Figure 2 are drawn from reports that are filed by police officers who attend each gathering. Comparisons between these reports and our own observations of beat meetings indicate that the reports are a reliable guide to the number of residents and police officers who attend. Figure 2 is based on 24,568 meeting reports submitted during the period. In 1995, Chicagoans attended beat meetings about 58,600 times. In 1996 the figure was over 61,000, and by 1998 it was about 69,000. About 66,000 residents attended beat meetings in 1999 and 2000. In 2002 (the last year for which complete information is available) 67,300 people attended a total of 2,916 beat meetings. By June of 2003, Chicagoans had attended beat meetings on more than 551,700 occasions.

Figure 2  
Trends in Beat Meeting Attendance, 1995-2003




As Figure 2 indicates, beat meeting attendance is highly seasonal. It is chronically low in December and January, and reaches its maximum in July or September. May and June are also good attendance months. Statistically, attendance is affected by temperature levels and snowfall, but not by rain. The figure illustrates peak monthly attendance each year. The worst attendance on record was in December 2001. During that month of near-record cold and near-record snowfall only about 1,800 Chicagoans made it to a meeting.

Of course, there are many other kinds of meetings and participatory events associated with CAPS that are not accounted for here. In some downtown areas special meetings are held for business operators, building managers and security directors. Heavily commercial police districts have a specialized business liaison officer who works with this particular “community.” In some beats, advance sessions are held with neighborhood activists or beat facilitators to craft action plans and prepare for regular beat meetings. CAPS-sponsored marches, rallies, block parties and neighborhood assemblies, and other mass events are held virtually every weekend. The figures above also do not include participation in new Spanish-language meetings that are being held by selected districts. A substitute for beat meetings, they bring together police and residents who can work together effectively in Spanish.

### Awareness of Beat Meetings

A prerequisite for attending beat meetings is awareness that they are being held. The evaluation surveys included questions monitoring the public’s awareness of beat meetings. Awareness was surprisingly stable during the course of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, with a steady 60 percent of adults reporting that beat meetings are taking place in their neighborhood. There were differences in awareness, however; and some of these are illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3  
Awareness of Beat Meetings, 2003



One of the biggest gaps in awareness that meetings are taking place is between homeowners and renters. The figures for 2003 were typical for the entire period: 69 percent of homeowners knew about the meetings, while only 52 percent of renters knew of them. Awareness was high among Chicagoans age 50 to 64 (73 percent), and quite low among those under age 30 (46 percent). Length of residence in the neighborhood, which is linked to both age and homeownership, is also tied to awareness of both CAPS and beat meetings. In 2003, only about half of those who did not graduate from high school knew about beat meetings, and the education gap depicted in Figure 3 has remained constant at about 10 percentage points since 1994. Since 1994, awareness among African-Americans has consistently outpaced that for whites; the gap was about six percentage points in 2003. Among Latinos who were interviewed in English, beat meeting awareness stood at 57 percent, but it was only 50 percent for those interviewed in Spanish. The Spanish-English gap, which was 12 percentage points in 1999, narrowed by 2003, but only because beat meeting awareness dropped off among English-speakers. We will see later in this section that changes in awareness among all groups are mirrored in differences in who attends meetings, to the decided disadvantage of some.


### **Beat Meeting Attendance Rates**

Where is attendance high, and where is it low? To examine levels of beat meeting attendance we combined meeting reports for all of 2002 for each of the city's beats and then calculated their average meeting attendance rate. The boundaries of the city's police beats were drawn more than a decade ago in order to equalize the police workload in each, measured by a formula using calls for service. As a result, beats vary widely in population. For example, in 2000, the bottom 20 percent of the city's beats in terms of population averaged 4,400 residents, while the top 20 percent had an average of more than 19,000 residents. Therefore, to compare attendance across beats it is necessary to take into account their varying sizes. In this analysis the denominator for each beat's attendance rate is the number of residents age 18 and older, because young people rarely attend beat meetings in any neighborhood. This section examines patterns of attendance by comparing rates of participation to demographic, crime and other beat-related data. Most measures were logged to account for skewed distributions. Nine beats are excluded because their residential population is very small; they are all located either in industrial areas or in the downtown business district.

The data reveal that beat meeting attendance rates are often highest in places that might benefit from the meetings most. Attendance rates are highest in the city's predominately African-American beats, and lowest in predominately white areas. In general, attendance rates are higher in low-income, high-crime areas where people do not have much education. Attendance is also high in areas where other institutions, including schools and the health care system, have failed to serve residents well. Figure 4 illustrates these relationships, charting both the data for beats and the regression line that best describes them. The charts document the link between beat meeting attendance rates and crime, poverty, language, health, city politics and the beats' organizational capacity.

The top panel of Figure 4 illustrates the link between meeting attendance and two measures of economic well-being. The first is an index of poverty that combines beat figures for household poverty, female-headed families, public-aid recipients and concentrations of children. The other is the percentage of adults in each beat with a four-year college degree. In both instances, meeting attendance rates were lower in better-off areas. The correlation between attendance and beat poverty was  $+0.42$ . Beat meeting attendance was also lower in beats where more residents had a college education; the correlation between these two measures was  $-0.33$ . Other measures of disadvantage that are not shown in Figure 4 point to the same general conclusion. Interestingly, there is no simple link between involvement and homeownership, a factor often strongly associated with participation in volunteer and civic activities. On the other hand, 2002 attendance rates were higher in predominately African-American beats ( $+0.58$ ) and in beats with high levels of unemployment ( $+0.50$ ).

Figure 4  
Factors Associated with Beat Community Meeting Attendance, 2002



Another measure of beat disadvantage presented in Figure 4 is linguistic isolation. The U.S. Census Bureau calculates measures of the ability of adults to speak English. In Chicago, linguistic isolation – the percentage of households in which no adult speaks good English – is closely related to immigration from Mexico and Central America. Unlike other disadvantage measures, linguistic isolation is correlated with lower levels of beat meeting attendance. This flags an important challenge facing the city – one that will be discussed throughout this report: the limited involvement of Latinos in CAPS.

Beat meeting participation is higher in high-crime, drug-ridden areas. The relationship between 2002 attendance rates and the overall personal-crime rate is presented in a middle panel of Figure 4. The correlation between the two was  $+0.61$ . The link between high-volume property crimes and participation (not shown) was lower ( $+0.27$ ), but still positive. The correlations for murder and rape were  $+0.40$  and  $+0.48$ , respectively. Figure 4 also presents an analysis of the distribution of an alternative crime measure, the rate at which residents of each beat contacted the city's 911 center during 2002 with drug-related complaints. The correlation between this measure of crime and beat meeting participation rates was  $+0.58$ .

City residents are worried about a number of problems in addition to crime, represented in Figure 4 by concern about loitering. This is measured by responses given by beat residents to a survey question about “groups of people hanging out on corners or in the streets.” Residents were asked whether this was a big problem, some problem or no problem in their neighborhood. Figure 4 combines the results of surveys conducted in 1999, 2001 and 2003, in order to assemble enough respondents to characterize most police beats. As it illustrates, the correlation between the extent of resident concern about loitering and beat meeting turnout was  $+0.41$ . (The surveys will be discussed in more detail in a section below on neighborhood problems.) The link between the extent of neighborhood problems of all sorts and beat meeting attendance can be seen at other levels as well. For example, when we compare the concerns of beat residents in general with those of residents who attend meetings in the same beat, participants are much more concerned about crime, social disorder and physical decay. The bad news is that beat meeting attendance is driven by concern about crime and neighborhood decline.

The success of beat meetings in areas where other institutions have not worked well is illustrated by the relationship between beat meeting attendance and school and health factors. Attendance is higher in areas where residents have severe health problems. Figure 4 illustrates this using an estimate of the infant mortality rate for each beat; in 2002, the correlation between infant mortality and beat meeting attendance was  $+0.50$ . Not shown in Figure 4 is that attendance is also higher in beats with high rates of gonorrhea ( $+0.51$ ) and tuberculosis ( $+0.42$ ). Meeting attendance is high as well in areas where the schools have failed. The correlation between beat meeting attendance rates and a composite achievement test score for the school serving each beat was  $-0.38$ . Higher meeting attendance is also associated with low attendance and graduation rates, and high levels of truancy.

Many other measures of living conditions and the quality of life follow the same pattern. In 2002, turnout was also somewhat higher ( $+0.36$ ) in beats where a large proportion of buildings were rated by the city as in bad condition, and in beats where buildings are abandoned ( $+0.30$ ) and many parcels of land sit vacant ( $+0.40$ ).

These findings are important because they run counter to a common form of bias in social programs. Voluntary, community-based programs typically over-represent the interests of better-off, homeowners and well-established areas. For example, the City of Minneapolis attempted to organize new block clubs in previously unorganized areas, with a focus on crime and public safety issues. Professional organizers spent two years on the project, but they only succeeded in the lowest-crime, best-off blocks in the project. This pattern is so common that it is the norm to expect a “middle-class bias” in volunteer-based social programs. Around the country, it has proven difficult to sustain the involvement of residents of communities that need community policing most. However, turnout rates for Chicago’s community policing program are directly linked to measures of need. Attendance is especially high in poorer areas with bad housing, in predominately African-American beats, and in areas where schools and health programs are not effectively meeting residents’ needs. Meeting attendance is highest in high-crime areas, because attendance is driven by concern about crime.

Meeting attendance is especially high in places that are less influential in politics. As the bottom right panel of Figure 4 illustrates, attendance is highest in beats offering the least support for the incumbent mayor. For the 1999 election the correlation was  $-.56$ . There are many ways of getting things done in Chicago, and politics is one. But beat meetings provide a somewhat alternative political system, a new and non-traditional way of securing the benefits of government. Previous reports have documented that both beat meeting attendance rates and the concerns expressed by participants independently affect the distribution of selected city services, including graffiti cleanup and the rate at which abandoned cars are towed away. Such services are also affected by beat politics, but beat meetings provide residents with an additional effective way of influencing government.

## **Who Gets Involved?**

Two factors are particularly important in sustaining beat meeting attendance. One is the role community associations and local institutions play in getting the word out and mobilizing people to attend. CAPS is importantly affected by the infrastructure of organizations in each neighborhood. The other is the special role played by a relatively small cadre of dedicated beat meeting activists. Their involvement drives both meeting attendance and CAPS-related activism in problem-solving projects.

### **Community Organizations**

One of the most important factors associated with awareness and involvement in CAPS is involvement in local organizations. Such groups include classic “voluntary associations” such as block clubs, and institutions such as local churches and school-based parent groups. To measure their influence, survey respondents were asked whether they or anyone in their household was involved in a list of neighborhood-level organizations. The survey asked about their involvement in “a neighborhood watch group or a citizen patrol,” “the PTA or a local school council,” “a church or synagogue,” and “a block club or community organization.” Those with a church affiliation were asked whether it was located in the area or somewhere else; only local church

affiliations are examined here. By far, the most frequent form of involvement was church attendance. In 2003, 52 percent of all respondents were affiliated with a church, and they split almost 50-50 on whether it was in their neighborhood or elsewhere. The next most common form of involvement was participation in a block club or community organization (19 percent), followed by PTA or local school council involvement (13 percent). Involvement in a neighborhood watch group or patrol was surprisingly common (10 percent of all adults) given the reluctance of the Chicago police to support proactive citizen patrols.

Figure 5  
Organization Involvement and CAPS Participation, 2003




Figure 5 combines responses to these four questions into one measure of participation in neighborhood organizations. The bottom axis charts the percentage of households involved in zero, one, two, three or all four of these activities. As it indicates, fully 44 percent of those interviewed were not involved in any local organizations, while just 2 percent were involved in all four kinds of organizations listed.

The vertical axis of Figure 5 charts three survey measures of interest: the percentage of respondents who were aware of CAPS, aware of beat meetings, and who attended a beat meeting. The conclusion is the same in each instance: the more involved Chicagoans are in their neighborhood, the more aware and involved they are in CAPS. In terms of awareness, more than 95 percent of those involved in three or four organizations (the numbers are quite similar) knew

about CAPS, and 94 percent knew about beat meetings. At the opposite end, only 69 percent with no local affiliations knew about CAPS and 45 percent about beat meetings. The involvement gradient was just as steep. Only 7.5 percent of those without an affiliation reported attending a beat meeting in the past year, while the figure for those reporting the most extensive neighborhood involvement was 60 percent.

The significant role played by the organizational infrastructure in sustaining CAPS awareness and involvement was also illustrated in Figure 4 above. The lower-right panel depicted the neighborhood-level relationship between beat meeting attendance and a survey measure of the average level of organizational involvement by beat residents. Like other survey-based measures in Figure 4, it was based on combined 1999, 2001 and 2003 surveys. As Figure 4 indicated, the correlation between neighborhood levels of organizational involvement and beat meeting turnout was  $+0.46$ .

Why are these forms of involvement so closely linked? One obvious reason is that people who are active in community affairs are much more likely to hear about CAPS and the opportunities it presents for participation. In the 2003 survey, the more involved people were in organizations and local institutions, the more they reported hearing about CAPS from other people. Church affiliation was linked to hearing about it through church, and being a PTA or local school council member was associated with hearing about it through school. Involved people are busy people, so it should come as no surprise that more active residents were less likely than others to report learning about CAPS from television! Some of these associations are also linked to demography. For example, African-Americans are particularly likely to report affiliation with a church, and they are more likely than any other group to know about and to participate in CAPS activities. Homeownership, longtime residence in the neighborhood, and age are associated with both community and CAPS involvement. At the other end, Latinos report low levels of neighborhood involvement across the board, and low levels of CAPS awareness and participation.

The difficulty for CAPS, of course, is that the bulk of the population lies near the low-involvement end of the scale. More than 80 percent of adult Chicagoans reported no or just one form of local involvement – usually church affiliation. But involvement in a neighborhood church made a difference in CAPS awareness and participation. As we will see below, just under 30 percent of all beat meetings are held in churches, and during 2002 a new awareness-building initiative by the Chicago police centered on the city's churches, so this should be no surprise.

### **Frequent Participants**

A second key factor sustaining beat meeting involvement is the key role played by relatively small cadres of frequent participants. Such participants attend a large fraction of their beat's meetings every year, and in doing so they drive up attendance totals. They are also very likely to be involved in the kinds of activist projects that the CAPS architects envisioned for neighborhood residents.

The mathematics of the contribution of frequent participants to overall beat meeting attendance is simple. Our 2003 city survey asked beat meeting participants how many meetings they had attended in the past year. Most attended just one or two meetings, and 66 percent of

those interviewed reported attending three meetings or fewer. However, the remaining one-third of participants attended a lot more. The average beat meets about 10 times a year, so we classified those who attended five or more meetings annually – about half the total – as frequent participants. They make up 20 percent of all beat meeting participants, but multiplying this by the frequency with which they attend reveals that frequent participants constitute 56 percent of all those who show up in the course of a year. More participants – 25 percent – show up just once for a meeting, but over the course of a year they account for only about 20 percent of their beat’s total attendance.


As a result, a beat’s attendance rate is very sensitive to the size of its cadre of frequent participants. The number of frequent participants is one of the biggest determinants of a beat’s yearly attendance rate. Beats – and beat team sergeants – blessed with a loyal contingent of participants can bask in the glow of high attendance rates, while those burdened with a less frequently active population face the never-ending task of recruiting new faces each month. Finding and fostering a local cadre of frequent participants is the surest road to sustaining high turnout rates.

Who are these frequent participants? Figure 6, compiled from 2003 data, describes them by charting the percentage that fall into the frequent-participant (five or more meetings) category. Differences among the groups are quite distinctive. Perhaps the most notable are linked to race and language. The disadvantage Latinos face is evident in Figure 6. Only 13 percent of English-speaking Latinos, and just 9 percent of Spanish-speakers, fell in the frequent participant category. More than a third of African-American participants and one-quarter of whites were frequent participants, on the other hand. Age differences were very strong as well. Older Chicagoans were the most likely to participate frequently: 37 percent of those over age 65 were classed as frequent participants, contrasted with only 18 percent of those under age 30. Age is also associated with two other factors examined in Figure 6, having children at home and labor force participation. Those with no children were twice as likely to report attending many meetings in the course of a year, and so were those with no job to go to the next day. Participation in neighborhood organizations, a factor that was examined earlier in this section, was linked to frequent participation as well.

Those who show up often are more concerned about the neighborhood. The survey included a battery of questions asking about the extent of various neighborhood problems, and Figure 6 divides respondents into high- and low-concern groups, based on their responses. (These questions are examined in much more detail later in this report.) The more concerned people were, the more frequently they attended beat meetings. In short, frequent participants are rooted in their community; they have time on their hands; and they are worried.

It is important to note that elements of this demographic profile work in concert against Latino involvement. On most dimensions Latinos are concentrated in the “infrequent-involvement” category. In terms of age, in the 2003 city survey only 6 percent of Latinos – as compared to 25 percent of African-Americans and 21 percent of whites – were in the age 65 and older category, a high-participation age group. Latinos were by far the most likely to have

Figure 6  
Frequent (5+) Beat Meeting Participants, 2003



children living at home. Among Latinos as a whole, 66 percent reported having children at home, compared to 43 percent for African-Americans and 22 percent of whites. For Spanish-speaking Latinos the figure was 72 percent. More than 70 percent of Latinos, 73 percent of whites and 60 percent of African-Americans were working at the time they were interviewed. Finally, Latinos are particularly unlikely to be connected to their community through organizational ties, including church attendance. In the 2003 survey, 64 percent reported being active in no neighborhood groups or institutions. Among whites, 55 percent reported being similarly cut off, and only 50 percent of African-Americans. The demography of the city's growing Latino community thus worked against their frequent involvement in beat meetings and involvement in CAPS problem-solving efforts.

Another reason to foster a local cadre of beat meeting participants is that they also become heavily involved in action projects. The role of activists in community problem-solving will be addressed in detail in a later section of the report. However, loyal meeting participants play a central part in that story. During the 2002 beat meeting study, observers surveyed participants. The questionnaire included a checklist of activities in which they might be involved. These formed two clusters, and frequent participants were heavily involved in both of them. One cluster of activities involved "aggressive activism." This category includes "in your face" activities such as marches, prayer vigils, positive loitering, parent patrols and neighborhood patrols. The other cluster reflected involvement in CAPS neighborhood projects ranging from attending neighborhood assemblies to being a court advocate, working on liquor-

control projects and organizing neighborhood groups. Three-quarters of the frequent participants were involved in neighborhood projects and 43 percent in aggressive activism.

## **Marketing CAPS**

Over time, the variety of meetings involving police and the public has grown. A few large and diverse beats have been subdivided and regularly hold separate meetings. Beginning in 2002, meetings in a number of beats plagued by low turnout were merged with those in adjacent beats to boost attendance. The Department also began to experiment with holding meetings at new times and days, including – for the first time – on Saturdays. Beats in some commercial areas convene only quarterly, and many who attend these meetings represent businesses. Police districts and individual beats sponsor other kinds of assemblies as well, including marches; rallies and block parties that involve considerable numbers of residents; smaller meetings between police and neighborhood activists or ministers; and neighborhood watch and cell-phone patrol groups.

Police are also directly involved in turnout projects. In July 2002, police distributed promotional flyers to 202 Catholic churches for inclusion in their weekly bulletins. Flyers were in English, Spanish and Polish, and included beat maps and a beat meeting schedule. The Department estimates that 136,200 copies were ultimately distributed. In September 2002 similar flyers were distributed to 25 synagogues. The CAPS Implementation Office took responsibility for distributing flyers to Protestant churches. In the districts, police officers distribute flyers and hang posters in businesses and apartment building entryways. Their community policing offices maintain mailing lists based on sign-up sheets completed at beat meetings. School children bring home announcements of beat meetings, and computer-savvy residents can check meeting schedules via the Internet.

Finally, in a somewhat recent development, Spanish-language meetings are being held at the district level. These are intended to match officers and residents who can most effectively collaborate in Spanish. However, when we attended a session that was billed as a “Spanish-speaking district wide meeting,” none of the police officers spoke Spanish at all. Community leaders and aldermanic representatives occasionally shared with them the gist of what was going on at this standing-room-only meeting.

## **Efforts to Improve Beat Meetings**

CAPS planners had a clear vision of how beat community meetings were to be conducted and what was to happen at them. Meetings were to facilitate interaction and help build trust between neighborhood residents and police officers who worked in the beat. They were to provide a forum for sharing information, identifying problems and making action plans. Both police and citizens were expected to take responsibility for problem-solving projects, and beat meetings were to provide a venue for everyone to regularly review efforts and assess how well they were doing. In particular, they were to involve working police officers, not the neighborhood relations specialists whom the Department previously sent out to attend public meetings.

However, evaluation reports issued during the 1990s documented that many beat meetings did not go according to plan. Beat officers did not assume their intended leadership role, and in many districts neighborhood relations specialists rather than beat officers stepped into the breach. Nor did residents play a leadership role at meetings. Too many meetings floundered without a clear agenda. Not much crime information was shared. Many complaints were voiced about neighborhood conditions, but few solutions were proposed, especially by residents. Most police officers sat mute in the back of the room with their arms folded.

But as the 1999 evaluation report was being prepared, the Department established a new CAPS Project Office, charged with rethinking some of the core elements of the program and re-energizing CAPS' implementation. The Project Office conducted a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of the Department's problem-solving strategies and investigated how well key elements of CAPS were being implemented. This involved Project Office staffers attending meetings and observing the program in action, as well as interviewing many district officers. Among the many changes announced was a new set of guidelines for beat meetings. To increase the amount of problem-solving discussion at beat meetings, the guidelines require that participants prioritize crime and disorder problems at the meetings and make preliminary plans for addressing them. Meeting participants are to analyze priority problems and identify specific tasks to be carried out by community members, beat officers and city service agencies. Beat sergeants are to develop timetables for carrying out these tasks and assign responsibility for them. The guidelines also require officers to review their own progress on previously identified problems at beat meetings. Examples of model written agendas and informational materials that are to be distributed at the meetings are included in the guidelines as well. The guidelines and subsequent orders created a coherent new picture of how beat meetings are to proceed.

The CAPS Project Office also began conducting training sessions for civilian beat leaders, beat officers and sergeants. Sessions included segments on how to conduct more productive beat meetings. However, as of the end of 2003, the most recent training was conducted in June 2002. More time is now being spent on beat meetings during promotion training for new sergeants, who are matched with current beat team leaders when they arrive in their new district. This reflects the reality that being a beat sergeant is not perceived as a particularly desirable job, because it involves additional work and responsibilities without additional pay. The task is typically handed down to new sergeants when they appear in a district.

Early in 2000, the CAPS Project Office was merged into a new Office of Management Accountability. This headquarters unit has the larger mission of ensuring that the Department's priorities and plans are actually carried out. Another key unit, Auditing and Internal Control ("the inspectors"), was also merged into the Office of Management Accountability. Beat meetings are now routinely monitored as part of the Department's internal inspections process. Inspectors from Auditing and Internal Control appear unexpectedly to examine district records and procedures, and they have been given the additional task of attending beat meetings and completing checklist reviews of how well beat meetings measure up to the Department's standards. Inspectors check availability of printed agendas and crime reports; note whether

progress on previously discussed problems is reviewed and new problems identified; watch to see if steps in the Department's official problem-solving model are applied during the discussion; and observe whether tasks were identified for residents, police officers and city service agencies. Inspectors also verify the number of residents and police officers present, as a check on meeting reports filed by beat sergeants. In addition, sergeants from the CAPS Project Office typically attend four beat meetings a week to observe how they are being conducted. When they observe good meetings, the sergeants write letters of commendation to the beat team leaders, officers and facilitators involved.

### **Trends in Beat Meeting Quality**

Despite efforts toward improvement, it is still often the case that there is some slippage between plans and practice in large organizations like the Chicago Police Department. On three occasions the CAPS evaluation has conducted large-scale observation studies to determine how closely activities in the field actually reflect the plans made downtown. Trained observers complete extensive observation forms that include, among many other factors, elements of a "model beat meeting." The information gathered in the field can be used to rate the extent to which each meeting resembles an ideal gathering. Some dimensions on which meetings were evaluated are summarized in Table 2. The 1998 study reached meetings in 254 beats in an attempt to observe all of them, while the 2002 study was confined to a random sample of 130 beats. A 1995 study involved 161 beats clustered in selected districts. Thus, the sample did not, strictly speaking, represent the entire city. Between the 1998 and 2002 studies there were paired observations in 120 beats, and 72 of the beats observed in 1995 also fell into the 2002 study. This discussion focuses on what took place in the 120 matched beats – because they were involved in the two major studies – and emphasizes the 1998 and 2002 studies because they were more recent. However, as Table 2 indicates, other comparisons would come to the same general conclusions, for the matched beats are quite representative of the city as a whole.<sup>2</sup>

The first two components in Table 2 summarize some simple meeting mechanics. The observers reported that a clear agenda was presented, either in print form or clearly announced, at 89 percent of the 2002 meetings. This was up from 66 percent in 1998, a 23 percent improvement. There was also a great deal of formal information-sharing by police. The CPD's crime-analysis system produces a variety of reader-friendly maps, crime lists and reports, and Department guidelines call for this kind of information to be distributed at beat meetings. This happened at 90 percent of the 2002 meetings, representing a 22 percent increase over the figure for 1998.

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<sup>2</sup> A detailed description of this study and all of the data collection instruments is presented in Project Working Paper # 26, *The 2002 Beat Meeting Observation Study*, by Jason Bennis, Wesley G. Skogan and Lynn Steiner. It can be found at the evaluation's website: [www.northwestern.edu/IPR/publications/policing.html](http://www.northwestern.edu/IPR/publications/policing.html).

Table 2  
Components of a Model Meeting, 1998 and 2002

Components of Model Beat Meeting Rating		All Beats in Each Study			Matched Beats	
		1995	1998	2002	1998	2002
<i>Agenda</i>	Was there a printed or verbal agenda for the meeting?	41	64	87	66	89
<i>Information</i>	Were crime maps or crime reports handed out?	60	69	91	68	90
<i>Facilitator</i>	Was there a civilian facilitator for the meeting?	nd	67	75	66	75
<i>Identification</i>	Were problems or issues identified at the meeting?	97	100	100	100	100
<i>Solutions</i>	Were solutions proposed for problems that were identified?	96	77	74	80	76
<i>Resident Feedback</i>	Did residents report back on previous problem-solving efforts?	35	35	44	32	47
<i>Officer Feedback</i>	Did police officers report back on previous problem-solving efforts?	51	60	72	65	73
<i>Volunteers</i>	Were volunteers called for or sign-up sheets passed around?	51	41	25	42	25
<i>Action Component</i>	Did residents leave the meeting with a commitment to future action?	nd	35	24	38	26
<i>Meeting Effectiveness</i>	rating of the effectiveness with which the meeting was run: very effective	nd	14	30	12	31
	fairly effective		59	55	62	56
	badly run		28	15	26	13
Number of beats		161	254	130	120	120

Note: "nd" indicates measures not included in 1995 study.

Under the Department's guidelines, a civilian facilitator is to be identified for each beat. Facilitators are to help organize and conduct the meetings. In a 1997 Department guideline it was noted that beat facilitators serve ". . . as a 'translator' or 'communicator' between beat residents and stakeholders and between these groups and the police." Their list of possible duties included assisting in planning agendas and chairing meetings, helping publicize sessions and following up on problem-solving activities by community members. Facilitators are locally selected (usually by the beat team sergeant), and beat facilitator training sessions are held on several occasions each year. In some areas facilitators serve on district advisory committees, to represent their beat. Observers noted whether civilian facilitators were present at the meetings, but doing so was dependent on facilitators being introduced or otherwise identified. Observers confirmed that facilitators were present at 75 percent of the 2002 meetings – a 9 percent increase over 1998.

The core function of beat meetings is to exchange information about problems and to identify possible solutions to neighborhood problems. Beat meetings provide the primary vehicle for citizen involvement in community policing in Chicago, a venue at which residents can influence police priorities. Officers who work the beat from all three shifts are usually represented at the meetings so they can all participate in the discussion. All officers in the Department's Patrol Division have been trained to employ a five-step process that features identifying and analyzing problems, developing and implementing solutions to them, and assessing the effectiveness of what they have accomplished. These problem-solving steps were also woven into the curriculum of a massive training program for neighborhood residents conducted in 1995 and 1996, eventually involving more than 12,000 people.

Observations in the field indicate a great deal of variation in the extent to which different elements of Chicago's problem-solving model are actually enacted at beat meetings. As Table 2 documents, there is no difficulty in identifying problems; this is a nearly universal feature of beat meetings. Most such discussion was initiated by residents; in 2002, police dominated the discussion of problems at only 10 percent of meetings, down from 16 percent in 1998. Solutions to problems that are broached are discussed less often, however. Solutions were proposed at about three-quarters of all meetings in 2002, down a bit from 1998 and very much less common than it was in 1995, when CAPS was new. The observers also noted who was most likely to suggest solutions, when they were discussed. Police took the leading role in proposing solutions at more than half of the meetings; police and residents made a fairly equal contribution at 28 percent; and residents took the lead at only 17 percent of the meetings.

Follow-up reports at beat meetings are another important aspect of the process. Reports on problem-solving efforts presented at beat meetings serve several functions. They help make it clear to participants that attending "pays off" – that they should attend because something actually happens as a result of the meetings. Reports on residents' problem-solving efforts help sustain the enthusiasm of participants for the process, for they illustrate residents' contributions and may encourage others to join in. Beat meetings also provide a forum at which residents hold beat officers accountable. Calling for reports on their efforts since the last meeting helps residents ensure that police and city service agencies actually follow up on problems discussed at these sessions. In this regard, well-functioning Chicago beat meetings are a remarkable institution. At best, they provide a tight link between residents' preferences and the operation of their government; it is difficult to identify any other institution of governance that does so as quickly and intimately. As Table 2 indicates, observers found that police contributed reports of their problem-solving efforts fairly often – at 73 percent of the meetings, up from 65 percent in 1998. There were fewer positive contributions by residents; only 47 percent of the meetings featured residents discussing their own efforts. However, this also represented an increase, up from only 32 percent in 1998.

Because sustaining effective citizen participation in problem-solving has proven difficult in many areas of the city, our observers also kept note of the role of beat meetings in mobilizing participants. Results indicate beat meetings are not very effective at stirring up residents, and in fact their effectiveness appears to be declining. One factor observers watched for was whether volunteers were called for or sign-up sheets were distributed at the meeting to engage

participants in particular activities. They found that this occurred at 25 percent of the 2002 meetings. This represented a significant decline in citizen mobilization at beat meetings since 1998, when that figure stood at 42 percent, and an even larger decline – down by half – since the 1995 beat meeting study. In addition, observers made a critical summary judgment at the end of each session as to whether residents left the meeting with a commitment to future action. When participants leave knowing both what needs to be done as well as their role in those efforts, beat meetings may have a greater impact than when there is no commitment to any clear action. Observers were to assess each meeting on the basis of calls for volunteers, announcements of other meetings or activities and action plans discussed. Based on these criteria, they judged that only 26 percent of the meetings met the standard of having an “action component,” down from 38 percent in 1998.

Finally, at the end of each session observers also judged the overall effectiveness with which the meeting was run. This was clearly a judgment call, one that took into account many factors not explicitly included in our model meeting evaluation standard. (An example would be if the meeting actually followed the agenda.) In their judgment, about 30 percent of the 2002 meetings were “very effectively run,” half were rated “fairly effectively run” and 13 percent were judged to be “badly run.” This was a decided improvement over 1998. Between 1998 and 2002 the percentage of meetings that were badly run dropped by half, and those that were very well run more than doubled. Who ran the meeting made a difference. In general, officers who played leadership roles got somewhat higher marks than did civilians; however, meetings led jointly by police officers and a resident were judged on the whole to be even better run.

There was another important change in the nature of beat meetings between 1998 and 2002. As part of a general crackdown on overtime expenses, in spring 2002 the Department announced that fewer off-duty officers would be attending beat meetings, and that the meetings should last no longer than one hour. There was considerable furor over the first decision, for residents feared they would lose contact with beat officers who were not working in the early evening, when meetings typically are held. This part of the cost-reduction plan was said to be suspended after several months, but shorter meetings were still the rule. Effects of these edicts can be seen in the observation data. In 1998, an average of 6.9 officers attended the matched meetings we observed, and the median attendance was seven officers. In 2002, the average number of officers attending had dropped to 5.7, and the median to five officers. In 1998, the average meeting lasted 96 minutes, with a median length of 99 minutes; in 2002 the average meeting lasted 60 minutes, and the median was also 60 minutes. In short, the effects of this efficiency push were substantial. Beat meetings got a lot shorter (at the median, shorter by 40 percent), and noticeably fewer officers attended each time.

To summarize all of these factors, a model-meeting index was created by summing each of the 10 components listed in Table 2. The index set a high standard by counting only meetings judged to be very effective; otherwise, the index components were either present or absent in each case. A value of “one” was added to the index whenever a facilitator was present, when solutions were identified for problems, if officers offered feedback on their efforts, and when other components of a model meeting were apparent. The resulting index could range in value from zero to ten. When elements of the meetings were combined for the 120 matched beats, the

average meeting score in 1998 was 5.6. In other words, the usual meeting met a bit more than half of our criteria. In 1998, 13 percent of the matched sample of beats received a very poor score (meeting three or fewer of the 10 criteria), while 18 percent were very highly rated, meeting eight or more criteria.

By this measure there was progress. In particular, there were fewer very poor meetings in 2002. In that year, only 3 percent of meetings received a very poor score (in the 1 to 3 point range), down from 13 percent in 1998. On the opposite end of the spectrum, 23 percent received high marks (8 to 10 points) in 2002, up a bit from 18 percent. The overall average score increased from 5.6 points to 6.2 points. However, the substantial improvements we observed in the mechanics of meetings and the feedback delivered were counterbalanced by the declining role that beat meetings play in mobilizing residents to take action on their own.

What seemed to contribute to better meetings? One factor is collaborative leadership by police and residents. The highest-rated meetings were led jointly by residents and a police officer. Just below these came meetings led by civilian facilitators or by beat team sergeants. Among the components of the model-meeting index, civilian- or jointly led meetings were more likely to have clear agendas, but so were the meetings run by sergeants. Civilian-led meetings were more likely to include calls for volunteers and to be judged as concluding with a commitment to action. Civilian-run meetings were also more likely to feature follow-up reports from residents about their problem-solving activities. Meetings conducted solely by beat officers, or by staff members of the district's Community Policing Office, came off worst on our model meeting index. Observers also rated each meeting on whether it had been dominated by police or by residents, or whether the two groups played roughly equal roles. Meetings involving both police and residents about equally came off best on the model-meeting index, and this kind of equality of participation increased from 45 percent of meetings in 1998 to 57 percent in 2002. When it came to identifying problems and solutions, meetings involving residents in the discussion came off better as well. Only 3 percent of meetings we observed were conducted – even in part – in any language other than English, and those that involved Spanish or Polish (the only others we saw in action) received significantly lower model-meeting scores. Finally, observers noted that 21 percent of beat meetings in 2002 opened or closed with a prayer. These meetings scored higher than did meetings that did not, so perhaps those prayers were answered!

Very important to note about the CPD's "re-engineering" of beat meetings in 1999 is that it appears to have largely broken the link between neighborhood disadvantage and the quality of beat meetings. The 1998 study found beat meetings were better in better-off places. In 1998, beats with high levels of poverty, many broken families, poor housing conditions, larger numbers of abandoned buildings and vacant lots, poor school attendance figures and rapid population turnover received lower scores on the model-meeting index. Beats with high levels of personal or property crime received lower scores in 1998. Ironically, in 1998 beat meetings were most likely to "go by the book" in lower-crime, better-off areas. However, by 2002 these relationships had all weakened or disappeared completely. The strength of the link between poverty, crime rates and bad meetings dropped by about half, and the correlations were no longer statistically significant. In 1998, the best meetings were those that were best attended; by 2002, big and small meetings were receiving about the same – and on average higher – ratings.

While there may be other explanations for this change in the distribution of meetings, the change is consistent with the Department's re-engineering plan. The adoption of clear procedures, model agendas, lists of materials to be distributed, training for officers and beat facilitators, special training for beat sergeants and internal inspections, were all intended to increase the quality of beat meetings and to standardize their operations. Between 1998 and 2002, there was clear movement in the direction of both goals.

## **Public Satisfaction**

Another dimension on which beat meetings can be rated is public satisfaction with what goes on at them. Evaluation surveys have monitored the views of beat meeting participants since 1995, when they became a citywide feature of CAPS. In recent years about 15 percent of survey respondents report attending a meeting. This stability in self-reported attendance is consistent with the general stability in beat meeting attendance reported earlier, as measured by reports filed by officers who attend. Those who indicated that they attended one or more meetings during the past year are asked follow-up questions that focus on the core function of beat meetings, which is the exchange of information about neighborhood problems and the formulation of action plans. Survey respondents are asked:

Did you learn anything as a result of attending the meeting(s)? (yes or no)


Was any action taken or did anything happen in your neighborhood as a result of the meeting(s)? (yes or no)

How useful do you think these meetings were for finding solutions to neighborhood problems? Were they very useful, somewhat useful, or not very useful?

The left panel of Figure 7 charts trends in positive views of meetings from 1995 to 2003. It reports the percentage of beat meeting participants who reported they had learned something at the meeting, that (in their judgment) action had taken place as a result of the meetings, and that they found the meetings "very useful" for finding solutions to neighborhood problems.

Figure 7 indicates that, in the eyes of the participating public, the effectiveness of beat meetings picked up during the 1990s and then declined almost to their original level. In 1998, almost three-quarters of those attending indicated they had seen actions taken because of the meetings, a figure that dropped below 60 percent by 2003. In 1999, 54 percent thought the meetings were very useful for solving problems, a number that later dropped a bit, to 48 percent. It is important to note that, virtually throughout, more than 80 percent of Chicagoans continued to think they had learned something at the meetings. However, on none of the measures was there much overall progress between 1995 and 2003. The right panels in Figure 7 track changes in the latter two measures by race. The results are mixed. There was a general decline in the likelihood that beat meeting participants would report they had seen action taken in their neighborhood because of the meetings, but judgments that the meetings are very useful for findings solutions to problems did not decline among African-Americans or Latinos.

Figure 7  
Trends in Satisfaction with Beat Meetings, 1995-2003



Ironically, this decline in satisfaction with meetings came during a period when they began to hew more closely to the Department’s model. This was, however, a period of apparently declining public involvement in the process. At meetings there were fewer calls for volunteers or announcements of participatory events, and the “action component” of the meetings was judged to have declined. Compared to when opinion was at its peak, by 2003 not much was happening at meetings to harness the energies of participants in solving neighborhood problems.

### Representativeness

Another standard by which to assess beat meeting quality is their representativeness. Beat meetings are the principal vehicle by which police monitor the opinions of Chicagoans, and they are the most significant venue at which residents can speak up and hope to have their voices heard. But only a small percentage of beat residents attend the meetings. Although in 2000 the average beat was home to about 7,800 adults, a good meeting by Chicago standards draws about 30 residents – only about 0.4 percent of the adult population. (By contrast, in the average beat about 28 percent of age-eligible residents turned out for the 1995 general mayoral election.) Because of the small turnout, a particularly important question is whether beat meetings represent residents’ interests. Even a small meeting can do this effectively if those who attend

adequately articulate the concerns of the general public, but they may not. As discussed earlier, many voluntary action programs have a strong middle-class bias. This does not appear to be a factor that strongly affects turnout for Chicago's beat meetings, but it may affect their representativeness. Here we ask two representational questions about beat meetings: do they reflect the social and economic composition of the beat, and do they represent the problems concerning beat residents?

### **Demographic Representation**


The first question is, To what extent do those who attended beat meetings resemble their neighbors? The answer involves comparisons like those in Figure 8, which describes the relationship between the demographic composition of beats and the background of those who attend meetings held there. Information about beat residents is based on U.S. Census data for 2000. The contrasting data on beat meeting participants is drawn from questionnaires distributed by observers who attended beat meetings during 2002. Because a minimum of 10 survey respondents is required to fairly characterize a beat, there are complete data for 128 of the 130 study beats. A total of 3,656 residents responded to the survey in those beats.

The right panel of Figure 8 examines the match between the percentages of beat residents and meeting participants who owned their home – an important feature of any neighborhood. As indicated, homeowners were significantly over-represented at beat meetings. At the average meeting, 77 percent of the participants were homeowners, compared to a beat average of 44 percent. Homeowners made up a majority in more than 90 percent of the beats. The over-representation of homeowners is especially apparent at low levels of beat homeownership; this is signaled by the decelerating regression line that is the best statistical description of the relationship between the two measures. Homeownership rates are close to 100 percent at the top, so the line has to level off. As an arrow in the right panel of Figure 8 illustrate, beats that averaged about 30 percent homeowners were represented by meetings where about 70 percent of the participants were homeowners.

Figure 8 also charts the representation of the city's Latinos at beat meetings. It indicates that Latino participation tends to be low except in beats where a "critical mass" of Latinos live. There it skyrockets, as illustrated by the rapidly accelerating regression line. But there are relatively few concentrated Latino beats in the city above the "takeoff" point (only 35 beats in the city were more than 60 percent Latino by 2000), so gross under-representation of Latinos is the norm. As Figure 8 illustrates, even when beats are about 70 percent Latino, the proportion of Latinos at beat meetings is only about 40 percent.

Beat meetings over-represent other groups as well. One cleavage was around education. In the average beat 70 percent of residents were high school graduates, but an average of 88 percent of meeting participants had at least a high school degree. Older neighborhood residents were also over-represented. The areas examined here averaged 11 percent over age 65, but the beat meeting average was 24 percent – more than double the population figure. This report noted earlier that older participants also tend to attend beat meetings frequently and thus play a disproportionate role in determining beat attendance rates. Women were over represented as

Figure 8  
Demographic Representation at Beat Meetings, 2002



well. Meetings attended by observers ranged from 21 percent to 93 percent women, and averaged 64 percent female. Women constituted the majority at 86 percent of meetings and were most over-represented in African-American areas, in poor beats and in public-housing areas.

In short, on many dimensions the representation provided by Chicago's beat meetings demonstrates a strong bias. In many social programs that rely on volunteers, better-off and more established members of the community are quickest to get involved and contribute to the effort. Research on involvement in neighborhood anti-crime organizations finds that higher-income, more educated, homeowners and long-term area residents more frequently know of opportunities to participate and are more likely to get involved when they have the opportunity. In the case of beat meetings, the largest discrepancies in involvement favored high school graduates, homeowners as well as older, long-term residents. Latinos were the most under-represented racial or ethnic group. In Chicago this bias was manifested not in turnout totals, but in who turns out.

Chicago has certainly made efforts to involve Latinos more deeply in its community policing effort. The publicity campaign supporting the program features a component aimed at Spanish-speaking residents. It includes paid promotional announcements and a police-staffed talk show on Spanish-language radio; booths at festivals held in Latino neighborhoods; and wide distribution of posters, flyers and newsletters in Spanish. Spanish-speaking community organizers work for the city to generate involvement in beat meetings and problem-solving. The city's emergency communication system is staffed to handle foreign-language calls, and the Police Department itself has about 800 Spanish-speaking officers. The Department's cadet

diversity training includes some role-playing exercises revolving around linguistic issues. But despite these efforts, integration of the city's Latino residents into CAPS has proven difficult.

At the same time, the 2002 study found that relatively few beat meetings are conducted in foreign languages. Two percent were conducted primarily in English but featured some Spanish translation, and another 2 percent were truly bilingual in character. (Another featured some translation into Polish, the second most frequently requested foreign language by those calling the city's 911 and 311 service hotlines.) Translators at the meetings were all police officers or resident amateurs and the meetings ran at a slow pace. If foreign-language meetings become more widespread and frequent, the special Spanish-language beat meetings now held on occasion might help make up for this shortfall.


### **Interest Representation**

The second representational question is, To what extent do those who attend beat meetings represent the views of residents concerning the problems they face? We have seen that meetings over-represent more established members of the community, based on a comparison of beat populations with meeting participants. The same comparisons can be made between reports of neighborhood problems gathered in surveys of beat residents and meeting participants. The data indicate meeting participants are more concerned about problems than were the residents of their beat: those who attended gave higher ratings than did their neighbors to a broad range of problems. However, the data indicate that those who come to meetings broadly represent the views of beat residents, although more accurately for some issues than for others.

To make these comparisons, the results of citywide surveys conducted during 2001 and 2003 were aggregated to the beats in which respondents lived. The two surveys were quite large, involving about 5,300 respondents living in identified beats, but because they were scattered throughout Chicago, many beats were still sparsely represented. This analysis requires 10 survey respondents as the minimum number for characterizing a beat, which reduces somewhat the number of beats available for analysis. City survey results were matched with the findings of surveys of participants in the 130 beats involved in the 2002 study of beat meetings, and enough neighborhood and beat meeting respondents were interviewed in 93 of them. Both groups had been asked to rate whether each of seven issues was a "big problem," "some problem" or "no problem" in their neighborhood. The largest gap between meeting participants and residents concerned street drug sales. In the average beat, 50 percent of those who attended beat meetings reported street drug sales as being a big problem in their neighborhood, compared to 24 percent of residents.

Figure 9 addresses the extent to which residents' interests were being represented at meetings in their neighborhood. Beat by beat, the panels compare ratings of problems gathered in the city surveys with ratings of problems supplied by meeting participants in the same beat. Responses to questions about three forms of physical decay – abandoned cars, abandoned

Figure 9  
Interest Representation at Beat Meetings, 2002



buildings and graffiti – were combined to form a physical-decay index. Questions about the extent of problems with burglary, street crime and auto theft formed a personal- and property- crime index, while responses to questions about gangs and drugs constituted a measure of their own. The only social disorder question that there was space for on the beat meeting questionnaire concerned public drinking, and the results of this are also included in Figure 9, which presents average resident and beat meeting participant scores on these measures for each beat.

The strong relationship between resident and participant ratings of gang and drug problems is apparent in Figure 9. The correlation between the two measures was  $+0.84$ . Likewise, there was a strong link between beat and participant assessments of the extent of physical decay in their area; that correlation was  $+0.70$ . The resident vs participant correlation for public drinking was  $+0.63$ . In these domains, where residents are concerned, so are those who show up at meetings; where they are not, many participants share that view as well. Chicagoans can feel fairly confident that those who attend meetings in their beat reflect their views about the seriousness of gang, drug, decay and public drinking problems.

The link between activist's views of crime and what the general public thought about burglary, auto theft and street crime was much weaker, however. As Figure 9 indicates, the two were correlated only  $+0.35$ . The three individual components of the crime index displayed about the same pattern.

One plausible explanation for the limited correspondence between resident and participant concern about crime is the issue's visibility. Most of the other problems probed by the surveys have visual manifestations. There is nothing subtle, for example, about a Chicago street drug market, or the activities of large and powerful gangs. When asked about his neighborhood's biggest problem, a respondent in one of our special neighborhood surveys replied: "Drugs. How the guys stand on the corners, you can't even walk down the street because they're selling the drugs. They stand in the middle of the block." Another observed, "Gangs get together on the weekend. They hang out in the streets, they have problems with other gang members, and gangs start shooting each other." Others pointed to problems like "People on the corners in the liquor stores cause fear to other people;" "Guys hanging on the corners all night long;" and, "Younger kids hanging out on the corners and on the next block. It's become a party street because the teenagers hang out on the weekends, and I've called the police because they were so loud around two in the morning." Seeing (and hearing) all of this provides evidence of the magnitude of problems that can be shared by broad segments of the community. Graffiti has as its "victim" everyone who views and is offended by it, and unless it is cleaned up the victimization continues. By contrast, theft and street crime victimize individuals and households, and they are crimes of stealth. People may hear and gossip about victims of these offenses, but they rarely see such crimes in progress. After the fact, theft and street crime they leave few visible scars. They do not present the kind of shared, visible, repetitive experience that other problems in our inventory can manifest, even if they are widespread in a community.

Another possible explanation for the relatively weak link between residents' views of crime and those of beat meeting participants is representational. The question is: To what extent do biases in the representation of social and economic groups account for any lack of correspondence between the views of the general public and those that are carried into beat meetings? The views of beat meeting participants vary somewhat, so demographic imbalances in representation like those already described may have an impact on the correspondence between the priorities of the general public and the issues that concern just those who attend meetings.

Examining this involves contrasting the impact of imbalances in the representation of various groups at the meetings on the fit or lack of fit between the views of meeting participants and their neighbors. Groups that made the largest differences were Latinos, women and older residents. The over-representation of women and older people affected the views represented at the meetings because they tended to be less worried about crime problems than their younger and male counterparts. The varying mixes of younger-versus-older participants and men and women at the meetings thus had a substantial effect on the gap between beats and meetings. Having too many women was correlated  $+0.36$  with the under-representation of concern about crime, and having too many participants over age 65 was correlated  $+0.30$  with the under-representation of concern about crime. But the strongest effect was due to under-representation of Latinos at the

meetings. The correlation between a shortfall of Latinos at the meetings and the under-representation of crime problems (measured by the three-item index) was +.45. In contrast, there were only small differences between older and younger people, and between men and women, when they were asked about visible problems like physical decay, social disorder and drug and gang problems, so demographic misrepresentation had a much smaller effect on the match between the views of residents and beat meeting participants concerning these issues.

Finally, the data on beat meeting participants and the residents they represent documents the relatively high level of concern the former have about issues in their community. Respondents to the 2001 and 2003 city surveys living in the study beats examined here were asked to rate the magnitude of burglary, auto theft and street crime in their neighborhood, as were beat meeting participants. Among the general public, 48 percent reported that burglary was “no problem” in their area; the comparable figures for street crime and auto theft were 49 percent and 56 percent. On the other hand, among meeting participants living in the same beats, only 26 percent thought burglary was not a problem in their area, and the figures for street crime and auto theft were 28 percent and 34 percent. Public drinking and gang violence were also of more concern to participants than to residents, by about 15 percentage points. Those attending meetings were more concerned about loose trash and junk, graffiti, abandoned cars and buildings, and every type of crime included on the list. At every level of analysis, concern about neighborhood problems turns out to be an important driver of involvement in beat meetings.

### **What Makes Beat Meetings Work?**

Many of the evaluation reports have included sections on beat meetings, as meetings are one of the most distinctive features of Chicago’s community policing model. This section includes a summary of observations made in this report and elsewhere regarding the effectiveness of beat meetings and the implications of those findings for improving them in the future.

#### **Structural and Organizational Features**

A key feature of beat meetings in Chicago is that they provide widespread opportunities to participate. By-and-large, most beats meet nearly every month. In 2002, for example, the 270 beats that are significantly residential in character met an average of 10 times during the course of the year. Beat meetings occur regularly in all parts of the city. Meeting frequency is not correlated with a community’s class or race, nor with its crime rate or strength of community organizations in the area. The number of people who turn out is linked to these factors, of course. However, the frequency with which beats meet is not tied to the size of the turnout, so even if few people attend, subsequent meetings will still be held. Meetings take place on a regular schedule, for example on the third Thursday of every month, and at the same time and place. Meeting locations are typically well known to members of the community, and other civic events take place there on a regular basis as well. In 2002, 28 percent of meetings were held in churches, and 12 percent in park district field houses. Another 15 percent were held in schools, and 7 percent in library community rooms.

These are also safe environments. The police keep them that way, and residents can attend with some confidence that they will get home safely. In some beats there is concern about potential retaliation by bad elements in the community, if people speak up against them at meetings. A few well-known instances of fire bombings, and even one murder in retaliation against CAPS activists, have made it clear that these fears can be well-founded. In 1998 our observers attended 253 beat meetings, and there was discussion of potential retaliation or actual reports of incidents at 55 of them – 22 percent of the total. Expressions of concern about retaliation were voiced most frequently at meetings in heavily Latino beats and in places where concern about gangs and drugs was particularly high. Police have devised a number of simple tactics that enable people to voice their concerns under those circumstances. In some beats they pass out cards on which trouble spots can be identified and returned at the end of the meeting. Other districts feature prominent citizen “suggestion boxes.” Of course, anyone can call the district’s Community Policing Office directly to voice concerns.

Beat meetings also facilitate resident involvement because someone is always responsible for organizing and conducting them. On occasion our observers have arrived for meetings to find that no one in the crowd outside had a key to the building, but almost always the problem gets rectified quickly. As we saw above, maps or other current materials are usually available at the sign-up table, and meetings at least start with – though they may not follow – an agenda. Civilian facilitators play a visible role at meetings, as do the police. In 2001-02, each of the five police areas (groups of five districts) held Saturday training sessions for beat team sergeants and their civilian facilitators. There they learned how to run a good meeting; at one point the Department used a video of a staged “beat meeting from hell” to illustrate how not to do things. However, there seems to have been no effort like this in 18 months.

Why is this important? There has been a great deal of research on citizen involvement in anti-crime activities, and it usually documents strong biases in participation. Some of this research involves identifying geographic locations of meetings or active groups and examining the social and demographic correlates of those locations. Other studies employ surveys that ask people about their individual involvement in various crime-prevention efforts. These studies usually find that programs relying on voluntary participation are most common where they are least needed and involve people with only modest crime problems. There is a strong “middle-class bias” in activism. Homeowning neighborhoods already endowed with strong organizations field the most impressive anti-crime projects, while in poorer and higher-crime areas a few isolated volunteers struggle to build any capacity at all in their community. In high-crime areas people tend to be more suspicious of their neighbors or their neighbors’ children. There, older residents, who we have seen provide the backbone for beat meetings in many areas, are more likely to stay home in order to stay safe. But in Chicago, beat meetings are held everywhere, not just in places blessed with strong organizations and preexisting leadership. Women and senior citizens turn out in large numbers, even after dark, because the meeting places are safe. The police do not get discouraged by low turnout, returning to the next month’s regardless. They have a key to the church social hall.

In short, police have used their organizational capacity to create quite egalitarian as well as frequent opportunities for participation. As documented above, people come to beat meetings because they are concerned about neighborhood problems, and crime is the number one correlate of beat meeting attendance rates. In Chicago, residents of poor and high-crime areas also have a place to go. Meetings provide them with an opportunity to participate that might not be there without the organized structure provided by the city's community policing program.

### **Process Factors**

There are also features of the meetings themselves that appear to attract participants and cement their loyalty. In particular, feedback and payback are important such features.

One reason people attend is that they are concerned about their community, but they are not well-informed about crime or the efforts being made by police and local activists to respond to it. Traditionally, police departments have not been particularly "transparent." They expect the public to be their "eyes and ears" but give back as little information as possible about their activities or effectiveness. From the beginning, Chicago's beat meetings were to be venues for the actual sharing of information that could help both police and residents more effectively address community problems. In 2002 beat meeting observers watched for information-sharing and found quite a bit of it. Department guidelines call for the distribution of crime information at the meetings, and their crime analysis system produces a variety of reader-friendly maps and reports. Our observers found that police shared this kind of information with residents at 90 percent of the meetings. Feedback also comes in the form of reports by police and residents on what they have been doing to address local problems, and what has been done about concerns brought up at the previous beat meeting. From the residents' point of view, meetings provide an important venue for holding beat officers accountable. In short, they enable the community to monitor whether police are holding up their end of the partnership. The 2002 observational study found that police were reporting back on their efforts at almost three-quarters of the meetings.

Meetings can also provide a venue where residents celebrate their own efforts, and perhaps successes. But while observations in 2002 revealed that police were reporting to the community with some frequency, residents had something to say at less than 50 percent of the meetings. More distressingly, only about one-quarter of meetings seemed to include any action component. Mostly, people left with no commitment to action before the next meeting. As one community policing sergeant put it, "A lot of residents think that CAPS is like a laundry. Drop off the shirts, come back in a week and they're done."

Payback comes from the ability of residents needing help from a city agency to attend a meeting and see their problem written up in a CAPS service request. If they show up, they can get something done. There was no shortage of problem-identification at the meetings the observers attended: problems were raised by residents at every session. The mix of issues discussed at beat meetings is surprisingly diverse, and a large percentage of the conversation concerns issues that are not resolvable using traditional policing tools. In 2002, the third most frequently discussed category of problems was physical dilapidation, which came up at 47 percent of the meetings.

Problems in this category included concern about abandoned or run-down buildings, abandoned cars, graffiti, litter and trash, and illegal dumping. The number one category of problems discussed was social disorder, which came up at 89 percent of meetings. Social disorder includes a long list of relatively minor offenses and conditions that are not criminal at all, but that frequently disturb neighborhood residents. The most commonly discussed issues were prostitution, public drinking, panhandling, truancy, disturbances by teenagers, noise, trespassing, public exposure and landlords who lose control of their buildings. Neighborhood drug problems (62 percent) and property crime (38 percent) topped the list of traditional policing concerns, but calls for more emphasis on parking and traffic problems came up at 44 percent of the meetings.

This illustrates the importance of CAPS service requests. These simple forms were devised to link beat officers to the expedited delivery of a broad range of city services. They could be generated by anyone in the Department, but in the mid-1990s service requests were the special domain of beat teams. Officers' service requests triggered a prioritizing and case-tracking process that greatly increased responsiveness of other city agencies. Agencies most involved in the program include the Department of Streets and Sanitation, mostly to handle graffiti removal, tow abandoned cars, trim trees and fill potholes; the Department of Buildings, to take action on abandoned and troublesome properties; and the Department of Transportation, to replace missing or damaged signage. The Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information originally served as the conduit for requests for assistance. The successful integration of problem-solving with a broad range of city services was one of the most important early successes of CAPS. In contrast, one of the many liabilities facing residents of the city's remaining large and deteriorating public housing developments is that police have less capacity to "deliver the goods" in terms of services, because many of those services lie in the hands of the Chicago Housing Authority rather than city service agencies.

However, it appears officers have virtually abandoned using service request forms. Over time, civilian employees of the CAPS Implementation Office assumed responsibility for identifying service needs and completing the paperwork. The management-accountability process that now steers the Department includes a check on whether service requests are being filed, but there is no determination of whether police officers are completing them. In addition, the city's new and effective 311 city service hotline has lifted part of the burden from the police. These trends may be undermining one of the central reasons Chicagoans come to the meetings – to get something done.

Social factors are important for sustaining successful beat meetings as well. A potentially important feature of beat meetings is networking. Meetings can provide a venue for neighborhood residents to get acquainted and begin building linkages that will sustain their relationship outside meetings. In 2002 we surveyed beat meeting participants to gauge the extent to which they encountered each other outside of the meetings, including "seeing them around," attending other meetings at which beat regulars were also present and speaking with them on the phone. The survey also included questions about how involved they were in a broad variety of local problem-solving efforts, and being networked had the strongest link to being a beat meeting activist. Networkers were more likely to be frequent participants at beat meetings as well. This recommends efforts to increase the networking potential of meetings. We think it can be encouraged by developing "phone trees" that put lists of participants in each other's hands, with a license to make contact about local concerns. It also highlights the importance of the social aspects of beat meetings. Some beats

routinely offer social periods preceding or following their meetings. Some offer coffee and snacks that bring people together at the back of the room. At better meetings officers and residents huddle after the formal session is over to hash out issues too specific to involve the entire group. The role of social interaction highlights the importance of how the seats and head tables are arranged. The fixed pews and pulpits that greet participants when meetings are held in a church sanctuary are far less congenial than the scattered card tables and folding chairs that might be found in the social hall in the basement.

## **District Advisory Committees**

District Advisory Committees (known widely as “DACs”) are groups of residents, community organization leaders, business owners, representatives of local institutions, and others from the community who meet regularly with the police to discuss district affairs. The first DACs were formed in 1993 in the prototype districts where CAPS was developed. DACs were to assist the commander in establishing district priorities and developing strategies to address them, and to bring to the table community resources that could contribute to resolving local problems. They have always operated in a somewhat autonomous fashion. Members are selected in a variety of ways, they have taken on different roles in the various districts and the manner in which they conduct their business varies a great deal from place to place. This diversity has not always led to success, however. Many express frustration over their ill-defined mandate, their leadership problems and their inaction on many important issues.

Much of the real work of the DACs is to be done through their subcommittees. Each is required to sponsor two subcommittees, court advocacy and senior citizens. Beyond that, they are supposed to organize subcommittees to address local priorities, and most DACs have five or six. Subcommittees are typically focused on domestic violence, youth affairs, housing and economic development. Many districts have clergy subcommittees and beautification or environmental subcommittees. Some sponsor neighborhood or cellular patrol groups.

DACs have considerable resources at their disposal. Each year they are allotted up to \$12,500 from the city’s CAPS Implementation Office, and an additional \$7,500 from the Allstate Foundation for targeted crime-prevention and safety programs. Together these monies support the production of newsletters, alley numbering signs, t-shirts sporting the CAPS logo, smoke detectors, refreshments at events and items presented at awards ceremonies. DACs have purchased fax machines and patrol bicycles and helmets for their district officers. Another potentially important resource is the staff of the CAPS Implementation Office. They regularly attend advisory committee meetings and work in support of DAC projects, and officers from the district’s Community Policing Office are assigned to coordinate the work of the committee.

Past reports have examined DACs in great detail, and in early 2000 we conducted a study of CAPS activists that included survey interviews with 635 current or former DAC members. During 2003, the evaluation staff conducted more interviews and observed a selection of DAC meetings to update our findings. Because the DACs vary greatly in how they are organized and conduct their business, it is difficult to generalize about all of them. There are exceptions to every rule, and some DACs make exceptional contributions to CAPS. However, our evaluation reports have painted a fairly unfavorable picture of the DACs in operation.

**No Compelling Mission.** Many DACs have found it difficult to translate the general mission defined in Department plans into a useful mission for themselves. After nine years, confusion about the mission of DACs persists. Are they “meta-beat meetings,” and should they be largely composed of beat representatives? For some, this approach turns their attention to local and specific issues that should be handled at a lower level. These DACs sit and listen to woeful stories concerning individual 911 calls that were not appropriately handled, a subject about which they can accomplish little. Is their role “to exchange information?” Too many meetings we observed were dominated by the one-way flow of information, from the police to committee members in attendance. At these the commander reads monthly crime statistics aloud and announces upcoming official CAPS events. This is often followed by subcommittee reports recited by officers because no civilian members of the group were present to do so. Even this modest role for the DAC assumes that the members in turn broadly communicate to their constituencies what they have heard, but this may not be the case. Our most recent study of all 25 DACs found that district commanders had stopped attending meetings in some districts, because so very little of importance was going on and the members of the DAC were unable to command their continued attention.

We have observed DACs creating a mission for themselves by focusing on particular problems. One district concentrated on liquor problems. They wrote to license holders encouraging them to be more responsible, and their court advocacy subcommittee worked through the city’s liquor commission to shut down several establishments. Another district selected youth issues as their focus. They developed a truancy program and transported youngsters to an after-school program sponsored by the district. The best DACs set priorities and routinely gauge progress made on them, and have members who take responsibility for components of the action plan. Others cannot even decide how to spend their money, and at the end of the year throw together hasty and ill-considered proposals that subsequently are rejected downtown.


**No Role in Planning or Assessment.** The Department’s internal process for planning district strategies and assessing their effectiveness in theory involves DAC chairs. These committee leaders are supposed to represent the community’s interests and priorities as well as their view of police operations’ effectiveness. DAC chairs are formally members of district management teams and are supposed to be invited to accountability review sessions at all levels. However, it is virtually unheard of for DAC chairs to play any role whatsoever at the planning stage, and we have never observed a DAC chair make a significant contribution to accountability meeting discussions at any level. Many commanders do share their priorities with the DAC once they have set them, by discussing the two or three problems around which they have developed strategic operational plans for submission downtown, but this belongs in the “information sharing” category of CAPS functions.

**Weak Subcommittees.** Our most recent analysis of the work of the subcommittees examined whether they were actually conducting projects aimed at local problems (if they were able to attract members), and whether there was regular DAC oversight of subcommittee activities. We concluded that about half the DACs were barely functioning at the subcommittee level: members never met, they sponsored no projects and they were not being held accountable by their DAC. Some DACs with effective subcommittees have trimmed the list to just a few, so they could focus their attention and effort on a smaller set of priorities. They also demand accountability from their subcommittee chairs, and in turn have contributed their advice, money and support to subcommittee projects.

**Lack of Representativeness.** The function of DACs is to represent the community, and the Department’s order setting them up specifies that they should “. . . reflect the district’s social, ethnic and racial make-up, and include residents, youth, business people, representatives of community educational and religious organizations, and other stakeholders in the district.” However, our research indicates that the membership of many DACs falls somewhat short of these goals. Surveys of their members reveal that, compared to the districts they represent, the DACs are dominated by better-off, homeowners, long-term residents. More than 80 percent own their home, in contrast to the citywide figure of about 45 percent. They are heavily weighted toward middle age: more than 60 percent of DAC members are at least 50 years old. While about 55 percent of adult Chicagoans have some education beyond high school, the comparable figure for DAC members is about 80 percent. About 45 percent of DAC respondents are white, 40 percent are African-Americans, and only 5 percent are Latinos.

This bias in representation is illustrated in Figure 10, which is reprinted from the 2000 evaluation report. It compares DAC members to the districts that they represent. As in similar charts describing beat meetings, the establishment bias of DACs is clear. In almost every case their membership is noticeably better off. As the upper-right panel documents, districts that are composed of about 50 percent homeowners are represented by DACs that are about 86 percent homeowners. Where about 30 percent of residents have a college degree, almost 60 percent of DAC members do. Overall, whites are over-represented by about 20 percentage points. The mismatch is most extreme for Latinos. As Figure 10 indicates, in districts where residents are about 50 percent Latino, less than 20 percent of DAC members are Latinos.

Figure 10  
Representativeness of District Advisory Committees



**Not an Independent Voice.** DACs are to provide a voice for the community to help shape police priorities and strategy. However, in practice many simply respond to the agenda put on the table by commanders or their Community Policing Office. They get more advice than they give. Some DACs seem heavily dependent on the police officers assigned to “support” them and often just automatically ratify their “recommendations.” Commanders often do not attend these meetings, and attendance is scant.

**Need New Blood.** Ironically, one problem facing many DACs is the lack of turnover of membership. Many members hang on for years, some regardless of their productivity as members. They seem to enjoy their status and the seeming “insider” nature of the commander’s reports to the group. The same faces are present every month, with the same complaints. When asked why no one wants to leave their DAC, one former member observed, “they love meetings. Actually they love all of it. And the bad thing is that some of them never brought anything to the table.” In our 2000 survey, more than half the DAC members had been involved in CAPS by the end of 1993, the year the program was initiated. The 2000 evaluation report concluded that “insular,” “narrow-minded,” and “dependent” were terms that applied to too many DAC members. The lack of turnover in some DACs may exacerbate the representation issues facing the DACs, especially their inability to find slots for the city’s large and growing Latino population. Of course, finding new members that will actually work on projects, as opposed to attend meetings, can be difficult. Their addition to the DAC may also be destabilizing, because they might represent new ideas or new constituencies, and many commanders are comfortable with the DACs they already have.

### **Confidence in the Police**

One goal of CAPS is to increase confidence in the fairness and effectiveness of the police. Nationwide surveys find that police generally have the support of the public, and they are held in higher esteem than many other public officials. But support for the police is not as high among residents of the nation’s largest cities, and Chicago is no exception. Opinion about the police is also deeply divided by race, and in the past, Chicago has come off badly in comparisons of the views of its residents. During the 1970s, the Census Bureau conducted surveys of residents of 26 of the nation’s largest cities. In these surveys, the opinion gap between white and African-American residents of Chicago was the largest of any city, and as a whole Chicago stood near the bottom in terms of public confidence in policing. More recently, a 1998 federal government survey of residents of 12 cities found that Chicago placed second to last in terms of satisfaction with the police who serve their neighborhoods.

Distrust of the police threatens the viability of CAPS in the very neighborhoods where it is needed most. Chicagoans are divided along class lines, with homeowners and better-off residents sharing more positive views of the police. They are also split along age lines, for those under age 30 are substantially more critical of the quality of police service. But the largest cleavage over policing is along racial lines. In the original CAPS prototype districts, African-Americans and Latinos were two-and-a-half to three times more likely than whites to report that the police were unfair, impolite, unconcerned and unhelpful. From the outset of the program,

many anticipated that dissatisfaction among the city's African-Americans and Latinos would make community policing a tough sell in many neighborhoods. Concern about police misconduct and residents' negative perceptions of police effectiveness led some to question whether beat meetings would attract participants or if residents could be convinced to form partnerships with police around problem-solving projects.

## **Trends in Public Confidence**

The evaluation has monitored public opinion about the police since 1993. During that period there have been observable changes for the better on several key dimensions. Public opinion improved steadily between 1993 (when the first small evaluation survey was conducted) and 1999, before leveling off at a new high in the 2000s. At the same time, it is also apparent that the gulf between the races in Chicago has not diminished at all. Partly this is good news, for it signals that improvements in the image of the police are not confined to only one group. On every measure, changes in opinion have been apparent among whites, African-Americans and Latinos alike. But on every dimension, the 15 to 20 percentage point gap between the views of whites and those of other racial groups closed scarcely at all over the 11-year period during which the evaluation monitored the views of the general public. Chicagoans are happier about their police but just as polarized in their views.

The first dimension on which Chicagoans have been asked to rate their officers is police demeanor. The surveys included four questions asking how well people living in their area are treated by police.<sup>3</sup> Like all of the questions in this section, those interviewed were given four response categories to choose from; the best and worst of each category are reported below.

In general, how polite are the police when dealing with people in your neighborhood? Are they [very polite to very impolite]?

When dealing with people's problems in your neighborhood, are the police generally [very concerned to not concerned at all] about their problems?

In general, how helpful are the police when dealing with people in your neighborhood? Are they [very helpful to not helpful at all]?

In general, how fair are the police when dealing with people in your neighborhood? Are they [very fair to very unfair]?

Chicago police have always done best on the demeanor dimension. Even at the outset, a majority of Chicagoans believed that their neighbors were treated well by police, so there was not as much room for improvement on this measure. In the small citywide survey conducted in

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<sup>3</sup> Some respondents inevitably reply "don't know" to specific questions about police activity; for the questions discussed in this section this fraction ranged from 2 to 17 percent. Those respondents are excluded from consideration on a question-by-question basis.

1993, 86 percent of the 540 residents queried thought police working in their neighborhood were either very or somewhat helpful, as opposed to not very helpful or not helpful at all. By 2003 this figure had risen to just more than 90 percent, followed by 86 percent who found the police concerned about their problems, and 85 percent who thought they treated people fairly. Responses to these questions went together consistently in every yearly survey. In 1996, for example, they were correlated an average of  $+0.57$ . In analyses that combine them into an index, the resulting police demeanor measure has a reliability of  $.83$ .<sup>4</sup> The discussion below is based on combined indices for each of the dimensions used to evaluate the police.

A second measure examines perceptions of police responsiveness. It is based on responses to three questions:

How responsive are the police in your neighborhood to community concerns? Do you think they are [very responsive to very unresponsive]?

How good a job are the police doing in dealing with the problems that really concern people in your neighborhood? Would you say they are doing a [very good job to poor job]?

How good a job are the police doing in working together with residents in your neighborhood to solve local problems? Would you say they are doing a [very good job to poor job]?

There were large differences in how Chicagoans rated police on these three measures. In 1993, the police fared best on responsiveness, with more than 80 percent of respondents reporting that the police were responsive to neighborhood concerns. By 2003 this figure had risen to 86 percent. However, in 2003 only 63 percent of those we interviewed thought police were actually dealing with problems that concerned them, and 57 percent reported that they were doing a good job working with neighborhood residents to solve problems. Despite these differences in the magnitude of the ratings, responses to these three questions also went together consistently every year: in 1996, for example, they were correlated an average of  $+0.65$ . The combined police responsiveness index had a reliability of  $.85$ .

The last measure that can be tracked over this eleven-year period is perceived police performance. It is also based on responses to three questions:

How good a job do you think the police in your neighborhood are doing in helping people out after they have been victims of crime? [very good job to poor job]

How good a job do you think they are doing to prevent crime in your neighborhood? [very good job to poor job]

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<sup>4</sup> The reliability of an index is its internal consistency, or the extent to which positive and negative responses to questions in the index go together. An index should include only items that consistently contribute to high or low overall scores. The reliability measures reported here are quite good for measures based on three or four questions.

How good a job are the police in your neighborhood doing in keeping order on the streets and sidewalks? [very good job to poor job]

In 1993, Chicago police did not rate highly on any of these aspects of their performance. They did best in terms of keeping order; 56 percent gave them positive a rating on this, a number that rose to 66 percent by 2003. In 2003, 58 percent of those interviewed believed that police worked well with victims, and 61 percent gave them passing marks on preventing crime. Responses to these items were correlated an average of +.63 in 1996, and the combined police-performance index used later in this section had a reliability of .84.

Figure 11 illustrates trends in these measures over most of the 1990s. It charts the percentage of respondents averaging a positive rating (the two best of four rating categories) on each index. Separate trend lines are presented for whites, African-Americans and Latinos, the three racial groups that the surveys are large enough to monitor with accuracy. No figures are given for Latinos in 1993, for that survey was conducted in English only.

Figure 11  
Trends in Assessments of Police Service Quality, 1993-2003




Figure 11 also combines all of the measures of police effectiveness into a single index of service quality. Those who gave police a positive rating on one dimension also tended to give them a favorable rating on the other two, so this summary index provides a fair representation of residents' overall opinion of the police.

As noted above, police scored best on their personal relations with the public. Before CAPS began in 1993, almost two-thirds of those interviewed averaged a positive score on the police demeanor index, and that figure rose to 73 percent by 2003. The biggest increase in this category was the percentage that thought police treated residents of their neighborhood politely, which increased from 71 percent to 81 percent by 1999, before dropping a bit to 79 percent in 2003. The percentage who thought police were helpful went from 82 percent in 1995 to 90 percent by 2003. In 2003, 85 percent of Chicagoans thought police were either very or somewhat fair in dealing with their neighbors. There were notable differences between the races in how they rated the police, however. In general, whites perceived that police treated people well even at the beginning of the evaluation, and there was not much room for improvement. Positive perceptions of police demeanor improved by about 10 percentage points among both Latino and African-American respondents and ended on a high note.

In contrast to the public's view of police demeanor, before CAPS was launched only 43 percent of Chicagoans had an optimistic view of police responsiveness to community concerns. Responding to this perception was one of the most important goals of CAPS. By 1995, beat meetings were being held regularly in every part of the city, and each police district had formed an advisory committee. The CAPS marketing campaign succeeded in driving program recognition to 69 percent by 1997, to 79 percent by 1999, and it stood at 80 percent in 2003. Perceptions of police responsiveness to community concerns improved steadily until 1999; overall, the responsiveness index rose nearly 20 percentage points during the 1993-1999 period. Then, like the other measures examined here, perceptions of police responsiveness stopped improving. In 2003 about 56 percent of city residents averaged a positive view on this dimension. The largest gain in the area of police responsiveness was the percentage of respondents who thought police were doing a good job working with residents to solve problems, which rose from 39 percent to 58 percent in 2003. Perceptions of the police changed the most among African-Americans and Latinos, improving by almost 20 percentage points between 1993 and 1999. The views of whites, which were more positive even before CAPS began, improved by about 10 percentage points.

At the outset, Chicagoans were mostly negative in their views of how well police did their job. At early beat meetings residents complained about unanswered calls to the city's 911 emergency number and that patrol cars would not stop when anxious residents tried to flag them down. But over time, the index measuring this aspect of police service improved significantly, rising from a low of 36 percent in 1994 to a high of 51 percent in 2003. Police efforts to prevent crime were widely recognized. The percentage granting them a positive rating on this aspect of their work rose from 44 percent in 1994 to 61 percent by 2003. Reports that police were doing a very good job or a good job assisting crime victims increased from 39 percent in 1993 to 58 percent at the end. Police got the highest marks for keeping order; positive scores on this

measure hit 66 percent in 2003, up from 53 percent in 1994. These were solid gains, but in 2003 only 51 percent of Chicagoans were willing to give the police an average score in the positive range on performance, their weakest mark. Whites began the period with relatively negative views of police on-the-job performance. As Figure 11 illustrates, on average less than half the whites surveyed thought the police were doing a satisfactory job. Their views – like those of African-Americans and Latinos – shifted by about 10 percentage points during the course of the 1990s, then leveled off in the new century.

The summary index presented in the lower-right quadrant of Figure 11 encapsulates many of the patterns described here. It is not just a simple average of the three scores presented in Figure 11, for it is based on all 10 individual survey questions. The summary index points to an improvement in white opinion by 13 percentage points, while positive opinions among African-Americans grew by more than 15 percentage points between 1993 and 1999, before dropping a bit by 2003. Improvement was more continuous for Latinos. In 1994, 31 percent of Latinos averaged a positive view of police service, a number that grew to 48 percent by 2003.

Were these shifts due to CAPS? Some of the best evidence of the impact of CAPS on resident perceptions of the quality of police service comes from the first two years of the evaluation, when research could be conducted in the prototype districts where the program was being developed and in comparison areas where policing was being conducted as usual. In the prototype districts, large changes in opinions about the police were confined to perceptions of their responsiveness to community concerns. The evaluation surveys found that perceived police responsiveness improved significantly in four of the five experimental districts, but only in one of their comparison areas. Perceptions of police effectiveness and demeanor also improved in predominately African-American districts but not in their comparison areas. Combining the opinions of all surveyed residents of the prototype districts, attitudes toward the police changed most favorably among African-Americans, who began with fairly negative views on every dimension. Views of policing also improved among whites, but their views were quite positive at the start. Attitudes toward the police also grew more positive among both renters and homeowners. The biggest shortcoming of the program in the prototype areas was among Latinos, who started out even more dissatisfied than the city's African-Americans. Their views did not improve at all, and the prototype district in which Latinos were concentrated was the one where opinions did not improve significantly overall. It is to be expected that the attitude changes recorded here could be much larger, because the data span a period of 11 years, and CAPS has become part of the ordinary business of the Police Department.


### **Continued Racial Divisions**

However, despite these improvements, in 2003 only the views of whites stood in the positive range on the overall index. Less than a majority of Latinos and African-Americans averaged a positive view, and for blacks the most recent trend was in the wrong direction. In addition, at the end of the decade the gulf between whites and others was almost as great as it was near the beginning. Based on the summary index, 25 percentage points separated whites from African-Americans, exactly the same figure as 10 years earlier. The gap between whites

and Latinos was smaller and still closing, but still stood at about 15 percentage points. The views of many city residents grew more favorable, but the division between whites and racial minorities in Chicago over policing hardly shrank at all.

The depth of remaining racial divisions over the quality of police service is depicted in Figure 12, which is based on the most recent (spring 2003) city survey. Figure 11 presents the percentage of respondents giving the police a favorable rating on questions drawn from each of the three dimensions described above. Differences in how Chicagoans of different backgrounds rate the police are substantial. In terms of perceived police responsiveness, whites were more likely than African-Americans – by 24 percentage points – to give police a favorable rating for dealing with problems that really concern people. The gap was the same when it came to perceptions of how good a job police are doing at preventing crime; in 2003, 74 percent of whites, but only 49 percent of African-Americans and 58 percent of Latinos, thought the police were doing a good job at that. As described in Figure 12, satisfaction was highest among all groups with regard to how police were perceived as treating individuals with whom they came in contact. Racial differences in these ratings were a bit smaller, but still substantial. Fully 87 percent of whites gave police a favorable rating for politeness; the comparable figure for African-Americans was 72 percent, and among Latinos it was 78 percent.

Figure 12  
Race Differences in Opinions About Police, 2003




## Age, Affluence and Family Factors

Race is not the only dividing factor among Chicagoans when it comes to policing, although it is one of the most significant. Another dividing line across which people look in the direction of the police is age. Like studies in other cities, the Chicago surveys indicate that there are large gaps between young people and others when they rate the quality of police service. Older city residents are more unified – and positive – in their views, while young people are more negative. In addition, in Chicago there is an interaction between race and age. Young African-American males are more negative than either their race or age would predict. As we will see below, they are also stopped by the police in tremendous numbers.

This pattern is illustrated in Figure 13. One section of the figure charts the relationship between age and the percentage of survey respondents who gave the police a favorable rating. This chart combines responses from the 2001 and 2003 surveys, increasing the number of respondents in each category. As it indicates, younger African-Americans (and to a lesser extent young whites) are more negative than their counterparts. African-Americans under age 30 were the most negative, splitting roughly down the middle in their assessments. Overall, the effects of age were much stronger among African-Americans than among whites. Among Latinos, on the other hand, there was little relationship between age and their views of the police. One of the most significant features of the city’s Latino population is its youth. In 2003, for example, only 6 percent of Latino respondents were over age 60, compared to 23 percent of African-Americans. As a result, there were so few older Latinos, even in the combined surveys, that it was impossible to adequately represent their views using a representative sample if they were older than 60.

Figure 13  
Age and Other Factors Affecting Attitudes Toward Police, 2001-2003



Compared to age and race, differences among other groups of residents were relatively small. Some of the more noticeable of these differences are also illustrated in Figure 13. As it indicates, there was about a 10 percentage point difference between those making less than \$40,000 per year and those over that mark. The gap was very similar between married and single people, and between owners and renters. The owner-renter difference affected only whites, however. African-Americans who had children living at home were more negative than their counterparts, a difference that persists even controlling for age and other factors. This effect was not significant for either whites or Latinos.

## **Personal Experiences**

There are also strong effects of experience with the police. Since 1997, evaluation surveys have included questions that track both citizen-initiated encounters with the police and stops by the police. Citizen-initiated contacts are inventoried using a nine-question list describing the most frequent reasons that people contact the police. These range from reporting a crime or suspicious person to requesting routine information or informing them about an accident or other emergency situation. In recent surveys about 50 percent of all adult Chicagoans have recalled contacting police during the course of the past year. In the 2001 survey, the most frequent reason to contact police was to report a crime (24 percent). Reporting accidents or medical emergencies was a close second (19 percent). Between 10 percent and 12 percent of those interviewed recalled reporting suspicious persons or noises, or “things that might lead to a crime.” About the same proportion recalled giving the police information or contacting them regarding some other neighborhood concern or problem, and 17 percent reported contacting police to ask for advice or information.

In response to another set of questions, about 20 percent of those interviewed reported having been stopped by police during the past year, either while driving or while they were on foot. In the 2001 survey, 16 percent of those interviewed recalled a police-initiated traffic encounter during the previous year, while 6 percent described being involved in a foot stop. Police-initiated contacts are not entered into voluntarily, and they are quite likely to be of a suspicious, inquisitorial and potentially adversarial nature.

There was also a substantial overlap between police- and citizen-initiated encounters. Among those who were stopped by police, 61 percent also reported contacting them about some matter during the course of a year. Chicagoans who are stopped by police are also willing consumers of police services, under different circumstances.

Not unexpectedly, the distribution of stops by police was strongly related to demographic and social factors. The strongest correlate of being stopped by police was age. Fully 42 percent of respondents age 18 to 25 were stopped during 2001, in contrast to 7 percent of those over age 55. The next most potent predictor of police stops was gender; 28 percent of males, but only 12 percent of females, reported being stopped by police during the course of a year. Additionally the racial background of Chicagoans was related to their risk of being stopped by police as well. In 2001, 26 percent of African-Americans surveyed reported being stopped by Chicago police during the past year, in contrast to 16 percent of whites and 20 percent of Latinos.

The combined effect of these three factors is illustrated in Figure 14, which divides survey respondents into age-sex-race groups and shows the percentage of each that reported being stopped by police during the previous year. In this figure, “young” respondents are age 18 to 25; “middle-age” spans ages 26 to 55, and “older” respondents are over age 55. Graphically depicted is the fate of the demographic group at highest risk: young black males. The very high stop rate for young black males – 64 percent in the course of a year – contrasts with all other groups. Statistically, age had the greatest impact by far of the three factors. Note that four of the six young groups depicted in Figure 14 were the four most frequently stopped, and another (young white females) ranked sixth. Next came differences associated with gender. Three of the four most-stopped groups were male, and four of the top six groups. The six groups including white respondents were evenly divided between the highest and lowest halves of the figure.

What transpired during these encounters made a difference as well. In each case, respondents who have police- and self-initiated contacts are asked follow-up questions about what happened at the time (or during their most recent encounter, if there was more than one) and how satisfied they were with the transaction. Not surprisingly, their personal experiences strongly affect respondents’ general views of the police, as measured by the 10 questions discussed above. In general, having a positive experience helps a little bit, and having a bad experience hurts a great deal. The effects of how police handled their encounters with the public were independent of the personal background of our respondents, and in particular the effects – good and bad – were about the same among whites, African-Americans and Latinos.

Figure 14  
Age-Race-Sex Distribution of Stops by Police, 2001





Figure 15 charts some of these factors and uses the index score based on responses to all 10 questions about police service quality. The leftmost column presents the overall percentage that averaged a positive score on this measure and provides a baseline against which to gauge the impact of personal experience. The middle panels present the scores of those who reported not being stopped in the past year, those who were stopped once (either on foot or while driving) and those who were stopped both ways. It also divides those who were stopped by satisfaction with their most recent encounter, judged by answers about how they were treated and what the police did at the scene. Being stopped in more than one fashion in the past year had a dramatic effect, cutting respondents' police approval rating almost in half. There was also a 15 percentage point difference between those stopped just once and those not stopped at all.

The rightmost section of Figure 15 examines the impact of citizen-initiated contacts on our respondents' general assessments of the quality of police service. Having a few contacts does not do much harm, although those with a lot of police-related problems are clearly less satisfied with what is being done about them. However, the impact of satisfaction with service rendered at the scene is almost as great as the impact of how people were treated when stopped as objects of police suspicion.

Figure 15  
Attitudes and Contacts with Police, 2001



The frequency with which Chicagoans come into contact with their police, and the impact that this experience has on their views, highlights to the extreme the importance of how people are treated as the police conduct routine business. For our respondents, positive experiences were those in which police paid attention to what they were saying, and those in which police explained to residents what actions they were going to take. Politeness was very important, as was the perception that officers handled the situation fairly. When citizens call the police, they expect them to arrive quickly or at a scheduled time that works for both parties, and the public is very appreciative of helpful advice. Research on crime victims has consistently pointed to the importance of police showing concern and compassion for their plight, and to victims' strong need for practical and useful information and advice. When people are stopped, receiving an explanation for why they were stopped pays a dividend in terms of their acceptance of how the case was handled. Being able to explain their situation and communicate their views to the police is linked to people's views of the legitimacy of resulting police actions. People also expect police to be unbiased, neutral in resolving disputes as well as objective in their decision-making, and evenhandedness enhances the apparent fairness of their ultimate actions. Finally, people value being treated with dignity and respect, and having their rights acknowledged. In a time in which there is much discussion of "problem-oriented policing" and "intelligence-driven policing," there is evidence pointing to the importance of "process-oriented policing" as well.

### **Personal Experience and Neighborhood Effects**

The joint impact of factors discussed here is examined in Table 3. It presents a multi-level analysis of confidence in the police, using the ten-question index of opinion. Hierarchical linear modeling is a statistical technique for untangling the joint effects of both individual- and neighborhood-level factors. Table 3 looks at two questions. The first is the independent impact of neighborhood, as opposed to individual, factors in shaping people's opinion of the police. In particular we are interested in the impact of crime rates, for declining levels of crime may help explain the positive trend in opinion in Chicago during the course of the 1990s. The second question is the importance of recent personal experience on confidence in the police. Here we are interested in the extent to which the apparent impact of race, age and other personal factors is actually just a "stand in" for the impact of personal experience. For example, if police routinely treat people differently based on their background, it may be those experiences that actually make the biggest difference in their views.

To consider these questions, Table 3 merges multiple years of survey data. It combines the opinions of all the white, African-American and Latino respondents interviewed between 1993 and 2003 to examine the impact of neighborhood factors such as crime on views of the police.<sup>5</sup> Results are presented in the left panel in Table 3. Individual factors that are included were all consistent predictors of opinion when they were examined separately above. Other individual factors,

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<sup>5</sup> This analysis excludes a relatively small number of respondents who were of Asian or other backgrounds, or whose race was undetermined. It also excludes respondents who failed to answer several of the police opinion questions, those for whom we could not identify a residential beat, and respondents who lived in one of the city's nine primarily non-residential beats. The later were excluded because crime rate data are uninterpretable for those areas. Together these criteria excluded about 20 percent of those who were interviewed.

Table 3  
Hierarchical Models of Confidence in the Police

	1993-2003 Service Quality Index		1997-2003 Service Quality Index	
	coefficient	standard error	coefficient	standard error
<b>Intercept</b>	3.47**	.049	3.43**	.049
<b>Individual Factors</b>				
African-American	-.092**	.021	-.029	.022
Latino	-.023	.017	-.019	.018
homeowner	.016	.011	.020	.012
married	.049**	.011	.032**	.012
age 60 and older	.263**	.016	.182**	.017
under age 30	-.085**	.014	-.036**	.014
young and black	-.156**	.026	-.129**	.028
children at home	-.044**	.012	-.035**	.012
years of residence	-.022**	.000	-.002**	.000
<b>Personal Experience</b>				
positive citizen-initiated			.020	.011
negative citizen-initiated			-.577**	.017
positive police-initiated			.037**	.016
negative police-initiated			-.326**	.018
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>				
percent African-American	-.002**	.000	-.002**	.000
percent Latino	-.003**	.000	-.003**	.000
poverty index	-.052**	.011	-.062**	.012
stability index	.035**	.008	.042**	.008
robbery rate (log)	-.075**	.013	-.058**	.013
residential burglary rate (log)	-.038**	.011	-.014	.010
<b>Variance Explained</b>				
within-neighborhood	4%		18%	
between neighborhood	82%		89%	
<b>Number of Cases</b>				
individuals	15658		11693	
contexts	2197		1308	

\* p<.05; \*\* p<.01

including gender, are excluded because they were not particularly related to opinions of police. The neighborhood level factors include a measure of concentrated poverty that represents five census measures of economic hardship, and a stability measure reflecting length of residence and homeownership. Two measures of racial composition of each beat were also included, helping to separate out the unique effects of crime rates as opposed to other related features. Crime is represented by the robbery rate (a personal crime) and the residential burglary rate (a property crime), both per 10,000 residents of the beat. As in earlier parts of this section, the police service

quality measure here sums responses to 10 questions on police demeanor, responsiveness and performance that were included in all of the surveys. Data are organized so that the beat context in which each respondent lives is described by crime and census data for the year in which they were interviewed. For example, respondents interviewed in 1994 are linked to 1994 crime rates and estimates of 1994 census characteristics for their beat, while those interviewed in 2003 are linked to data for that year. Technically, these are “fixed effect” models for estimating the impact of context-level measures on just the dependent variable – perceptions of police service quality.

Together, the factors described in Table 3 explained 4 percent of the individual-level variance in views of the police. (This is the individual level  $R^2$ ). Asterisks indicate factors that are statistically significant; the others should be discounted. The most influential factor was age; older Chicagoans are more positive about the police, while those under age 30 are more negative in their views. African-Americans were also more negative, and being both young and black had an added negative impact. Having children living at home continued to exert a negative influence even when age and other factors are taken into account.

At the neighborhood level, crime rates mattered as well. Even controlling for poverty and the racial composition of a neighborhood, residents were more negative in areas with high rates of robbery and residential burglary. Because crime rates were dropping in almost all areas of the city between 1993 and 2003, there is an implication that neighborhood crime decline was one factor behind increasing levels of support for the police over time. Where people were more affluent there was increased support for the police as well, and there were also improvements in neighborhood poverty over this time period. Together, the factors listed in Table 3 explained 82 percent of the difference between neighborhoods in confidence in the police.

The second question addressed in Table 3 is the effect of recent personal experience on people’s views of the police. To examine this issue, the right panel adds four measures of the self-initiated and police-initiated encounters that respondents experienced in the course of the past year. These measures, which were discussed above, separately identify those with positive and negative experiences during police citizen and police-initiated encounters. Statistically, the effects of these positive and negative experiences are contrasted with not having an encounter at all. The analysis of the independent effect of experience is confined to surveys conducted in 1997 through 2003, the years in which those questions were included.

Table 3 documents that the independent effects of experience were quite robust. Positive and negative experiences were measured as dichotomies, as were all of the personal factors except length of residence, so the coefficients are comparable to one another. Nothing in either model approaches the importance of having bad experiences. People seem to expect good service, for having a good experience after calling the police had no significant impact on their general views of the police. On the other hand, when people were stopped by the police, having a good experience improved their views somewhat. However, Figure 3 documents that all of these effects pale in significance in the face of having a bad experience with the police.

Controlling for personal experience reduces somewhat the impact of neighborhood crime. As Table 3 indicates, residential burglary no longer has a significant effect when experience is introduced into the equation, and the effect of local robbery is somewhat reduced.

## Trends in Crime and Fear

Crime has been dropping steadily in the United States for more than a decade. While this is welcome news, researchers have puzzled over possible explanations for this trend. Some point to demographic change or the economic boom of the 1990s, others to the waning popularity of crack cocaine. There are also supporters of the effectiveness of incarceration, and many point to intelligence-driven, community-oriented or more aggressive policing. Research has tied the drop in crime to abortion policies, cultural shifts, changes in lifestyles and increased numbers of police officers due to federal funding.

This section of the report describes trends in crimes reported to the police and summarizes statistical research that examines the drop in crime in Chicago. Factors such as improving neighborhood conditions, decreasing gun availability, changes in drug markets, police effectiveness and the growing capacity of the city's neighborhoods to defend themselves all are linked to the city's declining level of violence. The section then turns to an alternative measure of crime trends in Chicago – views of its seriousness gathered through interviews with large samples of city residents. Surveys measure crime in a different fashion, unconstrained by legal distinctions and people's varying willingness to report crimes to the police, and the survey findings point in particular to the unique experiences of the city's large and growing Latino population. This section then examines the parallel issue of trends in fear of crime. Although they are related, perceptions of crime problems and fear of crime do not necessarily change in unison. Fear is driven by a wide range of concerns and experiences, but it is no less real for its more complex character. Fear of crime is an important social fact with real consequences for individuals, neighborhoods and metropolitan areas. In this light, the substantial decline in fear documented by the surveys bodes well for the city's future. Finally, this section puts crime trends in Chicago in comparative perspective. Compared to other large American cities, Chicago did fairly well. In general, the drop in crime paralleled trends in other big cities, and was deeper than some.


### Trends in Recorded Crime

In Chicago, many categories of crime peaked in 1991 and then declined sharply. Over the 1991-2002 period, violent crime declined by 49 percent, and property crime by 36 percent. Figure 15 depicts trends in the crime figures submitted by the city to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting system. It excludes high-volume property thefts, down 27 percent, because it was difficult to display on the same chart. Murder and rape, the least frequent of the offenses presented here, are graphed on a separate scale (on the right) so their trends are visible. The yearly number of crimes is presented here because the population of the city changed only slightly over the period. As Figure 16 illustrates, there has been a steady decline in crime in each of these categories since its peak in 1991.

The largest decline in crime was in the robbery category. Robbery dropped by 58 percent in Chicago between 1991 and 2002. Robbery is a closely watched crime category because it combines theft, risk to life and limb (for a gun is often involved), and predatory intent. It is seen by some as a bellwether indicator of urban trends. Between 1991 and 2002, robberies with a gun went down by about the same amount, 59 percent. Murder, by contrast, was least down over this period, by 30 percent. Like in many cities, the ability of Chicago's police to solve homicides has

waned. While other kinds of homicide have declined, the remaining core of gang- and drug-related shootings has proven to be more difficult to counter. During 2001 the number of murders in the city actually rose a bit, before declining again in 2002. Criminal sexual assault (a local recordkeeping category that approximates the FBI's rape statistic) declined 45 percent. Aggravated assault and battery declined by 41 percent. The assault category encompasses many kinds of offenses, including domestic violence, gang battles, bar brawls, violence in schools and disputes between neighbors. Within this collection of offenses, gun-related crime went down faster than did incidents without guns; assaults in domestic situations went down a bit more than others; and gang-related assault did not go down at all.

Figure 16  
Trends in Recorded Crime, 1991-2002



There are other ways of classifying offenses, and crimes in some of the most significant alternate categories also registered significant declines. For this purpose we sorted and categorized more than 7.34 million crime incident records for the 1991-2002 period. A category of special significance is gun crime. In many ways it is gun use that differentiates American crime from that of other nations. Combining all offenses in which a gun was used in some way, there was a 54 percent drop in the level of gun crime in Chicago between 1991 and 2002. Hold-ups of commercial establishments and store customers were less common than street robbery, but they declined as well, by 53 percent. Another offense category that resonates politically is “street crime.” To create a street-crime index, personal-crime incidents of all kinds were classified by their location, identifying those that took place on the street or sidewalks, in alleys and parks, along the lakefront, or in parking lots and driveways. By this measure, street crime declined by 45 percent.

In the property-crime category, motor vehicle theft was down by 47 percent between 1991 and 2002. This offense is accurately reported by victims and recorded by police, because of the high value of the average loss and the fact that most cars and trucks are insured against theft. Stolen vehicles are also sometimes recovered, which is another reason to keep accurate reports. Burglary, which typically involves break-ins of businesses, homes or garages, went down 51 percent. Burglary just of residences and garages dropped 46 percent. Simple property thefts declined 27 percent over the same period. A separate measure of thefts just from commercial establishments also registered a 27 percent decline.

## **Race and Trends in Crime**

Who enjoyed the benefits of the large drop in crime documented in Figure 16? To answer this, the city's police beats (a beat being the smallest administrative unit of the Police Department) were grouped by their racial composition, based on the 1990 census. In 1990, there were 71 predominately white beats, 121 heavily African-American areas, 32 areas of concentrated Latino residence and 46 diverse areas that were impossible to classify in simple fashion. There are 279 beats in the city, but only 270 of them are substantially residential (although still mixed) in character. The remainder include large commercial or industrial areas that are home to only a small number of people. The aggregated groups of beats differ in size, so the analysis here reports rates of crime per 100,000 persons living in each area.<sup>6</sup> It is important to examine crime rates because beats vary greatly in size and population. The boundaries for beats were drawn in the 1980s, and they were designed to equalize police workloads rather than population. Since then, both the workloads and populations of many beats have shifted substantially. In 2000, the smallest beat considered here was home to 1,062 people, and the largest had 27,500 inhabitants.


Figure 17 presents trends for a selection of personal crimes. As it illustrates, crime was down in all or most areas, but it declined most dramatically in African-American communities. These were the areas in which personal violence was disproportionately concentrated at the beginning of the 1990s. Crime rates generally declined the least in predominately white areas, where they were not very high at the outset. However, in percentage terms, even white beats enjoyed significant declines in violent crime during the course of the 1990s.

The large decrease in crime registered by residents of predominately African-American beats is apparent: robbery was down by 61 percent, rape by 43 percent, and murder by 26 percent.

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<sup>6</sup> Crime rate calculations used the estimated population for each aggregated group of beats for each year. These estimates were made by interpolating changes between the 1990 and 2000 census figures for each beat. This principally accounted for the fact that some predominately white beats in 1990 lost population by 2000 (overall, the city's white population dropped by 13 percent), while many predominately Latino beats gained population over the same period. The city's African-American population remained much more stable during this time. In order to keep the base the same, beats were classified on the basis of their 1990 population and remained in the same category for the entire period.

Figure 17  
Race and Trends in Violent Crime, 1991-2002




Other areas also saw significant percentage declines. For example, robbery in predominately white areas dropped 42 percent, and for Latino areas it was 50 percent. At the low end, the 27 percent decline in assault in African-American beats was paralleled by a 30 percent decline in heavily Latino areas and a 14 percent decline in predominately white neighborhoods. Perhaps the most significant story illustrated in Figure 17 is the decline in gun crime. In comparison to other areas, the most distinctive feature of crime in Chicago’s predominately African-American beats is the use of guns. In every crime category, both the gun crime rate and the percentage of crimes that involve guns is highest there. In 1991, for example, 41 percent of all robbery in predominately African-American beats involved a firearm, compared to 34 percent in white areas and 32 percent in predominately Latino beats. Virtually every homicide in African-American areas was by gun. Thus, it was doubly significant that leading up to 2002 the gun crime rate there dropped 58 percent, and the percentage of all personal offenses involving a gun dropped most there as well. Gun crime also declined by 40 percent in heavily Latino areas. However, it is apparent in Figure 17 that the real Chicago story was

the initially high level of crime in African-American beats, and how declining crime there largely powered the drop in violent crime in the city during the 1990s. The only disquieting news presented in Figure 17 is the leveling off – and even slight uptick – in violent crime trends in African-American neighborhoods between 2001 and 2002. One year does not make a trend – or signal a reversal of a strong one – but this is worth watching.

Figure 18 presents parallel trends in property-crime rates for the city. For African-Americans, the biggest decline was registered in the residential burglary category, which declined by 51 percent. For whites the comparable figure was 39 percent, and for Latinos it was 50 percent.

Figure 18  
Trends in Property Crime, 1991-2002




On the other hand, motor vehicle theft rates dropped in predominately white areas by 55 percent over the period, while they were down 37 percent in African-American beats and 42 percent in predominately Latino areas. Property theft was down by 25 percent to 35 percent everywhere but in racially diverse communities. In general, racial differences in property-crime rates were notably smaller than they were in the personal-crime category.

So, by the beginning of the 21st century, Chicago was a substantially safer place than it was 12 years before, and residents of African-American neighborhoods had seen much of that improvement. Compared to 1991, 2002 saw 26 percent fewer people murdered in African-American

areas of the city and 43 percent fewer raped. Gun crimes there dropped by 58 percent, and 2002 found 61 percent fewer people robbed in predominately African-American beats.

Figure 19, which presents two maps of the city, illustrates the dramatic consequences of this decline for the level of safety in Chicago. The left panel identifies 52 residential beats with the highest rates of robbery in 1991-92. These high-crime beats all exceeded 300 robberies per 10,000 residents. During that period they accounted for just 12 percent of the population of the city, but suffered 34 percent of the robbery in the city. They were all predominately African-American areas; at the median these 52 beats were 98 percent black, and more than one-third of the households were headed by single women. In contrast, the right panel presents the four residential beats where the

Figure 19  
High-Rate Robbery Beats, 1991-02 and 2001-02



robbery rate exceeded 300 in 2001-02. All were above the 300 threshold in 1991-92 as well, but the remaining 48 beats had dropped below that level by the turn of the century. These 52 beats reported 27,380 robberies during 1991-92, but they were home to just 8,159 in 2001-02. The robbery count there for the entire period was just under 95,000. However, if robbery had continued to occur at its 1991 level in these 52 beats, by 2002 that total would have been almost 182,000. They would have been victim to about 87,000 more robberies (in that hypothetical world) – a huge social cost.

## Why is Crime Down?

This section of the report describes some of the factors associated with crime drop in Chicago. Beat-level changes in crime were calculated by subtracting the 1991-92 crime rate for each residential beat from its 2001-02 figure. As in the analysis presented above, a two-year rate is used to smooth out chance fluctuations in crime rates for these small areas. An examination of the resulting crime rate change scores revealed several key features of the crime drop in Chicago. The first is that the drop in violent crime was a general one: most beats saw a decline. Assault declined in 80 percent of the city's beats, and rape declined in 87 percent. Robbery was down in 98 percent of beats, and all crimes involving a gun declined in 97 percent of these police areas. Murder was down the least, in 70 percent of beats. In a few beats the crime-rate decline was very large, and as a result the change measures were skewed. For example, one beat that suffered 365 robberies in 1991 had only 57 in 2001, while the population of the area rose by 13 percent. Statistical adjustment (a square root transform) was used to compensate for this.

To examine the factors associated with the crime drop, beat crime rate changes were linked to the findings of censuses in 1990 and 2000, Police Department data and beat-level measures created from surveys that the CAPS evaluation team has been conducting since 1993. The resulting data revealed that, because much of the drop took place in poorer African-American beats, practically none of the social factors linked to levels of crime are related in the same fashion to the reduction in crime. In Chicago, violent crime went down most in areas with low property values and high rates of building abandonment. It declined fastest where schools were not educating children and where health indicators (such as infant mortalities) were bad. The biggest declines were in areas with troubled families, drug problems and dangerous gangs. On the other hand, crime rates in Chicago declined least in better-off, healthier, better-educated, uncrowded drug- and gang-free neighborhoods. It was down least in neighborhoods that had the strongest collective capacity to respond to crime.

This is a study of trends in crime, however, so the real question is whether improvements in neighborhood conditions, community capacity, police effectiveness and other factors during the course of the 1990s could explain declining crime. This is a more promising way to look at the decline in crime, for the 2000 census and other measures indicate that many improvements in beat conditions during this period were concentrated in African-American beats, as were declines in crime. For example, the percentage of beat residents who were African-Americans in 1990 was correlated with an ensuing decline in the percentage who were extremely poor, an increase in the percentage who were high school and college graduates, and a large drop in the percentage of households headed by single women. Predominately African-American beats also displayed a decrease in the number of residents age 15 to 24, a high-risk age category in studies of offending. The 2000 census also registered significant improvements in Chicago's heavily Latino areas. The fewest relative improvements were registered in predominately white neighborhoods, where conditions were much better to start with. The analysis that is summarized

here thus focused on changes in levels of the explanatory factors, in accord with the study's focus on changes in levels of crime.<sup>7</sup>

### **Economic and Demographic Change**

At the beat level, a decline in violent crime was linked to a decline in the Latino and African-American share of the population, fewer males, fewer young people and a growth in the number of older residents. Reductions in crime were tied to a decline in poverty, increases in employment, growing income and homeownership, and a more educated population. Together, economic and demographic changes in the city's beats explained 28 percent of the variance in crime declines in Chicago. Recent trends may provide a future test of this conclusion, for early in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the United States faces economic stagnation, falling real wages for the poor and a rapidly increasing number of young adults.

### **Crime and Policing Factors**

There are fewer direct measures of other things we would like to know about the city, including the availability of guns, the activities of gangs, the extent of drug markets and police effectiveness. The indirect measures that are available come from police data and surveys conducted by the CAPS evaluation. Gun availability was measured by the percentage of robberies involving a gun, and declining gun availability was linked to a decline in personal crimes of all kinds. The role of drugs in crime decline was measured in three ways: by drug arrests for crack cocaine and heroin, by 911 calls to the police, and by surveys that measured changes in the extent of drug sales and use in the eyes of neighborhood residents. The arrest, 911 and survey measures pointed to the same conclusion: increasing enforcement rates were linked to lower levels of crime, and where residents reported fewer drug problems, violent crime was down as well. This is consistent with trends in public concern about neighborhood drug problems as well. Between 1993 and 2001, the largest declines were among Chicago's African-Americans, who also reported the largest drops in crime problems in general. Police effectiveness at dealing with violent crime was also examined, measured by the extent to which police were able to "clear" violent crimes by identifying their perpetrators. Increases in personal-crime clearances were linked to declining beat crime during the 1990s. On the other hand, there was mixed evidence concerning the effect of changing gang involvement on the drop in crime. At the beginning of this study, Chicago was home to the nation's largest and most powerful street gangs. Measures based on police data – changes in the percentage of murders and assaults involving a gang, and changes in the percentage of gun crimes involving a gang – did not link declining gang influence to a drop in violent crime. However, changes in survey-based reports of

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<sup>7</sup> A paper detailing the statistical analyses underlying these conclusions, The 2002 Beat Meeting Observation Study (CAPS-26), is available at the Institute for Policy Research website, [www.northwestern.edu/IPR/publications/policing.html](http://www.northwestern.edu/IPR/publications/policing.html).

the extent of gang problems by beat residents were tied to a drop in violent crime. Together, indicators of change in predatory gun availability, crack arrest rates, personal crime clearances, and gang involvement in personal crimes explained 23 percent of the decline in personal crime over the course of the 1990s in Chicago.

### **Community Prevention Factors**

A host of community factors have proven to be powerful correlates of levels of crime, but less is known about whether these can clearly be linked to changes in levels of crime. An analysis of several large-scale surveys, including those conducted for the CAPS evaluation and the Project in Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, suggests that the prevention and intervention capacity of Chicago's neighborhoods rose somewhat between the mid-1990s and the end of the decade. Beat-level measures of these factors were created by combining results of surveys conducted during 1993-96 and repeated later in the decade and in the early 2000s. Awareness of anti-crime activity was used as a general proxy for community mobilization around crime. The intervention capacity of beats was measured by combining responses to questions about the likelihood that neighbors would intervene to stop a fight and to stop youths from vandalizing a building. Organizational involvement was measured by combining reports of membership in block clubs and neighborhood watch groups. For the beats with sufficient sample size, changes in the visibility of anti-crime activism, beat intervention capacity and the organizational involvement of residents were correlated .20 to .30 with declining crime rates.

There are, of course, other factors that are potentially associated with the drop in crime, including some that research suggests may have played an important role in Chicago. However, there are no small-area data available for them over the 1991-2002 time span. These include the sheer number of police officers on the payroll, which increased by about 9 percent during the course of the 1990s. However, additional officers did not arrive in significant numbers until about 1996 – years after the drop in crime was already visible. Another potential factor is incarceration: in the State of Illinois the prison headcount grew from 24,700 to more than 43,100 between 1989 and 2002, a 75 percent increase. Some have argued that youths' taste for violence simply evaporated following the orgy of violence that began in the latter half of the 1980s, and that young people came to recognize the devastating effects of crack addiction and gave it up. Alcohol has long been the drug of choice among criminologists, after the earliest studies documented strong links between violence and alcohol use by both offenders and victims. There is also research on the effects of specific social policies, most prominently abortion. Some have concluded that liberalizing abortion policies beginning in the 1970s reduced the proportion of unwanted children and focused more attention on those who were born, and thus led to dropping crime two decades later. However, in no case do we have Chicago data on small areas, and over time, to test these assertions.

The timing issue is also significant when we ask about the impact of improvements in police management and operations. After reviewing the literature, John Eck and Edward Maguire concluded that there is no evidence that a decline in crime of the generality and magnitude evidenced in the United States can be linked to changes in police organization, policies or management. As in many cities, Chicago's crime drop began well before it began its community policing initiative and other administrative reforms.

Some of the best evidence of the added impact of community policing on crime in Chicago comes from the 1993-95 period. During that time, research was conducted in the prototype districts where CAPS was being developed, as well as in comparison areas where policing was being conducted as usual. The findings are reported in a 1997 book by Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M. Hartnett, *Community Policing, Chicago Style*. The evaluation indicated that the program reduced crime. As measured by surveys, crime dropped more in three experimental police districts than it did in matched comparison areas. The declines involved burglary and auto theft in one district, street crime in another, and gang and drug problems in two districts. Officially recorded auto theft, burglary, robbery and assault all declined in parallel with the survey findings.

And of course, Chicago police continue to innovate in response to changing patterns of crime. The city's lagging decline in homicide did not pass without notice. The local media concentrated on the difference between Chicago's murder count and that of New York City, for although the latter has more than twice Chicago's population, in 2001 (for example) it had fewer murders. The year 2001 also saw an actual uptick in the murder total, from 631 to 666 cases. When these trends became apparent in December 2001, the *Chicago Tribune's* headline read, "City to Get a Dubious Title: No. 1 in Murder." In response, the police have become more aggressive about searching for violent offenders wanted on warrants, and they patrol more heavily in areas with concentrated violence. The Department's drug-enforcement efforts are also more focused on drug-related violence. The Department reorganized detective work, returning to the old practice of assigning murder investigations to an elite homicide squad rather than parceling them out to detectives with more diverse caseloads. A series of forums chaired by the superintendent of police led to increased interagency cooperation in tackling violence in one of the city's highest homicide zones.

### **Public Perceptions of Crime**

While police figures provide one vantage point for assessing trends in crime, others are available. Officially collected data like that examined in this section have substantial limitations. Police are heavily dependent on the willingness of residents to report crimes, especially the kinds examined here. A rule of thumb is that about 50 percent of crimes go unreported. The police further screen complaints to ensure that they meet legal and bureaucratic requirements before filing official records, and this also reduces the count. As a result, the fall-off between crime as measured by victimization surveys and by Department records can be substantial. The national gap is about 60 percent, and in Chicago the difference between the two figures can range from 60 percent to 85 percent.

Survey measures of crime bypass these barriers by going directly to one group of potential victims, ordinary city residents, who are in a position to report on crime as it is experienced, rather than as it is counted. This experience can include not just their own victimization but also what they hear from friends and neighbors, and in local shops. Residents factor in what they can see with their own eyes, even if they are lucky enough not to be involved personally. Surveys also provide an alternative measure of two issues that are very ill-measured in official crime data – gangs and drugs. In the case of drugs, police work mostly with records of

drug arrests, but this is actually an enforcement measure. Gang activity is even more difficult to track separately from the success of police investigations.

As an alternative to official measures of drug and gang problems, yearly surveys questioned city residents about what was going on in their area. They were presented with a list of problems, and asked in each case to rate whether they were “no problem,” “some problem” or “a big problem” in their neighborhood. The problems on the list ranged widely and included several that focused on crime-related issues.


### **Drug and Gang Problems**

One of the most important problems on the list is drugs. Concern about drug problems is rampant. In the 2003 city survey, respondents were asked about “drug dealing on the streets,” and this ranked highest on the list of 12 problems. In 2003, 26 percent of Chicagoans rated drug dealing a “big problem” in their neighborhood. However, this concern is not adequately reflected in police statistics. As noted above, drug offenses are generally measured by arrests, but arrests most directly measure police effort rather than the extent of the problem. While residents do call 911 to complain about street drug markets and other drug-related offenses, their complaints are difficult for police to count because they represent suspicion and concern, rather than discrete events such as robberies or burglaries. Police count events; the general public is concerned about conditions. But while they are hard to officially count, street drug markets are not hard to spot. In one beat we have studied intensively, drug dealing takes place everywhere: along the major arterial and shopping streets, in front of liquor stores, in the front yards of houses and apartment buildings, along side streets, and on many street corners. Scores of men and teens loiter in the vicinity, some yelling “Rock!” and “Blow!” at passing cars to advertise their wares. Buyers pull over, exchange a few words and a handshake, and then move on. As police approach, cries of “Five-O” warn everyone to lie low, and they slowly scatter. There may be no arrests that night, but area residents have no difficulty recognizing they have a drug-market problem on their hands.

The disjuncture between citizens’ concerns and police incident counts is also apparent in a related problem – gangs. In Chicago, the best measure produced by police is the gang homicide rate; another is a count of gang-related criminal offenses. While these are carefully done, they only partly capture the reality of the city: when planning for CAPS began there were 130 serious street gangs with 36,000 members; 19,000 of them belonged to the four biggest gangs. Much of the city had been carved up into recognizable gang turfs where “enforcers” maintained discipline through the studied application of violence, and gangs monopolized the recruitment of new members and the sale of drugs and guns on the street. Many are well-known: organizations like the Black Gangster Disciples, the Vice Lords and the Imperial Insane Vice Lords dominate African-American areas, while the Latin Kings, Spanish Cobras, Latin Disciples, Familia Stones and others are active in Latino neighborhoods. Far from lying low, these gangs flaunt their presence through their dress, demeanor and turf-demarcating graffiti. The 2003 city survey asked about “shootings and violence by gangs,” and 21 percent of all respondents rated this a big problem in their neighborhood, placing it third on the list of public concerns.

The concentration of drug and gang problems in Latino and African-American areas is apparent in Figure 20. In 1994, 40 percent of African-Americans and more than 30 percent of Latinos rated gang violence a big problem, compared to only 10 percent of whites rating it so. Street gangs were one of the most commonly cited crime problems among Latino survey respondents. Chicago's Latino community is home to fighting gangs as well as to those plying the drug trade. There is inter-communal warfare between gangs of Mexican and Puerto Rican origin, and between them and African-American gangs along the periphery of their home turf. In contrast, drugs fund the operation of the large and powerful gangs dominating the city's African-American beats. Outbursts of gang violence there are frequently tied to conflict over control of street drug markets and illegal arms sales. Turf wars easily escalate into shootouts with semiautomatic weapons that put everyone in the neighborhood at risk. Residents speak at meetings with police about sleeping on the floor and away from the windows to avoid stray bullets, and many know families that have lost members to drug-related gang violence. The level of concern about street drug markets among African-Americans and Latinos can be seen in Figure 20 as well. In 1994, almost half of all African-Americans interviewed reported that drugs were a big problem in their area, compared to "only" 23 percent of Latinos.

Figure 20  
Neighborhood Crime Problems by Race, 1994-2001



However, during the course of the 1990s, many Chicagoans reported improvements in gang and drug problems. The decline in concern about gang violence among African-Americans was particularly noticeable; the percentage rating gang violence a big problem dropped by half, and this figure was down a bit for whites as well. Concern about street drug markets remained high among the city's African-Americans but dropped by about 10 percentage points during the 1990s. Like trends in many problems described in Figure 20, these declines slowed or came to a halt in the early 2000s, but levels of concern continued to hover at their lowest point.

Trends among Latinos are another story. As Figure 20 illustrates, concern about gang violence did not abate during the 1990s, and leapt in surveys conducted in 2001 and 2003. The percentage of Latinos rating street drug markets a big problem rose steadily during the 1990s and then spiked upward in 2001 before receding to its 1999 high. The different course traced by gang and drug problems in Latino neighborhoods dampened overall improvement in the city, because the Latino population was steadily growing, while the number of white residents – who reported fewer problems of all kinds – declined. We will further examine causes of these trends later in this report, for they were not unique to gang and drug issues. In brief, they were driven by language, immigration, poverty and the increasing concentration of the city's Latinos in emerging barrios in the city's near southwestern and northwestern quadrants.

### **Personal and Property Crime Problems**

Figure 20 also presents trends in survey measures of three personal- and property-crime problems. Respondents were quizzed about “cars being stolen,” “people breaking in or sneaking into homes to steal things” and “people being attacked or robbed” in their neighborhood. Figure 20 traces changes over time in the percentage of Chicagoans reporting these as “big problems” in their neighborhood. Trends in these three problems followed the same pattern. Concern about street crime dropped most, followed by reports of the extent of auto theft. In the early 1990s, African-Americans and Latinos reported about the same level of concern for every crime problem. Whites thought things were a bit better, except in the case of burglary. Then, during the course of the 1990s, the experiences of African-Americans and Latinos diverged. Over time, more and more African-Americans reported that things were not so bad, and by 2003 their scores in these problem indices dropped by about 10 percentage points. By 2003, their views had converged with those of whites, and they expressed relatively low levels of concern about personal and property crime. But there was again little good news in the 1990s for the city's growing Latino population. In the first survey they reported about the same level of crime problems as did African-Americans, but reports of concern by Latinos did not decline during the 1990s. Worse, their ratings jumped to new highs during the early 2000s. By 2003, the city's Latinos were three times more likely than whites and African-Americans to report that street crime, burglary and auto theft were big problems in their community. At the same time, perceived crime problems declined significantly for the city's whites, albeit it from an already low base.

## What Happened in the Latino Community?

Why didn't the survey-based trends match those for recorded crime in heavily Latino neighborhoods? We saw above that, by many measures, Chicago has become a substantially safer place. Crime was down tremendously in predominately African-American beats and noticeably in majority white areas. In the surveys, both whites and African-Americans reported fewer crime problems, and lower levels of fear, during the course of the 1990s. Based on official crime records, beats that were heavily Latino in composition shared in those improvements. Robbery was down there by 50 percent, rape by 45 percent and gun crime by 45 percent. In the property-crime category, burglary was down by 50 percent, and auto theft by 42 percent. However, in the surveys, Latinos reported more burglary, more street crime and more auto theft, rather than less.

Why is this the case? At least part of the answer can be found in demography. The Latino community is growing, partly due to internal growth, but more from immigration, and it has cleaved apart. Things have gotten better for established, English-speaking Latinos living in diverse areas. They have grown worse for Spanish-speakers concentrated in the city's growing number of heavily Latino neighborhoods. Because newcomers are increasingly more numerous than their counterparts, as a group Chicago's Latinos find themselves progressively worse off each year. This is not unique to crime problems; a later section of this report examines in great detail the impact of demographic change on a wide variety of neighborhood problems. The results of continued immigration can also be read in respondents' language of choice in our surveys. Spanish-speaking interviewers screened and interviewed the randomly selected respondents when they preferred to be interviewed in Spanish. Using this indicator of linguistic preference, about one-third of Latino respondents were classed as "Spanish-speakers" in the 1994 survey; in 1997 that figure was 49 percent, and by 1999 it was 61 percent, a tremendous demographic change.

The problem is that the city's growing Spanish-speaking immigrant population is avoiding contact with the police. The data document this in a variety of ways, and by inference it appears that the unwillingness of newcomers to entangle themselves with the police extends to reporting crimes when they occur. Thus, not only are things growing worse in the city's emerging barrios, but the recorded crime figures kept by the police are not adequately representing what goes on there.

Two analyses that examine this issue are presented in this section. The first is illustrated in Figure 21. It directly addresses, by race and language, the correspondence between official crime rates and survey reports of the extent of crime problems. To do so, levels of both survey-measured-crime and reported-crime rates are standardized at "100" in 1994. Then, trends in subsequent years are described as percentage changes, up or down, since 1994. This is done separately for whites, African-Americans and Latinos. So, for example, survey-measured auto-theft problems reported by whites dropped by about 60 percent between 1994 and 2003, while police-measured auto thefts in predominately white beats dropped by just over 40 percent by 2002. (Crime figures for 2003 were not available in time for inclusion in this report.) This approach addresses the fact that police records and the surveys measure crime in quite different ways, and it focuses attention on differences in trends in the two figures.

Figure 21  
 Official and Survey Crime Trends, 1994-2003




Figure 21 presents this analysis for three kinds of crime that were measured in approximately the same fashion in the surveys and in police records: residential burglary, robbery and auto theft. The figures “jump around” a bit in the early years of each series. The surveys were smaller during 1994-96, involving only 1,300 to 1,800 respondents each year; later they grew to 2,500 to 3,100 respondents per year. Community policing was just getting underway, and that may have had some effect on perceptions as well. However, in the main, trends in official and survey measures of crime dropped roughly in parallel for the city’s whites and African-Americans. Compared to the beginning, by the end of the time period both measures were decidedly down in every case. For whites and African-Americans, crime was certainly down, both in official figures and in their own perceptions.


However, the two measures did not readily correspond for the city’s Latinos. As the rightmost panels of Figure 21 illustrate, the experiences of English-speaking Latinos who were interviewed generally paralleled official figures for heavily Latino beats. The survey samples are smaller when Latinos are divided by language, so we cannot expect completely stable findings when they are divided by year as well. However, the contrast between trends reported by English-

and Spanish-speakers is striking. While English-speakers generally reported fewer crime problems over time, their counterparts progressively saw things getting worse. For Latinos, the disjuncture between trends in recorded crime and their everyday experiences can be traced directly to language and immigration.

A second look at the issue of crime in the city’s Latino neighborhoods is presented in Figure 22, which examines the frequency with which respondents recalled contacting the Chicago police. In the city surveys, citizen-initiated encounters with police are monitored using a nine-question list of the most frequent reasons that people contact them. These range from reporting a crime or suspicious persons to requesting routine information. In 2001, almost exactly 50 percent of Chicagoans age 18 and older recalled contacting the police for one or more of these reasons. The most frequent reason to contact police was to report a crime (24 percent). Reporting accidents or medical emergencies was a close second (19 percent). Between 10 percent and 12 percent recalled reporting suspicious persons or noises, or things “that might lead to a crime.” About the same proportion recalled giving the police information or contacting them regarding some other neighborhood concern or problem, and 17 percent reported contacting police to ask for advice or information.

However, the surveys indicate that reliance on police among the city’s Spanish-speakers is incommensurate with their concern about neighborhood problems. They have a lot of them, but they do not call to involve the police in resolving them. This is illustrated in Figure 22.

Figure 22  
Race, Neighborhood Problems and Contacts with Police, 2001



It links, by race and language group, contacts with the police to an index of neighborhood problems. The index is based on responses to 10 questions about community problems that were included in the 2001 city survey. The problems ranged from street crime to abandoned cars, public drinking and household burglary. Respondents were asked to rate each as either a big problem, some problem or no problem in their neighborhood. Their combined answers were classified into three categories as well, for presentation in Figure 22. (These questions are described in detail later in the report, in the discussion of CAPS problem-solving.) The figure indicates that the more concerned Chicagoans were about a broad range of neighborhood problems, the more likely they were to mobilize the police. This was true for whites, African-Americans and English-speaking Latinos. More than 80 percent of whites in the highest problem category reported having contacted the police in the past year, as did about two-thirds of African-Americans and Latinos who were interviewed in English. However, only slightly more than one-third of Spanish-speakers in the highest problem category recalled contacting the police.

The consequences of this unique relationship with the police among Spanish-speakers are magnified by the distribution of problems by race and language. Using the three categories of neighborhood problems reported in Figure 22, only 10 percent of whites live in areas that they rated as having severe problems; however, although they contacted the police frequently, there are not many in this group. Among African-Americans, 26 percent placed themselves in the highest-problem category, and for English-speaking Latinos it was 22 percent. But among Spanish-speakers, 66 percent rated their neighborhood in the most problem-ridden category. Spanish-speaking Latinos are heavily over-represented in areas plagued by gang violence, street drug markets, public drinking, auto theft and other serious problems. They thus suffer a double disadvantage: while plagued by the worst neighborhood conditions, they are very reluctant to involve the police in their problems. The dramatic differences in the rate at which English- and Spanish-speaking Latinos initiated encounters with the police suggests that language and immigration factors play a very large role in shaping the relationship between the city's newcomers and institutions of government. In conjunction with the findings presented above on trends in crime, it also implies that official rates of crime – which depend upon ordinary citizens contacting the police to make official reports – may not adequately reflect the problems facing those living in the city's heavily Spanish-speaking areas.

### **Trends in Fear of Crime**

Since about 1980, specialists in urban issues have stressed the importance of fear of crime, as well as actual victimization. In the 1970s, American cities felt the consequences of the flight to the suburbs of families who could afford to do so. This flight was in part a reaction to mounting center-city crime, as well as to perceived declines in the quality of schools and neighborhood life. By then, fear of crime had become a familiar component of the country's political rhetoric. Surveys indicated that many more people were fearful of crime than actually were victimized and that this fear undermined the quality of their lives. Even criminologists took up this argument. Michael Maltz famously noted that, "Unless the public feels safer in

proportion to its increased actual safety, the full potential of (crime control) improvements will not have been reached.”

But fear of crime represents more than just the level of officially recorded crime, and it does not merely reflect people’s objective risk of being victimized. Instead, their expressions of fear reflect a range of beliefs and experiences. These include people’s views of the actual risks they face, the threats they potentially might face, the likelihood that someone will come to their aid if they encounter trouble and their chances of remaining in one piece if they do get in trouble.

The multifaceted nature of fear of crime can be seen in Chicagoans’ concerns. This section examines trends in one of the most common measures of fear, responses to the question: “How safe do you feel or would you feel being alone outside in your neighborhood at night?” Respondents indicated whether they would feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe if faced by that situation. This question has been included in surveys conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, and it is commonly used in research on fear. It focuses on the potential for harm that people feel crime holds for them, or what they believe could happen to them if they exposed themselves to risk. Because the risk is posed by their own neighborhood, it is a close-to-home measure of fear.


This measure of fear is related to many other attitudes and experiences reported in the surveys. Not surprisingly, Chicagoans are more fearful when they think burglary or assault is a big problem in their neighborhood. They are also more fearful when they can see around them visible signs that the social order is breaking down. They report more fear in places where public drinking, loitering and graffiti are common, and they are most distressed by the appearance of street drug markets in their community. Fear is also linked to people’s views of the effectiveness of the police and the capacity of their neighbors to control crime. Chicagoans who feel that the police are doing a good job preventing crime are less fearful than those who are more skeptical. In the surveys, those who believe that their neighbors are watching out and will actively intervene when they spot trouble are less fearful still. In short, fear stems in part from the belief that standards of behavior are deteriorating and neither the police nor neighbors can do much about it. It is not just a reaction to official reports of crime. There is also a strong, independent effect of personal vulnerability on fear. As we shall see below, women and older people are more likely to report that they would feel unsafe outside after dark, as are renters, the poor and recent arrivals to the neighborhood. Finally, other studies find persistent evidence of the impact of television on people’s fears, and other research at Northwestern University has documented the adverse impact of stories and rumors that circulate about neighborhood crime. People’s views of crime have a variety of origins, and the significance of events for their own lives stems in part from both who they are and the context in which they live.

Figure 23 examines trends in fear in Chicago during the course of the 1990s. It presents trends separately by race, age, gender and (for Latinos) language preference. The trend lines report the percentage of respondents who indicated they would feel somewhat or very unsafe out alone in their own neighborhood at night. The data begin in 1994, the year of the first large citywide survey.

This figure depicts an impressive decline in levels of fear in Chicago over this 10-year period. As it indicates, some of the old division remains: even in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, men were less fearful than women. Whites continued to feel safer near home than did Latinos or African-Americans. English-speaking Latinos reported less concern about crime than did their Spanish-speaking counterparts, by a wide margin. Surprisingly, age differences in fear (here comparing the fears of those under age 35 and those 60 and older) virtually disappeared in Chicago at the end of the 1990s. This is surprising because age is one of the most reliable correlates of fear, and its apparent disappearance in Chicago should be the focus of more in-depth investigation.

However, the biggest story reported in Figure 23 is the downward trend in levels of fear in Chicago. Fear was down by 10 percentage points or so among men and younger people. In 1994, 30 percent of men surveyed reported they would be afraid to go out after dark; in 2003 the comparable figure was 20 percent. Levels of fear among the city's whites dropped by half, from 34 percent to 17 percent. However, fear was down more – by 20 percentage points or so – among African-Americans, women and older residents of the city. Among blacks, reports of fear dropped from 49 percent to 25 percent. For women the decline was from 49 percent to 31 percent, and among those over 60 years of age the drop was from 51 percent to 28 percent. By 2003, every group depicted in Figure 23 had fallen below the 50-percent-fearful mark, and seven of the nine were at or below 30 percent.

Figure 23  
Trends in Fear, by Race, Age, Gender and Language



The city's Latinos turned out to have made the fewest gains over this period. In comparison to 1994, fear levels for the group as a whole were down a bit by 2003, from 43 percent to 38 percent. However, the contrast between the concerns of the city's Latinos and those expressed by African-Americans is a dramatic one. Earlier in the decade African-Americans were the city's most fearful group, but as Figure 23 illustrates, by the turn of the century blacks felt significantly safer than the city's growing Latino population. As the lower-left panel in Figure 23 documents, the limited gains reported by Latinos were due largely to trends among Spanish-speakers, who changed little by this measure. In 1995, 52 percent of Spanish-speaking Latinos reported they would feel unsafe in their neighborhood after dark, and in 2003 that figure had dropped by only 4 percentage points. On the other hand, fear dropped among English-speaking Latinos from a high of 40 percent down to 25 percent. But because Spanish-speakers are the fastest-growing component of the city's Latino population, their impact on these figures grew during the course of the 1990s, slowing progress for the group as a whole.

These trends are significant because fear of crime is an important social and political fact. At least since the 1970s, fear of crime has become a familiar component of the nation's political rhetoric. The costs of fear are both individual and collective. For individuals, fear can confine them to their homes, and it undermines their trust in their neighbors and – especially – in their neighbors' children. Fear is a key “quality of life” issue for many people. Research also indicates that concern about crime has bad consequences for the neighborhoods in which we live. Fear leads to withdrawal from public life, and it undermines informal and organized efforts by the community to control crime and delinquency. It is difficult to organize activities in neighborhoods where people fear their own neighbors. Fear undermines the value of residential property and thus the willingness of owners to maintain it properly. When customers – and even employees – fear entering a commercial area, the viability of businesses located there declines. Finally, in Chicago, as elsewhere, fear of crime has been one of the most important factors driving residents to the suburbs, encouraging race and class segregation and undermining the political importance of American cities.

But can police do more to reduce levels of fear? As earlier comments on the sources of fear indicate, “getting crime down” is only part of the picture. It is not to be discounted, to be sure. The very large declines in fear reported by the city's African-Americans may be testimony to the tremendous drop in reported crime in predominately African-American areas during the course of the 1990s. However, personal vulnerability factors are also important determinants of fear, and these factors are beyond the range of police efforts. The police can focus on the targeted delivery of services to older residents in particular and, in Chicago, assigning officers to conduct senior programs in every police district reflects this priority.

But some important aspects of fear are in the hands of the police. Research on the “reassurance” component of policing points to the importance of police efforts in alleviating fear. For example, in some communities police periodically visit all households and businesses in their area, to learn what is bothering residents and what problems need solving. In a well-organized program, there is a management system in place to make sure that officers address the concerns identified; research indicates that this is an effective crime-fighting tool. Being able to identify and respond to local priorities is also one of the most important aspects of community policing. Rather

than making house-to-house visits, Chicago relies on beat community meetings to give voice to neighbors' concerns. This can be effective for those who attend, but in a typical beat only about 0.4 percent of the adult population does so. And, as an earlier section of this report documented, beat meetings are also not particularly representative of the communities in which they are held.

There are also important community components to fear that police can foster and support. In some cities, police help organize neighborhood groups, and train and provide them with equipment. They encourage turnout at neighborhood events, including "take back the night" marches and other collective anti-crime demonstrations. The efforts of Chicago's CAPS Implementation Office are on the mark in this regard. As described elsewhere in this report, its workers organize block clubs, recruit residents for rallies and marches, and focus city services on particularly troubled areas. However, Chicago police are not as involved in community-based crime-prevention projects as are those in other innovative cities. In those, police conduct household security surveys to advise residents about what they can do to "harden the target" against crimes such as burglary. They also assist poorer residents in upgrading lock and door standards, and they press landlords to enhance building security and ensure that door buzzers and other access control devices are actually working. In Chicago, officers do lecture audiences on how to protect themselves on the street and guide them through the process of calling 311 or 911 in appropriate circumstances.


However, Chicago police have been particularly supportive of another popular approach to crime control and community-building – neighborhood patrol groups. These patrols may deter some crimes because of their visible presence on the street and because patrol group members usually carry cell phones or radios so they can notify police directly when they are needed to intervene. Perhaps as importantly, their visible presence on the street can help reassure residents that the community's intervention capacity is alive and well – an important component of fear.

Police can also take more responsibility for providing service to crime victims. Traditionally they have defined "good service" as driving quickly to the scene when called. Research on police effectiveness in helping victims suggests that they are often not very good at it. In fact, victims are often more fearful as a result of their contact with police. Research has documented that victims have a list of specific and immediate needs. They need information, recognition, advice, support, protection and reassurance from the police, and usually they get little on their list. In this light, it is important to note that Chicago police come off worst with the public when it comes to providing service to victims. As noted elsewhere in this report, service for victims is the lowest-rated of 10 dimensions on which survey respondents were asked to rate the quality of police service. This is ironic, for by many measures victims – and there are a lot of them – are the most important customers of the police. Recently, the Chicago police have been receiving about 5 million 911 calls each year, and the surveys indicate that about 59 percent of all adult Chicagoans have personal contact with a police officer in the course of a year. The city has a well-developed program for responding to the targets of domestic violence, but otherwise crime victims are on their own.

## How Did Chicago Do?

Our report published in 2003 compared Chicago with national crime trends for the 1991-2001 period. By this standard, robbery declined more quickly in Chicago than it did for the nation as a whole. City and national trend lines were virtually identical for burglary until the end of the 1990s, when the national rate of decline slowed noticeably, while Chicago's continued to decline. Chicago's auto-theft rate fell faster than the nation's during much of the 1990s, and while the national auto-theft rate spiked upward in 2001, Chicago's continued to decline. Murder was a different matter. The city's homicide rate declined more slowly than it did for the nation, and by the first year of the new century Chicago's rate had dropped 31 percent, while the national rate had dropped by 41 percent.

Figure 24  
Robbery Trends in 10 Cities, 1991-2002




This report compares trends in other big cities with crime in Chicago, over the 1991-2002 period. Big cities perhaps provide a fairer standard by which to evaluate the extent of the drop in crime in Chicago. The other big cities are the nine with populations of about a million or more: Detroit, Phoenix, Houston, San Antonio, San Diego, Los Angeles, Dallas, Philadelphia and New York. Figure 24 examines trends in all of the cities for a single crime – robbery. The robbery rate in these cities varied considerably. In 1991, it was 1,340 for every 100,000 residents in New York City, while in San Diego it was 470 per 100,000. In order to subtract out these differences in levels of crime, Figure 24 standardizes each city's crime rate at "100" in 1991. Comparable trends in crime are then depicted as a percentage of the 1991 rate. For example, by 2002 Chicago's robbery rate had

dropped to just 40 percent of its 1991 level. Note that based on this comparison San Diego and New York City experienced about the same trend in crime, despite their dissimilar levels of crime.

In this comparative perspective, Chicago stands in the middle of the pack, but closer to cities like New York and San Diego, which have reported the largest decreases in robbery. Robbery rates actually increased in a few cities early in the 2000s, notably Houston and San Antonio. Los Angeles ended up in a virtual dead heat with Chicago because robbery rates rose there after 1999. Trends in Phoenix and Philadelphia did not match those for other big cities, and they ended the period with far smaller declines in robbery. In terms of robbery, Chicago compares favorably with the bulk of its peer communities.

Figure 25 expands the scope of this comparison to include other categories of crime. To do this, it averages the trend lines for the other nine large cities, thus comparing Chicago to “big-city America” in general. As it illustrates, Chicago lagged in homicide. Since 1991, big-city murder has gone down quickly, ending at exactly half its original level by 2002. This contrasts with Chicago’s one-third decline, to 67 percent of its 1991 number. On the other hand, Chicago did better than average in the robbery category, as noted above. Chicago essentially matched the very substantial declines that took place in big-city burglary and auto theft during the course of the 1990s. By 2002, big-city burglary (in all of the cities including Chicago) stood at less than half its 1991 level, and auto theft at about 55 percent of its earlier figure.

Figure 25  
Chicago and Big-City Trends in Crime, 1991-2002



## Tackling Neighborhood Problems

In Chicago, policing is not just about crime. In the CAPS model, police are to move beyond driving to the scene quickly in response to individual 911 calls. They are to adopt instead a proactive, prevention-oriented stance toward a wide range of neighborhood problems. In addition, they have taken responsibility for a wider range of neighborhood problems. Community policing inevitably involves an expansion of the police mandate to include concerns that previously lay outside their competence. A growing job description is probably typical of agencies that launch serious community policing initiatives. In Chicago, the expansion of the police mandate had two sources. The police took on new responsibilities because they needed to be able to respond to the concerns expressed by residents at beat meetings and other public venues, and because Chicago took seriously the "broken windows" view of crime and neighborhood decline.

First, residents put it on their agenda. When beat officers face residents at neighborhood beat meetings, concerns that are voiced include all manner of problems. The public does not make neat legal or bureaucratic distinctions about the forces that threaten to drive their neighborhoods down. The types of crimes that police traditionally tackle are fairly low on the public's list of concerns. Residents are as worried about garbage-strewn alleys, graffiti on garage doors and landlords renting to threatening-looking people as they are about burglary and car theft. This was documented when we analyzed 2,500 reports filed by officers after their monthly meetings with residents during 1998. At the meetings there was discussion of 11,221 problems. The largest category – constituting 36 percent of those discussions – fell into a "social disorder" category that is examined in detail in this section. Residents talked about loitering, prostitution, public drinking and various fears about teenage conduct. Next came discussion of a traditional target of policing, drug markets (24 percent of discussions). The third most common topic of concern, constituting 12 percent of discussions at beat meetings, was physical decay. This included expressions of concern about graffiti, vandalism, abandoned buildings, and trash and junks in vacant lots. Even at police-sponsored beat meetings, talk about individual victimizing crimes like robbery and burglary arose only 9 percent of the time, tied exactly with complaints about parking and traffic problems. When the program was developed, CAPS planners knew that if their officers' response to community concerns was "that's not a police matter," many residents would not show up for subsequent meetings. Thus, they needed to have a plan in place to deal with issues that concerned the public.

Second, by the time CAPS began, police took what is known as the "broken windows" argument seriously. In 1982, noted criminologists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling advanced the idea that disorder undermines the capacity of a neighborhood to defend itself. They focused mainly on problems we classify as social disorder. Wilson and Kelling's list included public gambling, public drinking, street prostitution, congregations of idle men and bands of youths dressed in (apparently) gang-related apparel, and activities like panhandling, disturbing the peace, loitering and vagrancy. Residents take these as signs that others have given up, and they give up as well. Those who can do so move away, and many of the remainder hunker down to stay out of trouble.

The broken windows perspective is that the emergence of visible signs that the community has ceased to care or intervene also invites predatory troublemakers from outside the neighborhood to join unruly insiders, thus creating new possibilities for crime. Gambling and drinking lead to robberies and fights; prostitution and drug sales attract those who prey on the customers. Social disorder thus begets an even broader range of problems and can, in short order, inundate an area with serious and victimizing crime. The title of Wilson and Kelling's argument suggests that the signs of physical decay need to be addressed as well. The decline of community control may be read in dilapidation, abandoned buildings, broken streetlights, trash-filled vacant lots, graffiti and garbage-strewn alleys blocked by abandoned cars.

The belief that "broken windows" are a cause of crime and neighborhood decline was the second force pushing expansion of the police mandate in Chicago. It is widely believed that crime is rooted in a range of neighborhood conditions and events, and that it is necessary to address both criminal and criminogenic problems if the city is to take its mission of preserving the city's neighborhoods seriously. A 1996 Police Department document describing its rationale for community policing noted,

. . . CAPS recognizes that graffiti, abandoned vehicles and buildings, malfunctioning street lights and other signs of neighborhood disorder do have an adverse effect on both crime and the public's fear of crime. By addressing these relatively minor problems early on, police and other government agencies can prevent them from becoming more serious and widespread crime problems.

As a result of this expansion of the police mandate, the Department now finds itself involved in orchestrating neighborhood cleanups and graffiti paint-outs. Districts have "problem-buildings officers" who inventory dilapidated and abandoned structures and track down property owners. Police stand with residents at prayer vigils and guard barbeque "smoke-outs" in prostitution zones, distribute bracelets that identify senior citizens if they fall down and they take note of burnt-out street lights and trees that needed trimming. They are steered toward problems like the sale of loose cigarettes and individual cans of beer, as well as toward the open-air drug markets that plague too many city neighborhoods.

An important feature of Chicago's approach to solving these problems is that it does not just involve arresting people. Unlike New York's "zero tolerance" approach to addressing community problems by making tens of thousands of arrests for minor offenses, Chicago's solution for broken windows is to fix the windows. It is also supposed to be strongly prevention-oriented in its approach to both crime and associated neighborhood problems. The Police Department's 1993 description of its brand-new program stated:

It is this focus on prevention through a stronger government-community partnership that holds real hope for addressing some of the City's most difficult neighborhood problems — and for doing so in a way that is far less expensive than constantly reacting to those problems after the fact.

To accomplish this, the city is confronting a wide range of neighborhood problems with a diverse package of solutions, and the police are just one tool for addressing these issues. In Chicago, community policing is the city's program, not just the Police Department's program. This section first describes some innovative problem-solving partnerships that police have developed with other agencies. It then examines resident involvement in problem-solving, because the rhetoric of community policing in Chicago has a strong "self-help" component. The section then details trends in two kinds of problems that were a special focus of agency and community partnerships – physical decay and social disorder.

### **Agency Partnerships**

While it was apparent to CAPS planners that they needed the capacity to respond to a broad range of troublesome and perhaps criminogenic problems, it was clear police were not going to actually do all the work. Police officers might learn at a beat meeting that rats in the alley are a priority concern to residents, but someone else would have to bait the traps. To get things done, police had to forge new relationships with a range of city agencies. This was often not easy. The various bureaucracies involved – including the police – were divided by their differing priorities and operating routines, as well as by their notions of what "speedy service" entailed. Many of the agencies eventually involved in CAPS performed familiar tasks, including trimming trees (to cast more light on street drug markets, for example), towing abandoned cars and installing stop signs at dangerous intersections. But in addition, new units were created or got involved for the first time in coordinated problem-solving projects. Their efforts are aimed at the social-disorder and physical-decay problems we track using surveys and reports from beat meetings, and trends in disorder and decay will be examined in detail later in this section.

### **Code Enforcement**

One problem-solving tool is the city's Strategic Inspections Task Force (SITF), which was formed in 1996. Prior to the formation of the SITF, each department handling inspections acted largely independently, following its own schedule and using its own personnel. The task force took responsibility for coordinating some of the efforts of individual departments by banding teams of inspectors to work together to focus on buildings that were special targets of the police. SITF teams are composed of inspectors detailed from the Buildings, Fire and Police Departments. Inspectors from the Department of Revenue are called in if a place with a business license is targeted, and health inspectors turn out for actions involving restaurants. Four teams of inspectors are in the field at the same time, some working in bulletproof vests and all guided to their targets and protected by district officers. In one police area (a group of five districts), to support the work of SITF, the area deputy chief created a team that specialized in identifying problem buildings and discovering the often-hidden identity of their owners.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> In 2001, this project won the Quality in Law Enforcement Award from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, sponsored by Motorola Corp.

SITF inspections are conducted on a rotating schedule in each police district. A team can inspect seven or eight properties per day. Inspectors do a crime-abatement survey, looking for signs of gangs and illegal activity as well as building code violations; in addition, they compile a list of recommendations about how to fix the building. Equipped with digital cameras, inspectors can include in their reports pictures of the conditions they find. The results are given to city attorneys stationed in each of the city's five police area headquarters buildings who initiate actions against owners before administrative hearing officers or in criminal court. Through reports it generates, SITF keeps its city partners and the community apprised of the status of buildings it inspects. Teams also conduct re-inspections to ensure that landlords follow up on the renovation plans they negotiate with the city. SITF teams can also recommend "fast track" demolition of particularly unsafe buildings.

The task force handles a substantial number of cases. In 2002 it inspected almost 6,000 buildings. Because most SITF cases involve enforcing city codes, they fall under the jurisdiction of the city's administrative hearing process, which is described below. For example, one South Side duplex was referred to the city attorney by district police after a narcotics arrest was made there. The SITF inspection revealed 11 building code violations, resulting in the city filing a case against the building owner in the administrative hearing unit. The owner subsequently agreed to a negotiated settlement that included correcting the violations, attending local beat meetings and paying a fine.

The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority conducted an evaluation that included an analysis of SITF. The study found that crime decreased where SITF and city attorneys operated, not only in targeted buildings, but in a half-block area around each property as well. This deterrent effect was lasting, continuing even after inspection teams left the area. SITF also has successfully driven building owners to comply with code standards. A senior SITF administrator reports that, when cited for building code violations, most owners fully comply or attempt to fix the problem; of cases that go on to a hearing, he estimates that half are quickly resolved as buildings are brought into compliance. Landlords who fail to comply are subject to further prosecution.

### **Drug and Gang House Enforcement**

The city's Drug and Gang House Enforcement Section (DGHES) plays a prominent role in problem-solving. Chicago's Department of Law formed DGHES to use the city's 1996 drug and gang house ordinance to prosecute negligent property owners. City attorneys are assigned to each of the five police areas. They focus on crime in and around gang or drug houses and abandoned buildings. Most of their cases are referred by SITF teams or by the police districts. The drug and gang house ordinance holds property owners responsible for physical conditions and criminal activities in and around their buildings. DGHES attorneys use municipal code violations and crime patterns to target selected buildings, with the goal of renovating them and deterring future negligence.

DGHES was formed because the city's Department of Law wanted to get more involved with the community and viewed the recent creation of the SITF as a vehicle for doing so. They thought their possible role had been overlooked when CAPS was planned. As one DGHES administrator put it, "No one looked at how civil enforcement can impact quality-of-life issues. Wouldn't it be great to have a municipal prosecutor be part of the pie — to deal with problem-solving in districts [using] the CAPS model?" After experimenting for a year in a few pilot police districts, the project expanded citywide in 1998. Staff attorneys represent their parts of the city, handling each case from beginning to end.

Cases come to an attorney's attention mainly through the police. Each district has police officers designated to act as their liaison for drug and gang house projects. Officers refer five or so problem properties to the district's DGHES attorney every six weeks. Properties are chosen based on community complaints, arrests and calls for service. The city attorneys usually attend police district management team meetings, so they also know which buildings lie in the Department's priority areas. A few cases are referred to attorneys through aldermanic complaints or beat community meetings. A DGHES committee also prioritizes cases involving owners of a string of bad buildings. Over time the program has shifted its focus somewhat, taking on bigger cases involving the most serious crimes. As one staff member put it, they ". . . take a big problem and have a big solution, rather than more properties with small fines and small solutions."

To pursue cases, DGHES attorneys cite municipal code violations documented by SITF and crime data revealed by police databases. They target property owners rather than the persons committing the criminal activity, though these may be the same. In order to prosecute, there must be at least one felony or two misdemeanors related to the property. Landlords are sent a notice of violation requiring them to meet with the DGHES attorney and a police representative at a resolution meeting. They can attend with or without a lawyer; owners who fail to show up risk a jail sentence.

The goal of resolution meetings is reach an agreement about what must be done to abate problems that contribute to criminal activity in and around the property. A resolution meeting alone often leads to a negotiated solution for a problem building. DGHES attorneys have the interest of the community in mind as they tackle these cases, so solutions vary. They may seek to fine building owners or to force them to install new security measures at the building, to repair code violations, to evict problem tenants, or to close and board up the building – or to impose any combination of these remedies. If illegal apartments have been carved into a building, they must be removed. Landlords can be required to post "no loitering" signs and upgrade exterior lighting. They often find themselves agreeing, as part of a settlement, to attend beat meetings and to take the city's landlord training course (see below) to learn how to screen potential tenants. Sometimes the solution lies in informing an absentee landlord about the problem or providing assistance to an inexperienced landlord. "We give them leniency if they're willing to fix the problem. If not, we seek fines and remedies, including security guards and physical improvement to the property," stated one assistant corporation counsel.

Most cases involving landlords are resolved through an agreement signed by the landlord and the attorney. Charges against families or homeowners can be more difficult to resolve through negotiation, in part because they have fewer resources. If the parties cannot agree, the issue is taken to an administrative hearing officer (see below), or to criminal court. If the initial problem is very severe, an agreement is broken, or the landlord does not respond to the notice of violation, cases go directly to an administrative hearing or criminal court. The city has a stiff criminal housing management ordinance that can be used in the most egregious cases. Whether the case is resolved through agreement or by a formal decision, police and DGHES staff monitor the property in question for compliance with the abatement plan.

Residents attend hearings to a varying degree; some attorneys emphasize resident involvement because they believe it encourages better settlements or stiffer sentences from judges and hearing officers. Others view the program as having become more routine and professional, and as a result more insulated from day-to-day community involvement. After several years of more casual management, the program now maintains a database for its activities. Reports now showcase the dollar amount collected through fines rather than the informal settlements that enabled landlords to use their money to fix their properties.

### **Administrative Hearings**

One arm of the city's apparatus to enforce codes and statutes is its Department of Administrative Hearings. Founded in 1997, it was the first municipal administrative adjudication agency in the nation. It provides a "quasi-judicial" forum for adjudicating violations of municipal ordinances, including those brought forward by the SITF and city lawyers working with police. Instead of judges, trained attorneys serve as hearing officers. Persons cited for municipal ordinance violations attend, either with or without a lawyer of their own. The city is represented by an assistant corporation counsel. Hearing officers cannot jail anyone; that still requires action by a judge. But they can level monetary fines, order restitution, suspend various licenses and direct violators to perform community service. They can also issue "orders of compliance" which, if violated, automatically become a criminal offense.

Interestingly, judgements against landlords of problem buildings commonly include a requirement that they regularly attend beat meetings in their area, and our observers attended beat meetings at which city attorneys appeared to report on the progress of a case. In one instance:

A drug and gang house attorney for the city thanked everyone who came to court for an abandoned-building case. She said that the owner refused to cooperate. She had brought copies of the court order against the landlord, so that residents will know when she is violating the order. She said that court is the "last thing we want to do." She said that the order requires the woman to come to beat meetings, where she will not be allowed to cause disruptions. The woman is required to listen to the problems of the community and if she causes difficulties she will not get credit for coming to the meeting.

In 2000, this branch of city government heard more than 400,000 cases. Among the city agencies able to use the hearing system to enforce codes are the Department of Buildings (for code violations as well as for drug and gang house activities); Streets and Sanitation (for overflowing garbage bins); Department of Zoning (illegal residential conversions as well as unlawful or unlicensed businesses); and the Department of Public Health (unsanitary stores, outdated food and rat infestation). In 2002 the agency heard more than 38,000 health and garbage-related cases.

This administrative process was created to increase the efficiency of ordinance enforcement. A looser standard of judgement prevails, making it easier to fine people. At an administrative hearing, only a “preponderance of the evidence” is required to collect a fine; proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” is not required. The inspector or police officer who issues a violation notice is not required to be there, a very important cost savings for the city. In practice, issuance of the citation that brought the recipient to a hearing is routinely accepted as evidence enough, and it is difficult for anyone to get off. Unlike the courts, administrative hearing officers take these kinds of offenses seriously; their training encourages them to play an active role in imposing order in the city’s neighborhoods. The curriculum emphasizes that quality-of-life offenses impact the life of the community and rebuffs any notion that these offenses are merely “petty” or “victimless” offenses. Trainees visit selected neighborhoods to observe city inspectors, investigators and police officers working in the field.

For police and the city attorneys assigned to work with them, one important role of the administrative hearings system is that it facilitates negotiated settlements that achieve their real goal – to clean up bad buildings, not to collect fines. One case we followed closely involved a two-story building with a liquor store on the first floor and apartments above. It was connected to a small courtyard apartment building around the corner. In a 12-month period the complex generated 960 calls to 911, which got the attention of the police. Bands of loitering men, including many who were drinking, routinely gathered in front of the liquor store, and drug dealers worked out of the apartment building. Inside, the building was in complete disarray, with open sewage running through the basement and rats everywhere. The area deputy chief and the attorney representing his area tackled the building, beginning with an SITF inspection of the premises. Implementation Office organizers turned up at the ensuing administrative hearing with a busload of residents who had been complaining about the building at beat meetings. The police commander described them to the startled defense counsel as his “witnesses.” At the hearing, the building owner was fined \$50,000 for building code violations. However, the real function of this impending financial blow was to encourage him to agree to a formal abatement plan drafted by the attorneys involved. In the end the owner paid a \$10,000 fine and spent the remaining funds on carrying out the terms of the plan. The liquor store operator was ordered to leave because he had violated the terms of his lease (something the landlord had somehow overlooked before). This automatically triggered an instant revocation of his license without any involvement at all by the liquor commission (see below). The owner also agreed to hire two armed security guards who would patrol the corner during agreed-upon periods of the day. The guards (and the police) were given a list of tenants, so that persons not on the list could be challenged and forced to leave. The police contributed a team that backed up the guards, and district cars patrolled the area heavily. While police were there in large numbers, city agencies

undertook a coordinated “service blitz” (see below); they cleaned the streets and alleys, aggressively towed cars and improved street lighting. Police occasionally attempted to make undercover drug purchases in the area, to make sure there was no backsliding. And, of course, the building owner had to respond to all of his building code violations.

### **Landlord Training**

In addition to aggressively enforcing codes and statutes, the city tries to develop a constructive relationship with building owners and managers. “Bad buildings” are a frequent topic of discussion at beat meetings. Bad buildings are places where residents and hangers-on can be seen congregating day and night, and where there is rumored to be drug dealing or fencing of stolen goods going on. In bad buildings residents “air mail” their trash into the alley rather than trudging downstairs to deposit it in cans. Children who live there apparently do not go to school. Residents and police lay some of the blame for bad buildings on landlords – frequently absentees – who pay little heed to whom they lease. However, the city’s 1996 drug and gang house ordinance raised the ante for them. As described in a city brochure for building owners, “The ordinance makes it illegal for any person who owns, manages or controls a property to encourage or permit prostitution, drug trafficking or other illegal activity on the premises.” Owners can be fined up to \$500 for each offense on their property.

To help them control their buildings, the city began a landlord training program in 1997. It is conducted by the Department of Buildings and the police. Monthly training sessions are held in each of city’s five police areas. Owners of buildings targeted by SITF inspectors and DGHES attorneys are particularly likely to attend, sometimes being required to do so in the agreements reached in the administrative hearings process. About 800 landlords representing more than 10,000 rental units attended during 2003.

At the sessions landlords and building managers learned about the law governing tenants and landlords, and modeled procedures for screening and selecting tenants. There was discussion of management tricks they could employ to deal with problem residents, building security measures and ways in which to work with the police to deal with emerging crime problems in their buildings. They were also reminded that the law required them to “. . . take reasonable measures to prevent the recurrence of the illegal activity.” Measures such as installing lighting, hiring security guards, and evicting tenants were also discussed.

CAPS Implementation Office staff also worked with landlords. One organizer from the Southwest Side described how this went.

I contacted the owner of a problem building and discovered that he was in the process of evicting five tenants and asked him to contact the block club president, suggesting that people from the block could sit with prospective tenants. This would get them on board, “like a welcome wagon,” though they’d also be told that they’re being watched. The owner was happy to hear about this. People are shocked to know that the owners know about the problem and were trying to do something about it. I told [the block club], “Now you have to show them some support.”

## Liquor Regulation

Criminologists long ago established a close causal connection between alcohol and crime, especially violence between individuals. There is a strong association between alcohol sales and a long list of crimes and disorders, including assault, robbery, sexual assault and prostitution. Statistically, there are untoward effects of both package carry-out and on-site-consumption establishments. The density of nearby liquor outlets also statistically reduces residential property values. Customers can create parking congestion on nearby residential streets. One link between liquor establishments and other problems is that conditions “inside” can spill “outside.” Taverns may generate noise, including after hours. Drinking may continue out of doors. Urinating in public, throwing beer cans at passing cars and hurling abuse at citizens passing by may occur. In many Chicago neighborhoods, groups of men can also be observed drinking outside convenience grocery stores and liquor outlets where they bought their goods, especially establishments that sell individual cans of cold beer, small bottles of liquor and “loosies” (individual cigarettes). Package stores may also fail to carefully monitor the age of their customers. At the successful conclusion of a campaign to close 27 liquor outlets in one small precinct on the far South Side, a resident voiced her view of the problems the outlets created:

It belittled the neighborhood . . . It was a problem, all this hanging-out, begging, wondering who was going to get robbed, wondering who’s going to ask you for rock or weed. All you saw was negativity.

Chicagoans noticed. In the 1999 city survey, for example, 20 percent indicated that public drinking – just one manifestation of liquor issues – was a big problem in their neighborhood, and another 30 percent reported that it was at least some problem. Latinos were most likely to report it as a big problem (28 percent did so); younger respondents were more concerned than older ones, and better-off people were generally less concerned than were the not-so-well-off. One resident whose views count for a great deal is the mayor, who is of the opinion that one of his predecessors issued far too many liquor licenses during her short stay in office, and he wants a significant reduction in the number of taverns and package stores operating in and near residential areas.

City ordinances provide the police and neighborhood residents with several mechanisms for tackling liquor issues. At beat meetings, residents share information with police about problems created by “bad” establishments. The liquor commission – one of the city’s more hard-working and corruption-free agencies – routinely holds informal meetings at which members of the public can bring problems to the attention of the licensing authority. If five or more residents file a complaint, the liquor commission compels the licensee to appear at a meeting to consider the complaints and to discuss with residents and a commission representative whether there are remedies for the problem. The commission must balance the rights of landlords and license holders with those of nearby residents. While holding a great deal of formal authority, the commission frequently attempts to broker informal, negotiated solutions to specific problems that satisfy the needs of the protagonists. In cases where these solutions fail, the commission can levy fines and suspend or revoke the licenses of individual establishments.

A more draconian instrument is a “vote dry” referendum. Through the “vote dry” process, city statutes allow area residents to vote in general elections to prohibit the sale of alcohol in their electoral precinct (a very small area). During the mid-1990s, representatives of the mayor’s office, the liquor commission, the city’s attorney, and the CAPS Implementation Office participated in repeated seminars and conferences explaining how to use this tool, and the city distributed information packets informing residents how to vote dry a premise or an entire precinct. Informational meetings were held in each police district. The city’s cable channel aired a program on local liquor referenda. “Bad Liquor Establishments: What You Can Do!” aired on a fairly continuous basis and listed the times and locations of area vote dry meetings.

On the police side, action against troublesome liquor establishments traditionally was cumbersome and time-consuming, because of the liquor commission’s hearing arrangements and the representation of licensees by their attorneys in an environment that formally respected their right to be in business. However, things got much easier when – as described above – an area deputy chief invented the tactic of addressing liquor problems through the interests of the landlord, who typically was someone else. In practice, buildings hosting problem liquor establishments can usually be found in violation of a list of city building, health, and safety ordinances. Goaded by the threat of a hefty fine in an administrative hearing, landlords usually find grounds for terminating the liquor store’s lease, which leads to the automatic revocation of the store’s license to do business, without further hearings at all.

### **School Safety**

Schools should be natural partners in any community safety program. They certainly can be loci for problems. Rambunctious youths are corseted there all day, and they surge through the surrounding neighborhood on their journey to and from school. National surveys of students indicate that levels of fear and even criminal victimization can be high in schools, and that it is easy to get drugs and even weapons in and around many schools. In Illinois, a 1990 statewide survey of public high schools found that one in four students feared violence in school and one in five during the journey to and from school. One in three Illinois students reported they had carried a weapon to school; one in three said that they knew someone who had dropped out of school due to gangs; and half said it was easy to get marijuana in their school.

Society certainly wants schools to solve their own problems when they can, and during the period that CAPS was being formulated, Chicago’s schools had their own disciplinary and safety initiatives in place. By the 1990s, the era was long past when teacher-enforced school disciplinary codes did the job. In 1990 the school board had already positioned 750 security guards in the schools. Special state funding then enabled them to hire even more, and between 1990 and 1995 these add-ons rose in number from 59 to 528. During the early 1990s, high schools began to install walk-through metal detectors, and they were all using them or hand-held devices by 1999. Beginning in 1990, the police contributed a special school patrol unit that by 2000 had grown to about 200 officers. Additionally, security cameras in lunchrooms and hallways were installed.

The pace of change picked up following a shakeup in school financing and administration. A thoroughgoing restructuring of Chicago's public schools began in 1995, when the Illinois legislature made changes in the governance and funding of the city's schools that effectively handed control to the mayor. In short order, the new administration made dramatic changes in virtually every aspect of operations. Many new disciplinary and security programs were instituted, some involving just the school bureaucracy itself, and others involving partnerships with police and the CAPS Implementation Office. Beginning in 1996, schools became more aggressive about expelling troublemakers, after alternative schools run by private contractors were set up to receive them. The state's 1995 Gun-Free Schools Act – which was later expanded to cover knives, pipes, alcohol and drugs – provided additional legal incentive to expel. Although school disciplinary statistics are very unreliable guides to either levels of problems or actual disciplinary practice, it appears that things got tighter during the 1990s. In 1996, one school reported 106 expulsions for every 100 students! In October 1998, the Chicago public schools announced a “zero-tolerance” policy with regard to the more serious offenses in its Uniform Disciplinary Code; this further toughened a zero-tolerance policy announced in 1995. School board policies allowed pat-downs and personal searches of students based upon suspicion by teachers or administrators, as well as wholesale locker and desk searches using dogs, looking for weapons and drugs.

There is community involvement in school safety as well. Beginning in 1990, parents were recruited to stand guard on school groups; later, this program was greatly expanded, and in 1999 the CAPS Implementation Office added a “walking school bus” project that organized students and parents living along various routes to a school into convoys that picked up and dropped off members as they moved through the neighborhood. A corporate donor bought them distinctive windbreakers and hand-held signs to carry that publicized the program. By 2000 there were parent patrols around 450 schools, and about 100 walking school buses.

Of course, efforts that are not on their face “security measures” can also have an impact on school climate and student performance, and these in turn can have spin-off consequences for school and neighborhood safety. In addition to the security projects described above, post-1995 there was a sea-change in school management and performance assessment in Chicago. Drastic revisions were instituted in the curriculum; selected schools began to remain open until 6 pm for optional math and reading programs; many thousands of failing students were held in school during the summer months; and a massive construction program replaced or renovated a host of school buildings. Dress codes drafted by parent groups were instituted in many schools beginning in 1996, as was a requirement for daily homework assignments for every class. Not the least of these changes was an empowerment of parents and neighborhood residents. The elected local councils affiliated with every school gained a significant voice in administrative, budgetary, staffing, and even curricular matters within their school's doors. Archon Fung, a Harvard University professor who has studied both community policing and school reform, concluded that CAPS and the Chicago Public Schools are “. . . the most participatory, democratic public organizations of their kind in any large American city.”



Making the service-delivery process function smoothly was difficult at first. On the service agency side were entrenched bureaucracies with their own ideas about neighborhood priorities and the pace at which their workers could respond to “outside” complaints. These agencies were accustomed to responding to politician’s demands that they fix particular problems, but they thought that community policing was the Police Department’s program. Initially, police officers were skeptical that the city’s cumbersome bureaucracies would be sufficiently agile to meet their requests, and feared they would be “left twisting in the wind” after promising residents that problems would be addressed. There was emotional as well as practical resistance to getting police involved in filling potholes. In the early years some officers simply refused to fill out request forms. A vocal faction of beat officers resented its new role as the first link in the process. These officers felt that they would not only be held responsible by residents for ignored service requests, but also that there was a fundamental unfairness to the assignment, because “they don’t call streets and sanitation workers when there’s a robbery!” One officer lamented, “Everybody complains to us. Why can’t the community call their alderman to complain? What do potholes have to do with police work?” In his area we found that beat officers could not be bothered reporting collapsing sidewalks or open fire hydrants. In another beat we studied intensively, officers resented serving as what they dubbed “the pooper-scooper police.”

But in time, service requests became a routine way of responding to residents’ complaints at beat meetings. Service requests are directly entered into the service tracking system using computers located in district stations. The system allows station personnel to check the status of individual requests and print out reports on service requests for distribution at beat meetings. A regular feature of the sessions held at police headquarters to review district performance is discussion of use of CAPS Service Requests to clean and repair priority target areas. Residents are now able to request city services via the city’s website, and the civilian-staffed CAPS Implementation Office has taken major responsibility for coordinating delivery of city services. Each police area has one or two full-time service coordinators. One we interviewed estimates that he writes about 100 service requests every day he is in the field. In the biggest service categories (graffiti cleanups, abandoned car tows, street light outages and tree trimming) the police are now generating only 3 percent to 4 percent of the service requests filed. This has essentially become a civilian agency tool rather than one of the Police Department.

While CAPS service requests help steer the delivery of routine service requests, the Implementation Office has responsibility for coordinating the involvement of service agencies in special projects conducted by police and resident groups. Operation CLEAN (City services Law Enforcement and Neighbors) is one example of this. According to a program description, its goal is “to deliver, in a coordinated manner, a massive amount of city services to high crime areas in an effort to improve the quality of life for residents . . . These quality-of-life issues affect public and officer safety and rank high among the underlying causes of crime and disorder problems in target areas.” These service blitzes, held about 30 times per year, include aggressively towing seemingly abandoned cars, graffiti removal by the city’s Graffiti Blasters (so named because they use high-pressure soda blasters), tree trimming, rat poisoning, sewer cleaning, clearing and mowing vacant lots, repairing streets and sidewalks, installing new street signs and lamp posts, and painting fire hydrants and other public structures. One service coordinator reported keying in

669 individual service requests as he got organized for one day's Operation CLEAN. Building and business inspectors come in to identify responsibilities for owners, and the SITF hits buildings suspected of harboring drug activity particularly hard. Implementation Office Staff, beat facilitators, resident activists and police get together and walk target areas to determine which of these services are needed, and later track agency follow-up efforts. Implementation Office staff walk door to door during the cleanups, encouraging people to participate in community organizations. A related program, "Clean & Green," provides community organizations with rakes, brooms, shovels and trash bags, so that they can clean up on their own.

An important feature of the service-delivery process that has developed in Chicago is that it creates a close, fast connection between residents and service providers. As one police officer described it:

I think it's empowered people; it's put them in touch with city services. They used to depend on the alderman, which was good if your alderman was strong, but otherwise things didn't get done. That's not true any longer. People can control the policing that occurs in their neighborhoods.

As a district commander noted, "The way this is set up, it really levels the playing ground for everyone. Everyone is entitled to – and gets – a good level of services."

The coordinated delivery of city services is thus an integral part of community policing in Chicago. It is linked to what are believed to be the causes of crime and neighborhood decline, and to the need to be responsive to the concerns expressed by the public via the citizen involvement parts of the program. It is also there because the mayor, who is very interested in the effectiveness of municipal services, saw the process as another mechanism for forcing his many bureaucracies to focus on their ultimate customers and generate more "consumer satisfaction."


### **Resident Involvement in Problem-Solving**

The vision of CAPS planners was that the principal partners of the police in problem-solving would be neighborhood residents as well as the groups and associations that represented them. A Department "fact sheet" noted:

While traditional policing relied almost exclusively on the police to fight crime, CAPS creates a partnership of police, residents, government agencies, and other members of the community. The community shares responsibility with the police for setting the crime-fighting priorities in their neighborhoods and for designing and implementing problem-solving strategies (Chicago Police Department, 1996, 2).

Before CAPS got off the ground, officers were trained (somewhat sketchily) in a five-step model the Department had adopted to guide the problem-solving efforts of police and


residents. The process involves: 1) identifying and prioritizing problems, 2) analyzing them, 3) designing response strategies, 4) implementing the plan, and 5) assessing its success.



The cornerstone of problem analysis is the “crime triangle.” The triangle emphasizes three features of every problem: victims, offenders and locations. During 1995, 7,500 officers assigned to the Department’s uniformed Patrol Division received two days of problem-solving training. They reviewed key organizational elements of CAPS and the problem-solving model, as well as how to document problems in their beat’s action plan and work with the community. Later there was yearly training for sergeants in crafting beat plans and managing beat meetings. Beginning in 1997, the Department held training sessions for selected officers assigned to beat teams, and for civilian beat facilitators.

Formal training in problem-solving for large numbers of residents began in 1995. Pairs of police and civilian trainers conducted sessions that introduced the general public to the concepts of community policing and problem-solving. They taught residents how to identify, prioritize and analyze problems; strategies for mobilizing the community around problem-solving projects; and how to evaluate their accomplishments. Trainers tried to hold an orientation meeting and three follow-up training sessions in every beat, and while they fell a bit short of that goal, more than 12,000 residents attended at least some training sessions.

**5 STEPS TO PROBLEM SOLVING**



1. Identify and Prioritize
2. Analyze
3. Design Strategies
4. Implement
5. Evaluate and Acknowledge Success

of community policing and problem-solving. They taught residents how to identify, prioritize and analyze problems; strategies for mobilizing the community around problem-solving projects; and how to evaluate their accomplishments. Trainers tried to hold an orientation meeting and three follow-up training sessions in every beat, and while they fell a bit short of that goal, more than 12,000 residents attended at least some training sessions.

There is evidence that many trainees got involved in problem-solving projects after undergoing training. To assess this we conducted a follow-up survey of 354 randomly-chosen training participants, about four months after their first training experience. The survey found that trainees took some kind of action on 63 percent of the priority problems they identified for their neighborhood, and three-quarters reported urging others to attend beat meetings. A survey of beat meeting participants in 1998 found that 75 percent claimed to have worked in some fashion to solve a problem during the past year.

An important determinant of individual problem-solving was organizational involvement. The professional community organizers hired to deliver problem-solving training believed that the effective participants would be those linked to one another through networks of local organizations, and they were right. The survey conducted at training sessions found that 65 percent of those who came to training were already involved in a community group, and most were affiliated with more than one. In contrast, the 1998 city survey found that members of 66 percent of households were not involved in any locally based nonreligious organization, and those who were almost always were involved in only one. Trainees with organizational connections were more optimistic about the effectiveness of neighborhood problem-solving under CAPS, and they were particularly supportive of the role for the public in the program. The more involved they were in the organizational life of the community, the more likely trainees were to think that citizens can analyze problems, prioritize them and come up with solutions. They were particularly optimistic about the kinds of efforts that organizations could encourage:

citizens training one another in problem-solving and getting others to attend beat community meetings. Trainees who were already involved in community organizations were more optimistic about the ability of ordinary citizens to prevent crime. They were also more likely to actually do something themselves. Among those who reported that they did not belong to a local organization, 48 percent indicated they had tried to solve a problem. But 63 percent of those who reported being involved in one, two or three organizations were involved in problem-solving projects. And those involved in four groups (as were 15 percent of those surveyed) tried to solve problems 80 percent of the time. Respondents with organizational ties were also more likely to attend beat meetings regularly, and to turn out for other CAPS events.

The results of police and resident training can be seen in action. During 1998, observers attended hundreds of beat meetings and noted what took place there. At a meeting on the far North Side they happened upon police and residents working their way through the crime triangle as they addressed a public-drinking problem.

The main topic of the meeting was problems with sports teams in Horner Park. The problems include drinking in the park and then driving, loud music, trash, urinating on trees, and staying past the park's closing hours. One woman says it is not just drinking sports teams that are the problem, it is also young kids and drugs in the park. At this point the sergeant steps in and says this is a perfect opportunity to do preventive work – to use the CAPS method of problem-solving and stop problems in the park before they begin again this year. First, they determine that it is a CAPS problem because it won't go away on its own, and it affects more than a handful of people. Then they brainstorm the three aspects of the CAPS triangle. The location is Horner Park, and especially the parking lot along California Avenue. The victims are park patrons and people who live along California Avenue, and a new potential group of victims is the seniors who will be moving into a new senior home at Montrose and California. The offenders are sports-team players, gangs and perhaps liquor stores selling to minors. The sergeant then says that to have a solution you have to address at least two sides of the crime triangle. The group talks about strategies: to talk to people on California to maybe get them to form a block club and get them involved in the CAPS group; to install better lighting and more trash cans; and to post signs in English and Spanish regarding park rules and fines for having liquor in the park. There is some talk about the fact that fines are rarely given or paid. The female police officer says that if the community comes to court, it pressures the judge to actually make people pay fines (“we’ve seen it work”). Someone suggests that since most people work, it would be good to get the seniors involved in Court Advocacy because they have the time to go to court. There is also talk about a neighborhood watch in the park and about getting the gates to the park closed on time. Also, someone suggests putting signs regarding park policy on liquor in nearby liquor stores.

An observer came across a “problem-solving refresher” when he sat in on a beat meeting on the North Side.

The first presentation was given by CAPS trainers \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. They conducted a problem-solving demonstration for almost one-and-a-half hours. The crime triangle and five step problem-solving processes were discussed by applying them to the problem of children being left unattended, and to a cluster of drug, gang and violence problems on a particular street corner. Offenders, locations and victims were identified and analyzed, and strategies were brought forward. Residents volunteered to get tax ID numbers for buildings in which trouble occurs so they could go after specific people. Officer \_\_\_\_\_ would pursue DCFS (Department of Children and Family Services) action for the children left unattended. Stepped up police presence would occur. The demonstration was explained clearly and was very understandable. There is to be a report next month.

At the district level, police and CAPS Implementation Office organizers frequently sponsor fairly assertive activities. For example, in one district we studied intensively, district activists conducted what are called “stand-ups” in front of problem businesses twice monthly, during the spring, summer and fall of 1999. On a chilly Saturday morning in mid-April, an observer stood with a group of 20 residents outside a corner liquor store. The crowd included members of the District Advisory Committee and other residents who were part of the district’s community networking subcommittee. The liquor store was targeted because loose garbage was perpetually strewn around its sidewalk. “We have to crack down on these businesses and stop thinking that we don’t deserve better,” explained one DAC member. They each took turns entering the store and “getting in the face” of the operator, while the others chanted slogans to passers-by.

Stand-ups are just one form of assertive vigilance. They fall toward the moderate end of a broad range of CAPS marches, rallies and vigils that took place during summer months. In the study of CAPS activists and DAC members conducted in early 2000, a consensus of respondents reported that marches were taking place in 24 of the 25 police districts, prayer vigils in 15 districts, anti-graffiti campaigns in all 25 districts and regular citizen patrols in 15 districts. Many of these were organized by the DACs or the Implementation Office, but others were initiated by beat meeting groups, neighborhood organizations or churches, and they would work closely with the Implementation Office to get things underway. In one police district, church groups conducted “emergency outreach prayer vigils” at the sites of drug-related shootings. District officers notified participants when an incident occurred, and they converged on the scene to pray. Another district held a very successful Year 2000 Prayer Vigil at the change of the millennium.

There are other forms of assertive vigilance. “Smoke-outs” – barbeque picnics – are held in drug market areas, with officers from the district attending to provide protection for residents. “Positive-loitering” campaigns are organized to harass prostitutes and potential customers.

Residents assemble and stroll around or walk their dogs, keeping an eye on passers-by and, on occasion, confronting troublemakers. In an interview an Implementation Office organizer described a project in her area:

Of the several problems in the district, one of the main ones is prostitution . . . [T]he problem was brought up at the beat meeting, after residents caught prostitutes doing business in their gangways and garages, or found traces of the business (e.g., used condoms). She proposed positive-loitering, and they agreed to give it a try . . . They started out with 30 people and were escorted by a police car. They began to alternate days and times so that the prostitutes would never know when they'd be there. Soon the prostitutes ran when they saw the group coming, while the police would stop them and check for warrants, arresting them if there were any outstanding. By the time of the next beat meeting, attendance rose because they had done such a good job with that problem that the word had spread. It was decided that they needed to carry signs to target the johns. So the next time they were out, they carried signs. When a community member complained of seeing prostitutes from 9 pm to 11 pm, positive loiterers came during those times. They got up to 60 volunteers. One day they just started chanting. The next step in their minds was to go to court to follow up on arrests. They were becoming so familiar that the prostitutes recognized them in the courtroom and left. They began to talk with the judge and develop a good relationship with him. He listened to them and said it was good of them to come and show community support, but he reminded them that the prostitutes had rights and he had to be impartial. However, he did give them and the police pointers on what they were doing wrong and what could be done to make these cases stronger.

According to activists we interviewed, smoke-outs and positive-loitering projects were underway in eight districts. One DAC began a positive-loitering campaign after watching crime levels skyrocket along a river-front walkway in the district.

Youth programs provide another focus for district activists. In the activist survey, a majority of respondents from every district reported CAPS-related youth projects. With the police, residents sponsored Explorer troops and baseball teams. The DACs raised funds to support youth programs, field trips, sporting activities and after-school programs operating in their districts. Beginning in 1999, the districts began to organize peer juries – groups of high school students who volunteer to serve on a “jury” that renders sentences for first-time juvenile offenders who agree to participate in the program. Residents serve as adult monitors, helping jurors and officers handle cases and overseeing the fulfillment of community service sentences. One district had a youth subcommittee composed entirely of teenagers who live or go to school in the neighborhood.

How frequently do residents get involved in these activities? To assess this, the survey conducted during the 2002 beat meeting study included questions about various forms of CAPS

activism. Overall, 64 percent of those who attended reported participating in at least one activity during the previous year. Table 4, which is reprinted from the 2003 evaluation report, presents detailed findings from the survey.

Table 4  
Beat Community Meeting Participant Activism

Percent of Meeting Participants Involved in CAPS Activities in the Past 12 Months			
Aggressive Activism		Involvement in CAPS	
marches or rallies	25	a city or area Neighborhood Assembly	18
prayer vigils	13	CAPS fairs, forums or education programs	16
smoke-outs, CAPS picnics or barbeques	12	attended court for court advocacy or a Court Advocacy subcommittee meeting	11
positive-loitering	9	Vote Dry or liquor control projects	12
parent patrols or walking school bus	6	worked with the CAPS office to organize a neighborhood group	14
neighborhood patrols or watches	21	contacted police or elected officials about a problem	39
percent involved in aggressive activism**	43	percent involved in CAPS neighborhood projects**	53

\*\* See text for definition of activism measures.

The activities described in Table 4 fell into two distinct statistical clusters. A set of more aggressive, “in your face” activities are listed on the left. They include the vigilance projects described above: marches, prayer vigils, smoke-outs, positive-loitering, parent patrols and neighborhood watch. Marches and rallies were the most frequent activities in this category. Twelve percent reported participating in “smoke-outs, CAPS picnics or barbeques,” events that are frequently held in prostitution strolls or areas with active street drug markets. Walking school buses, which were described earlier, were less popular, but neighborhood watches or patrols were surprisingly popular, reported by 21 percent of those attending. Overall, 43 percent of those attending beat meetings were involved in at least one of these efforts.

Involvement in CAPS neighborhood projects is summarized on the right side of Table 4. Actions taken include attending neighborhood assemblies, being a court advocate, working on liquor control projects and organizing neighborhood groups. Eleven percent of those attending reported having some involvement in court advocacy. “Contacting police or elected officials about a problem,” a fairly passive form of involvement, was the most frequent activity reported in the survey (at 39 percent), and it fell in this category. Overall, 53 percent of those attending beat meetings in summer 2002 reported being involved in at least one of those activities.

There were some differences in patterns of involvement in these two clusters of activities. Older, long-term residents of the community tended to be involved in neighborhood activities but not in aggressive activism. Men and African-Americans were most likely to report being involved in both CAPS projects and aggressive activism. Reports of activism were highly related to being a frequent participant in beat meetings and being active in the community. To examine this, we created beat-level measures of participation in CAPS neighborhood projects and aggressive activism. This confirmed that cohesive beats – beats where those who come to meetings attend frequently know and work with one another outside of the meetings, and belong to other kinds of community organizations as well – spawn more CAPS activism.

A more significant issue is whether CAPS activism is concentrated where it is needed most, or if it is higher in better-off areas of the city. The same beat data indicate that activism is more common in less-well-off areas. Beat activism was measured by the average number of activities described in Table 4 in which respondents reported participating. Based on this, activism was more common in poverty-stricken (+.44), high unemployment (+.38), African-American (= .36) areas of the city. Activism is higher in areas with high rates of violent crime (+.34) where residents frequently call 911 about drug problems (+.45). Beat meeting attendance rates are also higher (+.43) in areas where activism is more common. In short, like beat community meeting participation rates, both aggressive activism and involvement in CAPS neighborhood projects are more common in places needing it most. This is a finding that again runs counter to a common form of bias in voluntary social programs. In Chicago, areas at risk enjoy both higher rates of participation in meetings and higher rates of activism by those who attend.

## **Trends in Decay and Disorder**

The repeated administration of surveys enables us to examine trends in the extent of neighborhood problems over time, beginning in 1994. This was after CAPS was announced and development of the program began in the prototype districts, but a year before it expanded to the entire city. Surveys asked about neighborhood conditions using categories readily understood by the public and included many concerns that are not easily gauged using agency statistics. All were the target of problem-solving projects and city service agencies. The surveys were large enough to track changes in the views of major subgroups of residents. This is an important feature, for citywide averages disguised significant differences in the experiences of many Chicagoans.

### **Physical Decay**


Signs of visible neglect, abandonment, and deliberate vandalism that are apparent in too many neighborhoods are a significant source of concern to Chicago residents. Like the measures of perceived crime problems described earlier in the report, respondents were requested to rate a list of issues “. . . that you may think are problems in your neighborhood.” They were asked to indicate whether “. . . you think it is a big problem, some problem or no problem in your

neighborhood.” Responses to four questions were used to assess the extent of neighborhood physical decay.

- Graffiti; that is, writing or painting on walls or buildings.
- Abandoned houses or other empty buildings in your area.
- Vacant lots filled with trash and junk.
- Abandoned cars in the streets and alleys.

Figure 27 summarizes trends in reports of neighborhood decay during the course of the 1990s. It presents, by race, the percentage of respondents who thought physical decay problems were a big problem in their neighborhood.

Figure 27  
Race and Trends in Physical Decay, 1994-2003



**Graffiti.** Graffiti presents an important test of the effectiveness of the city service component of CAPS. Graffiti is a common fact of life in many neighborhoods. In 1994 – the first year for which there is survey data – it was the most highly rated problem among Latino residents. Overall, 22 percent of Chicagoans thought graffiti was a big problem in their area; for Latinos the figure was 38 percent, and among whites it was 17 percent. Chicagoans read graffiti as a sign that gangs are moving into their area – or growing more confident of their control of the neighborhood – and discussions pondering the significance of specific instances of graffiti take place at numerous beat meetings. This dialog was recorded by an observer attending a beat meeting in a heavily Latino area on the city’s Near North Side.

A resident said there is a problem with graffiti and drug use in a nearby alley. The officer replied that the person painting the graffiti is an “I-Quest.” He said the graffiti is signed “AOM,” which stands for “another outrageous mind.” He said he has been to the kid’s house and told him that if he sees any more graffiti, he will return. The officer noted that other graffiti is the work of peewee Maniac Latin Disciples. A resident said that residents must paint over graffiti immediately; he said they “cannot let it go.” The officer added that there had been a big problem earlier, because of the anniversary of the death of a gang member. He reported that this graffiti was painted over quickly and that arrests have been made.

This resident’s diagnosis may have been right. One theory is that graffiti is “infectious” – where it appears and is not quickly erased, its visible presence will quickly stimulate still more graffiti. The city’s anti-graffiti program involves strategies besides cleaning it up (including a city ordinance banning the sale of spray paint), but its aggressive approach to cleaning up graffiti rapidly reflects contagion theory. Perhaps the most visible element of the city’s graffiti-elimination program is its teams of “Graffiti Blasters.” They come armed with 19 high-pressure soda sprayers, and without charge they blast graffiti from the property of any willing property owner. Before 1993, this was the responsibility – and the cost – of the owner, as the city only maintained public property. Now the city considers them the victims of crime, and spends about \$4 million a year on private property cleanup. From 1993 through 2002, more than 900,000 buildings were cleaned of graffiti. Paint and clean-up supplies are also available for community groups bent on removing graffiti on their own. The logo for this program reads “Give graffiti the brush!”

As Figure 27 documents, reports of serious graffiti problems declined among all groups between 1994 and 1999, before leveling off for whites and African-Americans. Concern among Latinos jumped sharply in 2001 and remained high at the point of our last survey, in 2003. The gap between Latinos and others in the city was also the largest for graffiti, which now appears to be a problem primarily plaguing Latino neighborhoods.

**Abandoned Buildings.** At the other end of the spectrum, only 11 percent of respondents interviewed in 1994 reported that building abandonment was a big problem in their community. But that number varied greatly by group, with only a few whites, but many African-Americans, (and, by 1995, Latinos) reporting that abandoned buildings were a concern for them. Building abandonment is a question of economics. It is heavily concentrated in the city’s poorest areas, where it is most difficult to make reasonable rates of return by investing in housing because people do not have much to pay. In poor areas of the city absentee landlords and struggling property owners may be unwilling or unable to maintain their buildings. Though often constructed of brick and stone (a legacy in the building code enacted in the wake of the Great Chicago Fire of 1871), the ravages of time, weather and decades of neglect have left many buildings in poor neighborhoods with crumbling mortar, peeled paint, rotten framing, broken windows and leaky roofs. If left empty for long, scavengers pick them clean of items of value, including stained glass, light fixtures, elaborate wooden molding, copper electrical wiring and bathroom fixtures. Even aluminum siding will be stripped overnight and exchanged for cash at

recycling centers. Squatters may move in, and drug dealers find it easy to set up shop. Eventually many of these hulks are razed as part of the city's aggressive "tear-down" abandonment strategy because they are no longer habitable, and no one can be found to put up the investment necessary to return them to use.

There are several city programs for moving against abandoned buildings, including the Strategic Inspections Task Force described earlier, but of all the problems in Chicago, building issues can be the slowest to be resolved. The rights of property owners must be respected, so owners must be involved before their buildings can be demolished or rehabilitated. But they can often be difficult to identify, as Illinois allows landlords to hold property in secret land trusts that enable them to hide their identity from tenants. Thus officers have to use building Department records, tax files, tools on the Internet and old-fashioned detective work to track them down.

At a beat meeting our observer noted:

A resident complained about an abandoned building. The beat officer said the building is "terrible, terrible, terrible." He said the owner has never done anything to secure the building from squatters. A resident said that it is illegal for the building to be open. The beat officer replied that he and his partner have put in service requests every week for the past few months. A resident volunteered to call city services. The sergeant told the resident to be sure to mention the police requests.

However, over time there was no real overall change in the extent of resident concern about abandoned buildings. In 1994, 28 percent of Chicagoans reported it was some or a big problem in their neighborhood, and in 2003 the figure was 26 percent. As Figure 27 documents, decreasing concern by African-Americans was counterbalanced by heightened concern about abandoned buildings among the city's Latinos. By 2003, Latinos were about 10 percentage points more likely than blacks to report serious building-abandonment problems.

**Trash and Junk.** In the 1994 survey, about one-quarter of African-Americans and Latinos, but only 5 percent of whites, reported that loose trash and junk were a big problem in their neighborhoods. In two poor African-American beats that we studied in detail, many vacant lots were used as makeshift parking lots for cars, trucks and abandoned vehicles. The lots were not only ugly, but they posed a health hazard, for tall weeds, accumulating trash and abandoned vehicles inevitably become nesting spots for rats. Overgrown vacant lots are convenient hiding places for stashes of drugs and weapons that drug dealers do not want to keep on their person. Vacant lots also attract illegal dumpers, who deposit their loads there rather than paying hefty fees charged by licensed landfills.

Loose trash and junk generally requires a city service response. The following discussion took place at a beat meeting on the Near South Side:

A woman asks the tactical officers to ride down and check the end of the alley where there is a lot of overgrowth, couches and even grills sitting under a tree where people loiter in the abandoned lot. An officer responded that he has been by the lot and he only saw old guys hanging out there, and what first must be taken care of is the grass and weeds. The woman continues to complain about the weeds in the lot and how high they are. The officer tells her he will write up a work order and call city services to file a complaint, and that he will speak to her after the meeting to get all the information from her.

Vacant lots require maintenance and supervision to prevent them from becoming problems for the community. Cleaning these lots is the responsibility of the streets and sanitation Department. If the property is owned by the city, complaints can get lead to their enclosure by a fence to prevent further dumping. Private owners of lots requiring cleaning are ticketed in order to recoup some of the cost. As documented in Figure 27, concern about loose trash and junk dropped among African-Americans through 1999 and then leveled off. Concern remained high among Latinos, on the other hand, countering gains made during the 1990s.

**Abandoned Cars.** In 1994, abandoned cars were nominated as a big problem by 20 percent of Latinos and 12 percent of African-Americans. Abandoned cars are an easy target for city towing, but – like building problems – there are legal niceties that must be observed unless a vehicle is creating a direct safety hazard. At a beat meeting on the Near Southeast Side:

A resident complained of a car that has no license plates and has not moved in several weeks. The officer said that they would take care of it, but that [residents] should not wait for a meeting to complain about this. Several residents confirmed that there is rapid response to towing requests. A resident noted that an abandoned car on her block had been ticketed but that it was still sitting on the street. The CAPS organizer [from the Implementation Office] informed residents that a car without proper stickers left on the street for seven days is considered abandoned and should be called in to the city.

As Figure 27 illustrates, concern about abandoned cars actually grew a bit during the period we monitored. While concern among African-Americans and whites essentially remained steady, each year's sample of Latino respondents was more likely than the last to report this was a big problem in their community.

In short, the surveys indicate that whites began with few serious concerns about physical-decay issues, and things did not change much for them. Except for graffiti, few whites were concerned about neighborhood decay. African-Americans began with many serious problems, but they reported improvements in neighborhood conditions over time. They were nine times more likely than whites to think that abandoned buildings were a big neighborhood problem, for example, and five times more likely to give the highest rating to junk and trash problems. But during the 1990s, reports of serious neighborhood decay problems by African-Americans declined sharply. Concern about abandoned buildings dropped by half, from 22 percent to

11 percent, and concern about refuse-filled lots and graffiti declined by about 10 percentage points. The city's Latinos, on the other hand, began with serious problems and saw little improvement over the course of a decade. Even an apparent turnaround in serious graffiti problems stalled in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. By 2003, it was whites and African-Americans who were in the most agreement about improvements in their neighborhoods – although blacks certainly still had a way to go before they could claim parity. Nothing improved for Latinos, and some problems even grew worse. We will return to an examination of causes of these trends in the next section of this report. In a nutshell, like crime problems, concern about physical decay was driven by language, immigration, poverty and the increasing concentration of the Latinos in the city's predominately Latino neighborhoods.

### **Social Disorder**

Repeated administration of surveys also enables us to examine trends in social disorder over time. Responses to three survey questions were used to assess the extent of neighborhood social disorder. Unlike the others, questions about the extent of loitering and public drinking were not included until 1995, the year that CAPS became a citywide program. The conditions described were:

#### **Public drinking**


Groups of people hanging out on corners or in the streets

Disruption around schools, that is, youths hanging around making noise, vandalizing or starting fights.

**Loitering.** In 1995, loitering was the most highly rated problem in the survey. That year, 23 percent of Chicagoans reported that loitering bands of people were a big problem in their neighborhood, and another 33 percent thought they were some problem. Loitering received this high priority in part because many Chicagoans associate loitering with a host of related problems, including gang activity, violence, street gambling, public harassment, drug sales, public drinking and other activities. When asked about his neighborhood's biggest problem, a respondent to a special neighborhood survey replied: "Drugs. How the guys stand on the corners, you can't even walk down the street because they're selling the drugs. They stand in the middle of the block." Another was concerned because, "The guys are always on the corners saying 'rock,' 'hot' and 'weed'." But not all of their fears were gang-related. A third respondent observed that "gangs get together on the weekend. They hang out in the streets, they have problems with other gang members, and gangs start shooting each other." Another identified his beat's biggest problem as: "Teenagers. No respect. There's no curfew; you hear them cursing, hanging on the corners." Others pointed to problems like "People on the corners in the liquor stores cause fear to other people;" "Guys hanging on the corners all night long;" and "Younger kids hanging out on the corners and on the next block. It's become a party street because the teenagers hang out on the weekends and I've called the police because they were so loud around two in the morning."

Loitering became a major political issue in Chicago when the city council instituted a “anti-gang loitering” ordinance giving police officers the authority to arrest loiterers known to be gang members who do not move along when ordered to do so. The ordinance took effect in 1993 and led to about 10,000 arrests each year. It was ultimately declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, but tens of thousands of Chicago residents signed petitions declaring that their neighborhoods would be safer places if such a law were in place. Later passed was a revised version of the ordinance restricting the number of sites in which loitering could be forbidden and required police to be trained in enforcing the law.

Figure 28  
Race and Trends in Social Disorder, 1995-2001



Whatever the final policy, its implementation will mostly affect minority communities. In 1994, only 11 percent of white Chicagoans rated loitering a big problem in their neighborhood, while for African-Americans the comparable figure was 39 percent, and among Latinos it was 32 percent. Figure 28 summarizes trends in this view and indicates that little changed over time. Except for a 1999 drop among African-Americans, which was later largely negated, members of all three groups reported about the same level of concern about loitering in 2003 as they did in 1995. Regarding loitering, the experiences of Latinos and African-Americans were very much in agreement over the entire nine-year period. By 2003, loitering was still of great public concern, ranking just below street drug dealing on our list. While in 1995, 56 percent of Chicagoans thought it was a problem in their community, in 2003 the total was 57 percent.

**Public Drinking.** Overall, 17 percent of Chicagoans rated public drinking a big problem in their neighborhood in 1995. Public drinking is a visible, everyday pastime in some of the poor Latino and African-American beats that we studied intensively. In one South Side area, groups

of men (and a few women) regularly congregated near liquor stores – usually in vacant lots – or they sat on milk crates and curbs in alleys and on street corners, never straying far from carry-out liquor outlets. There they sat, passing around bottles wrapped in brown paper, surrounded by overgrown weeds, empty snack food bags, cans and broken bottles. When the police asked them to move, they never went far, shuffling around the corner or to the other side of the street, just enough to give the illusion of movement. Within minutes, however, the group would congregate again. An observer on the city’s South Side noted:

Without community pressure, beat officers may not come down hard on the drinkers. One noted, “I know them; they’re out here everyday. [Several of the drinkers had in fact greeted him by name.] Mostly they’re harmless, but they do litter, they urinate in public, and they set a bad example for kids. Adults drinking on the street all day do not make positive role models.” In another beat, the day-watch officer had less patience. Once, after several unsuccessful attempts to clear away a group of recalcitrant drinkers with his loudspeaker, he drove his squad car onto the sidewalk to disperse them.

Noting that public drinkers usually congregate around their source of supply, police and neighborhood activists often look to the city’s “vote dry” referenda to close them down. According to CAPS activists we surveyed in 1999, vote dry efforts were underway in 22 of the city’s 25 police districts. An observer encountered this presentation at a beat meeting held on the far South Side:

The neighborhood relations officer then introduced Anthony \_\_\_\_\_, a member of \_\_\_\_\_ Church. He explained to residents that members of his church and other residents were working to make the 9<sup>th</sup> and 34<sup>th</sup> wards “dry” and that the only way to get undesirable people off the streets is to close the liquor stores. Last year, 400 church members circulated petitions to get a referendum asking to close liquor establishments placed on a ballot. They were successful in getting some liquor stores closed. The members plan to start circulating petitions in June and continue until August. He told residents that they would be paired up with another person to get signatures, and he would pass out flyers later.

Reports that public drinking were either some or a big problem in the area did not decline much during the 1990s, beginning at 52 percent and ending at 50 percent in 2003. However, these city-wide figures disguised a drop in concern among African-Americans and a big increase in concern among Latinos. This is illustrated in Figure 28 which plots the percentage of Chicagoans indicating that public drinking was a big problem in their neighborhood. At the high in 2001, almost 40 percent of Latinos reported that public drinking was a big problem in their neighborhood.

**School Disruption.** Disorder around local schools was identified as a big problem by 18 percent of Chicagoans in the 1994 survey. School security issues were described by a police officer at a beat meeting on the Near West Side:

The sergeant brought up problems at \_\_\_\_\_ School. Because of the warm weather, problems that they normally expected in late March through May were starting now. Girls were getting more involved with gang activity. These elementary school girls were selling marijuana and carrying guns. He wanted to make parents aware and have them look for signs, such as gang-type graffiti on books, and what kids take and bring home in their book bags. Both boys and girls are susceptible.

Disruption in and around schools was of particular concern to parents. For example, 34 percent of Latinos interviewed in 1995 who had children at home also reported that school security was a big problem, while among Latino householders without children the comparable figure was only 12 percent. School disruption is a real issue for the city's Latinos because they are the group with the most children. In the 1995 survey, 66 percent of Latino households reported having children living at home; in contrast, 50 percent of African-American households and only 25 percent of white households had children at home.

Between 1994 and 2003 the largest overall drop in the social disorder category was in reports of school disruption. In 1994, 50 percent reported school disruption was not a problem at all in their neighborhood, a figure that rose to 59 percent by 2003. Figure 28, which charts the percentage of Chicagoans indicating that school disruption was a big problem, illustrates that this decline was confined to whites and African-Americans. School disorder problems did not improve for Latinos during the 1990s, and they spiked even higher in the 2000s.

The findings of these surveys with adults are corroborated by students themselves. The Chicago Consortium for School Research conducts periodic surveys of high school students. In 1994, 1997, 1999 and 2001, students were asked to rate how safe they felt in their school. During this period students in predominately African-American high schools reported the largest gains in school safety, followed by those in racially diverse schools. Students in predominately Latino schools reported improving conditions between 1994 and 1999, but then the trend reversed itself, and by 2001 they were the least safe group in the Chicago public schools.

In summary, when examined in detail, it is apparent that some city residents felt better off during the course of the 1990s, while others did not. Little changed in the city's predominately white neighborhoods over this period. Few whites reported serious neighborhood social disorder problems even before CAPS was announced, and over the ensuing period they still managed to witness significant improvement in school-related problems. The bulk of the improvements was registered by African-Americans. They expressed substantial concern about social disorder during the early years of CAPS. In 1994, almost 40 percent of blacks thought group loitering was a big problem in their neighborhood; the figures for school disruption and public drinking were 22 percent and 23 percent, respectively. But over time they reported modest improvements in neighborhood conditions. The percentage of African-Americans expressing concern about disruption in and around schools dropped to only eight percent in 1999, before rebounding a bit to 14 percent in 2003. Concern about public drinking was also down a bit, before leveling off in the 2000s. On the other hand, Latinos saw few gains over the period. In 1994 and 1995, African-Americans and Latinos reported about the same level of concern about social disorder. But by

1999, the experiences of the two groups diverged dramatically. Latinos reported deteriorating conditions in and around the schools serving their neighborhoods, and concern about public drinking jumped considerably.

### **What Happened to Latinos in Chicago?**

The Chicago story is that Latinos and African-Americans began the 1990s living in about the same conditions. On five of the seven disorder and decay problems considered in this section, and for four of the five crime problems considered earlier, Latinos and African-Americans gave their neighborhoods comparable ratings. But as the decade progressed the story became more complex as the views of the two groups diverged. What lay behind these contrasting trends during the 1994-2003 period? Part of the answer can be found in demographic and survey data for these groups. In brief, the Latino community is under pressure from immigration and internal growth, and in response it has cleaved apart. Things have gotten better for established, English-speaking Latinos living in diverse areas. They have grown worse for Spanish-speakers concentrated in the city's developing, heavily Latino barrios. Because the number of barrio-dwellers is growing faster than the number of their counterparts, as a group Chicago's Latinos have found themselves progressively worse off. By contrast, the city's African-American community is not expanding. Its numbers are static, and there is not much immigration from the American South or elsewhere. While they are differentiated by class, trends in Chicago's African-American areas have been much more uniform – and things have gotten more uniformly better – during this nine-year period.


The effects of immigration on the composition of the Latino population can be seen in the surveys. Because they arrive without much formal education, immigrants have had the effect of pushing down average levels of education for the group as a whole. In our 1994 survey, 71 percent of those identified as Latinos reported having a high school degree; by 1999 that figure had dropped to 54 percent. The Spanish-language version of the survey included questions designed to reflect the educational experiences of persons from Mexico, but responses to these questions can also be combined with U.S. educational categories. The effects of immigration from Mexico reflect the national pattern. Immigrants from Mexico and Central America bring with them low levels of educational attainment, even in comparison to immigrants from South America or the Caribbean.

The results of continued immigration can also be read in respondents' language of choice in the surveys. Spanish-speaking interviewers screened and interviewed the randomly selected respondents when they preferred to be interviewed in Spanish. Using this indicator of linguistic preference, about one-third of Latino respondents were classed as "Spanish-speakers" in the 1994 survey; in 1997 that figure was 49 percent, and by 1999 it was 61 percent, a tremendous demographic change.

A final key point about demographic change among Chicago's Latinos is that during the course of the 1990s they became more geographically concentrated. Between the 1990 and 2000 censuses, Chicago's Latino population grew from 546,000 to 754,000, and most of this growth was concentrated in a growing number of heavily Latino neighborhoods on the city's West and

Near North sides. Figure 29 presents a map depicting areas of Latino concentration in 2003, based on our population estimates. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of Latinos living in beats that were at least 50 percent Latino in composition in 1990 rose from 290,400 to 491,600, a 9 percent increase. By contrast, the number of Latinos living in beats that were less than 50 percent Latino in 1990 grew by only two percent. By 2000, two-thirds of all Chicago's Latinos lived in majority-Latino police beats.


Figure 29  
Areas of Latino Concentration, 2003



An illustration of the effects of these factors is depicted in Figure 30, which combines the results of surveys and the 2000 Census. The impact of geographic concentration is depicted in the rightmost panels. They classify Latino respondents by the composition of the beat in which they lived, which could range from near zero to virtually 100 percent Latino. Figure 30 classifies beats into five categories, ranging from areas that were less than 20 percent Latino according to the census to those that were more than 75 percent Latino. It charts this in relation to their scores on measures that combine responses to the physical decay, social disorder and crime problem

questions on the 1999 and 2001 city surveys.<sup>9</sup> The percent who averaged replying that these were greater than just some problem in their neighborhood is displayed in Figure 30. As it illustrates, Latinos living in heavily Latino beats report more disorder and physical decay problems. Among Latinos, reports of serious crime, disorder and decay problems grow in frequency with the concentration of their co-ethnics in their beat. The effects are roughly linear (the lines rise smoothly) for social disorder and crime problems, but reports of physical decay problems jump sharply among Latino respondents where their neighborhood is more than about 60 percent Latino. As we shall see below, the effects of neighborhood concentration persist when other individual and neighborhood factors are taken into account.

Figure 30  
Language, Latino Concentration and Neighborhood Problems



<sup>9</sup> These measures were discussed in this and the previous section of the report. The crime problems index combines responses to questions about burglary, auto theft, street crime, gang violence and street drug sales; the decay index reflects concern about graffiti, abandoned buildings, abandoned cars, and loose trash and junk; the social disorder index is based on questions about public drinking, loitering and school disruption.

The diverging experience of English- and Spanish-speaking Latinos is depicted in the left panels of Figure 30. Survey respondents who preferred to be interviewed in Spanish reported more extensive neighborhood problems than did their English-speaking counterparts, and this was especially true as the decade wore on. For example, in 2001, the individual-level decay-language correlation was  $+0.41$ , and that for social disorder was  $+0.38$ . Figure 30 charts trends over time in the percentage of respondents reporting that, on average, crime, social disorder and physical decay were more than just some problems in their neighborhood, breaking down respondents by language. Spanish-speakers always reported more problems, but over time the two groups began to report more divergent experiences. Much of the difference was due to reports of worsening conditions by Spanish-speakers. One reason for this divergence was the increasing concentration of incoming Latinos in beats that were heavily populated by Spanish-speakers. By 2001, conditions for Spanish-speaking Latinos were the worst for any demographic group we examined. This continued to be the case despite a small rebound by 2003.

The joint impact of these language and neighborhood factors is examined in Table 5. It presents a multi-level analysis of the distribution of the social disorder, physical decay and crime problems indices. The analysis merges two years of survey data closest to the 2000 census, those for 1999 and 2001. This yielded complete data for all measures on 1,007 Latino respondents scattered across 157 police beats. Beat-level data were drawn from the 2000 census. The individual-level variable of greatest interest is language preference. The beat-level variable is the percentage of beat residents classed as Latinos in the 2000 Census. An alternative measure of Latino concentration, the percentage of residents who reported speaking Spanish at home in 2000, is correlated  $+0.99$  with beat percent Latino. This is too high to examine separately in these (and most) statistical analyses, and the latter measure is employed here. Other control measures were included to strengthen the conclusions regarding language and neighborhood composition. At the individual level, nine additional measures were included: education, homeownership, age, gender, income, length of residence, marital status, employment status and the presence of children in the home. At the neighborhood level, a powerful indicator of neighborhood poverty – the percentage of households below the 2000 poverty level – was included as well. The dependent variables were created by summing the individual problem ratings for each; a high score indicates a high seriousness rating.

Hierarchical linear modeling is a statistical technique for untangling the joint effects of individual- and group-level factors on dependent variables. In this case, the question is one of the independent impact of language and ethnic concentration on the distribution of social disorder, physical decay and crime problems in Chicago. Table 5 presents results of the analysis.

As Table 5 indicates, only two individual-level factors were consistently linked to reports of neighborhood conditions by our respondents: language preference and education. In each analysis, Spanish-speakers reported more extensive neighborhood problems, and more educated Latinos reported fewer area problems. Otherwise, reports of the extent of neighborhood problems were almost completely independent of who our respondents were, as measured by the remaining control variables. Together, the individual-level factors explained 12 percent of the variance in the physical decay measure, nine percent of the variance in perceptions of the extent of social disorder, and 11 percent of the variance in the crime problems measure.

Table 5  
Hierarchical Models of Physical Decay, Social Disorder and Crime Problems  
Among Latino Respondents, 1999 and 2001

	Physical Decay		Social Disorder		Crime	
	coefficient	standard error	coefficient	standard error	coefficient	standard error
Intercept	1.357**	.121	1.281**	.137	1.456**	.119
Individual Factors						
Spanish language	.328**	.051	.288**	.053	.283**	.052
high school graduate	-.182**	.050	-.140**	.046	-.202**	.050
age (in decades)	-.005	.020	-.002	.023	.001	.021
female	-.040	.043	-.029	.039	-.070	.041
homeowner	.033	.048	-.040	.043	-.058	.049
income over \$20,000	-.024	.049	.046	.076	-.045	.076
years of residence	-.000	.000	-.003	.003	.002	.003
married	-.061	.046	-.040	.044	-.100**	.045
employed	.018	.051	.047	.050	.025	.051
children at home	.071	.048	.056	.051	.092	.049
Neighborhood Factors						
percent Latino	.003**	.001	.005**	.001	.005**	.001
percent households in poverty	.011**	.004	.014**	.004	.010**	.004
Variance Explained						
within-neighborhood	12%		9%		11%	
between-neighborhood	63%		70%		84%	

\* p<.05; \*\* p<.01 N=1007

In addition, both contextual measures were strongly associated with reports of neighborhood problems. Both Latino concentration and poverty were linked independently to all three measures. The effects of both neighborhood-level factors were highly significant, as indicated in Table 5. Because they are measured in the same metric (percentages), the coefficients are comparable, and it is apparent that the effect of local poverty was two to four times that of Latino concentration. Together, neighborhood poverty and Latino concentration explained 70 percent of the variation between neighborhoods in social disorder, 63 percent for physical decay and 84 percent of the total neighborhood effect on reports of crime problems.

In short, there is a very modest role for most individual factors except language and education, which are also linked to immigrant status. On the other hand, concentrated poverty and ethnic makeup of the neighborhood within which they live seems to have a large independent effect on the life chances of Chicago's Latinos. Poverty had the biggest effect, but in addition, conditions are worse in the city's growing areas of Latino concentration.

The improving fortune of Chicago's African-Americans was, by contrast, a relatively widespread trend. Changes for the better in reports of both decay and disorder problems ran in parallel for subgroups within the black population. African-Americans were divided by social class. The largest split was between homeowners and renters, who differed by about 10 percentage points on levels of social disorder, and seven percentage points on physical decay. More-educated African-Americans reported fewer neighborhood problems than did less-educated African-Americans, and there were parallel differences by income as well. But although poor and better-off African-Americans began with different levels of problems, trend lines for these groups dropped in unison between 1994 and 1999, then leveled off in the new century.

### **CAPS and the Latino Community**

During the summer of 2003, the CAPS evaluation team conducted an in-depth study of Latino involvement in community policing. Many of the issues that led to this study have already been described in this report, including high levels of fear and perceived crime among Latinos, as well as the concern they express about the extent of social disorder and physical decay in their communities. At the same time, Latinos are generally under-represented in CAPS. Latinos are least aware of the CAPS program and of beat meetings, and their awareness has been falling since the late 1990s. Involvement in beat meetings is driven by concern about crime and disorder, but Latinos do not turn out in expected numbers. They are particularly under-represented at beat meetings in racially diverse areas, and the Hispanic community lacks representation by the loyal participants who keep coming back again once they do attend beat meetings. Latinos are also under-represented on the District Advisory Committees that meet regularly with police commanders, despite the fact that committee members are appointed by the Police Department. In general their relations with the police are mixed. While they stand between whites and African-Americans on most measures of attitudes concerning the police, Latinos are noticeably more critical than are the city's white residents. There is also evidence that they are avoiding contact with the police, perhaps including not reporting crimes when they occur. This implies that police reports do not fully describe the level of crime in predominately Latino beats. And in virtually every instance, these problems intersect with language. Members of the city's large and growing Spanish-language community report more neighborhood problems, fewer contacts with the police, lower levels of CAPS awareness involvement, and higher levels of fear than do their English-speaking counterparts.


These issues take on special significance because of the enormous growth in the city's Latino population. Latinos began to make their mark on Chicago during the 1980s, and by 2000 they totaled almost 754,000. Like African-Americans in an earlier era, the Latino community is fed by an immigrant stream that is helping drive up their numbers. The immigrants are principally from Mexico: in 1990, 65 percent of the city's Latinos were of Mexican origin; by 2000 it was 70 percent. Puerto Rican migration to Chicago began later, and the proportion of Puerto Ricans in the city declined between 1990 and 2000, from 22 percent of the Latino total to 15 percent. The fraction of Cuban origin remained in the 1 percent to 2 percent range, with the remainder coming from a variety of points in Central and South America and the Caribbean.

## Study Beat Profiles

During the summer of 2003 a sample of beats was selected in which to explore these issues in detail. All were areas of concentrated Latino residents. Beats comprising one set were chosen because they are notable “ports of entry” for recent immigrants to the city. While also home to long-established residents, they are places of decidedly Latino character and a magnet for newcomers seeking jobs, housing and social life. Beats in the other set are more established areas. These beats display many fewer visible signs of Latino culture. While they are also largely Hispanic in composition, they are home to longer-term residents who are more likely to be native-born American citizens, to speak English and to feel integrated into the city’s economic and political fabric.

Figure 31 illustrates the location of the study areas in which the observers worked. The eight port-of-entry beats are located in two police districts on the city’s near southwest side. They encompass most of two widely recognized community areas, Pilsen (roughly the southern end of the 12<sup>th</sup> police district) and Little Village (the southern reach of the 10<sup>th</sup> district). Like the others, the beat lying between the two study areas was also largely Mexican-American in composition and flavor. The residential sections of both areas are extremely dense, filled with single-family homes, brick duplexes and low-rise walk-up apartment buildings. The two areas are each bisected from east to west by commercial streets that bustle with foot and street traffic both day and night. The southern tier of the port-of-entry beats is bounded to the south by an extension of the Chicago River that eventually carries the city’s processed sewage to the Mississippi River. This heavily industrial and commercial stretch has few residents and was not a focus of our study.

Figure 31  
Field Study Areas



The more established beats were located on the city's mid-northwest quadrant. They all lie in the 25<sup>th</sup> police district, the second largest and fastest-growing of the city's 25 policing divisions. These beats crosscut a number of officially recognized community areas, including Belmont-Cragin, Logan Square, Avondale and Humboldt Park. The area is cut by wide and busy arterial streets lined with commercial and industrial buildings, but behind them in the neighborhoods this is also a community of smaller homes, brick duplexes and low-rise apartment buildings. As in the port-of-entry beats, there is little public housing and virtually no high-rise buildings in the established areas. We estimate that in 2002 about 110,000 persons lived in each of the two study areas. In the port-of-entry area almost 90 percent of the residents were Latinos, and in the more established beats the figure was 75 percent. These and other statistical descriptions of the areas are summarized in Table 6.

Table 6  
Field Study Beat Profile

	ports of entry	establishe d areas	city total		ports of entry	establishe d areas	city total
population 2002 (est.)	108,850	110,620	2,896,000	murder rate	2.8	3.9	3.7
percent Latino	89	75	26	robbery rate	54	48	63
percent foreign born	51	39	22	burglary rate	53	84	87
percent non-citizens	40	27	14	auto theft rate	72	88	86
percent speak Spanish at home	82	69	23	percent Daley 1999 election	79	86	72
percent linguistically isolated	36	27	10	turnout rate 1999 election	15	19	29
percent born in Mexico	47	25	10	<u>Surveys 1999-2003</u>			
percent born in Puerto Rico	1	9	2	area unsafe	58	45	28
percent own their home	34	44	44	serious crime problems	39	29	12
percent receiving public aid	7	6	7	10-item index of problems	51	36	17
percent female-headed households	10	11	10	poor police service	44	38	29
percent high school graduates	39	51	72	police brutality a problem	25	20	14
median household income	\$31,361	\$38,315	\$38,625	interviewed in Spanish	57	36	10

Source: surveys between 1999 and 2003 interviewed 187 residents of ports of entry, 257 in established areas, and 8,497 citywide; crime rates per 10,000 residents calculated from CPD-supplied database for 2002; election data from Chicago Board of Election Commissioners; census figures calculated from Census 2000 STF1 and STF3 CD-ROMs.

Table 6 presents a demographic profile of the study areas and compares them to the city as a whole. Some factors described in Table 6 are closely associated with immigration patterns in Chicago. Almost half of all residents (adults and children) of the port-of-entry beats were born in Mexico, while the comparable figure for the established areas was 25 percent. Chicago is home to relatively few Puerto Ricans, and they were concentrated in the more established beats. Foreign-born Chicagoans and non-US citizens are disproportionately represented in these areas as well, and high percentages of them in both areas reported speaking Spanish at home. “Linguistic isolation” is a census category for households in which no one older than age 14 speaks English well, and in the port-of-entry beats they constituted 36 percent of all households. Note in the lower right portion of Table 6 that almost 60 percent of port-of-entry respondents in our yearly citywide surveys had to be interviewed in Spanish, as were more than one-third of those living in established beats.<sup>10</sup>

Because they come without much formal education, immigrants have also had the effect of pushing down average levels of education for Latinos as a whole. In our 1994 citywide survey, 71 percent of those identified as Latinos reported having a high school degree; by 1999, that figure had dropped to 54 percent. The 2000 census put that figure at 39 percent in the port-of-entry beats and 51 percent in the more established areas. On the other hand, homeownership was not as dramatically different from the city total. Two poverty measures presented in Table 6 – the percentage of households receiving public assistance and the percentage of households consisting of female-headed families – were virtually identical to those for the city as a whole. Median household incomes in the established areas matched the city total and were 18 percent below the city figure in the ports of entry. This was possible despite their limited skills because everyone in these areas is working: levels of unemployment were low and labor force participation was high in both areas – above levels for the city as a whole. During the early morning hours, day laborers can be seen lining up for work in all of the areas we studied.

Another important feature of Chicago’s Latino community is that it is becoming more geographically concentrated. Between the 1990 and 2000 censuses, most of the growth in the Latino population was in an expanding number of heavily Latino areas resembling those in our study. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of Latinos living in beats that were at least 50 percent Latino in composition in 1990 rose from 290,400 to 491,600 – a 69 percent increase. By contrast, the number of Latinos living in beats that were less than 50 percent Latino in 1990 grew by only 2 percent. By 2000, two-thirds of all Chicago’s Latinos lived in majority-Latino police beats, a list that included the 15 areas in this study.

An examination of patterns of reported crime in our study areas places these beats on the safe side of city totals for burglary and robbery. Both study areas were below the city average for robbery; as we have seen, robbery is extremely concentrated in predominately African-American areas of the city. Interestingly, residents of disadvantaged port-of-entry beats reported less crime

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<sup>10</sup> This figure is based on all survey respondents, not just Latino respondents. Among Latinos alone, 65 percent of respondents from port-of-entry beats were interviewed in Spanish, as were 52 percent of those from the more established beats.

than in the more established areas. However, we note earlier in this report that there is evidence that Latinos – and especially immigrants and Spanish-speakers – are avoiding contact with the police, including to report crimes, and this plays a role in reducing these figures.

The study areas faced some political advantages and disadvantages, as reflected in voting patterns. In the 1999 election (the most recent for which beat-based data could be calculated) they were above the city average when it came to supporting the winning mayoral candidate. This is significant because, as we have documented in earlier reports, support for the incumbent mayor plays an important role in shaping the delivery of selected city services. On the other hand, the voter turnout rate in the study areas (the number of voters divided by the age-eligible population of each beat) was relatively low, blunting their overall impact on city and state politics. These patterns are typical for predominately Latino beats and electoral wards all over the city.

Table 6 also summarizes some of the key opinions of residents of our study areas. Between 1999 and 2003, 187 residents of the eight port-of-entry beats were interviewed as part of our citywide surveys, along with 257 residents of the seven established beats. As Table 6 indicates, both of our study areas were relatively troubled places. While about 28 percent of all city residents reported being afraid to walk alone in their neighborhood at night, in the established areas the figure was 45 percent, and it was 58 percent in the ports of entry. The survey included questions about the neighborhood extent of four crime problems. While only 12 percent of all Chicagoans averaged a high score on this measure, 39 percent of those living in port-of-entry beats – three times the city level – were in that category, along with 29 percent of those living in the more established beats. Based on an index of 10 neighborhood problem questions, 17 percent of city residents classified themselves as living in quite troubled places. The comparable figure for port-of-entry beats was 58 percent – three times as high – and in established areas it was 36 percent, or twice the city average. Compared to the city as a whole, study area residents were also more discouraged by the quality of police service in their area. Forty-four percent of those interviewed in ports of entry, and 38 percent in established areas, averaged a “poor” or “very poor” rating on 10 questions about police performance, demeanor and responsiveness, compared to 29 percent for the city as a whole. Both study areas were also more likely to report (based on three questions) that use of excessive force by police was a problem in their neighborhood.

The picture, then, is one of neighborhoods that are not particularly poor when contrasted with the city as a whole. Residents of the port-of-entry beats are somewhat less likely than others in the city to own their own home, and their median income is about 20 percent lower. There are much larger contrasts between the study areas and the city as a whole when it comes to education, and linguistic isolation is a problem in both the port-of-entry and established study areas. Survey reports by area residents provided some of the most startling contrasts. Fear, concern about crime and neighborhood problems, and dissatisfaction with the police were higher in both areas.

## **Methodology**


Field observations and interviews took place in these areas between late May and August 2003. Two Spanish-speaking graduate students participated as field workers during the course of the study, one with a background in public health and the other in social work. They received training and met as a team on a weekly basis for a review of their progress. They spent their time in the field involved in various activities: identifying community resources (churches, visible service agencies, and the like); observing problem areas; identifying potential interviewees; observing beat meetings, court advocacy committee meetings and DAC sessions; and attending community events as they occurred. While there was some teamwork involved, especially when meeting or appointments overlapped, the majority of fieldwork was performed individually. At the conclusion of the field work, the field workers took project managers on a tour of the areas and summarized their own conclusions concerning issues facing these communities.

Over the course of slightly more than three months they conducted interviews with 96 individuals; 65 were in the port-of-entry beats and 32 were in the established beats. Of these interviews, 29 were with agencies/service providers (19 in port-of-entry beats, 10 in established beats); 21 with CAPS staff members or resident leaders (13 in port-of-entry beats, eight in established beats); 14 with residents (10 in port-of-entry beats, four in established beats); 11 with community-based organizations (six in port-of-entry beats, five in established beats); 10 with religious organizations (seven in port-of-entry beats, three in established beats); 10 with community leaders (eight in port-of-entry beats, two in established beats); and two with elected officials in port-of-entry beats). In addition, field workers attended and observed 31 beat and DAC meetings (14 beat and two DAC in port-of-entry beats, 14 beat and one DAC in an established beat). Five other community meetings were also observed by field workers (three in port-of-entry beats, two in established beats). At meetings that were not part of the 2002 beat meeting study, residents and police officers completed questionnaires asking about a number of topics, including beat meeting attendance, beat problems, and their involvement in CAPS-related activities. Questionnaires were provided to residents in both English and Spanish and to officers in English only. In total, 171 additional respondents were added to the 2002 study survey database – 143 from residents and 28 from the police. Of the resident questionnaires, 85 were completed in English (47 in port-of-entry beats, 38 in established beats) and 61 were completed in Spanish (59 in port-of-entry beats, two in established beats).

## **Neighborhood Problems**

One focus of the field work was to learn more about the distinctive problems facing the city's Latino residents. As earlier sections of this report documented, by the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century Latinos were not doing well on a number of dimensions. Four of the most distinctive problems identified in the surveys are described in Figure 32. It depicts the racial and linguistic distribution of concern about gang violence, public drinking, graffiti and school disruption. To more accurately describe the views of English and Spanish-speaking Latinos separately, it combines the findings of the 2001 and 2003 surveys. As was generally the case, by their report adverse conditions were strongly linked to language and the demographic and economic factors associated with it.

Figure 32  
Selected Latino Problems, 2001 and 2003



**Gangs.** Concern about gangs manifested itself in many aspects of residents’ lives in the study areas. In their view, recruitment of new members begins in school, and at an early age. As one experienced community organizer described it, “Gangs are present at elementary and high schools. Recruitment starts early around fifth grade. By sixth or seventh grade the kid is already within a gang.” During an interview with a local school official, our interviewer noted, “He said there has been an increase in the number of ‘crews’ or gangs inside the school. He said they emulate other gang members and are ‘wanna-bes.’ Most recently he identified three crews at school made up of fourth, fifth and sixth graders. According to Mr. \_\_\_\_\_, second grade students are already talking about gangs.” A CAPS worker explained, “Gangs are in all the schools. They are always looking for people to join. Latino youths are easy targets of gangs. When kids disengage from parents and do not listen to parents, gangs offer an alternative lifestyle and family. They [Latino youths] are vulnerable to this [gang] lifestyle. Kids want to fit in.”

There is concern that gangs and the symbols associated with them have become part of the youth culture in these communities. In their attitudes, dress and even pretensions, Latino youths emulated even gangs they were not actually associated with. An experienced youth worker said that they are “saturated” with gang-related paraphernalia, such as logos. “The first thing kids do is ‘put their colors on’ as they walk out of school.” He recalled that recently in an after-school drawing class a girl who was not affiliated with any gangs drew a picture of a playboy bunny (symbol of the “Two Sixers,” a leading gang in our port-of-entry study area)

walking a dog with a crown (symbol of the Latin Kings, another leading gang). To him, her picture signified Two Sixers' domination of Latin Kings, though she was not a member of either.

Fear of gangs greatly circumscribes the lives of young people in these areas. One of our interviewers summarized it this way: "The neighborhood is divided into two zones. Little Village is controlled by Two Sixers on one side, and by Latin Kings on the other. Youths have limited movements. Even if they're not gang members, they're scared to go to the other side of their neighborhood for fear of being mistaken for a gang member." It can be very dangerous to be on the wrong side of a gang's boundaries and have to cross over it. If young men become associated with a gang that does not include their school in its turf, they may have to drop out; it will be too dangerous to continue to attend there.

Parents who want to avoid these risks have a few options. They can arrange for their children to be bused to a school in another area, although that can bring new risks; if they can afford it, they can send them to a Catholic school; others send their children back to Mexico during their high-risk years, where it is seen to be much safer.

Aggressive efforts to counter gangs potentially put police in conflict with neighborhood youths who do not count themselves as gang numbers. As the coordinator of an anti-crime program in our established area put it,

The relationship between them is tense and hostile. The police do a lot of stereotyping of the youths. Many kids may appear to be in a gang because of their "look" – that is, the way they dress and behave. So this leads to harassment by the police all the time. The youths are angry because they can't dress the way they want to and not be harassed, or they can't hang out in groups because anything more than two looks suspiciously like "gang activity" to the police. The youths engaging in these behaviors are stopped and searched without any real provocation.

Aggressive police action can backfire when gangs find ways to retaliate. A youth worker in Little Village described it this way: "The gang members that Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ works with told him that when the police rough them up they [gang members] just get more pissed off. They have to redeem themselves after getting slapped by the police. This usually leads to more violence in the area."

Adults face the risk of gang retaliation as well; it is not just other youths who are at risk. As one resident put it, "It's like we're in our own little jails that we can't leave. There isn't an uninfested place nearby." For some, fear of gangs and retaliation for speaking out against them can be overpowering. Describing the gangs active in one port-of-entry area, a respondent noted "They are all over the place and vicious. They start recruiting kids when they are nine, 10, 11 years old. They disregard the age of the victim. They terrorize a lot of people here. Residents know who is spray-painting their garage but won't tell because they will burn down their car. Gangs bring drugs, guns and violence."

Fear of retaliation extends to participation in beat meetings. Gang members reportedly go to beat meetings to “stake out who is there. Gang members threaten those who attend beat meetings.” As one business leader described it, “The place is infested with gangs. People can’t go and speak [at beat meetings]. [By speaking] they can bring problems to their families.” He said that relatives of gang members go to beat meetings just to find out who is talking about gangs. A long-time community activist shared her thoughts regarding meetings held in her beat. “She stated that the people don’t feel safe having the meeting at \_\_\_\_\_ because of the gangbangers that hang around. She stated that previously it was located in two other places; they moved it from \_\_\_\_\_ Church to \_\_\_\_\_ School to \_\_\_\_\_ Park, primarily for the same reasons: residents fearing the gangbangers that were hanging around.”

**School Disruption.** Between 1994 and 2003 the largest overall drop in the social disorder category citywide was for reports of school disruption. However, this decline was confined to whites and African-Americans; school disorder did not improve for Latinos during the 1990s, and they spiked higher in the 2000s.

Given the locus of gang recruitment and the visibility of gang culture in schools, it is not surprising that concern about disruption in and around schools is a highly rated problem among the city’s Latinos. As noted earlier, school disruption is also a relevant issue for Latinos because they are the group with the most children. In the 2001-2003 surveys, 61 percent of English-speaking Latino respondents reported having children living at home, as did 70 percent of Spanish-speaking respondents. By contrast, the comparable figure was 24 percent for whites and 47 percent among African-Americans. Between 1994 and 2003, conditions in and around schools got worse rather than better in the eyes of our Latino respondents.

Our informants were well aware of the problem of violence in their neighborhood schools. One resident noted that “gangs are present nearby at \_\_\_\_\_ School. They wait outside. They intimidate children who are going to and returning from school.” A local school official described where she finally turned for help with the problem: “Police officers came to the school earlier to escort students who were afraid to walk out of school for fear of rival gangs. They were respectful and did not go to classrooms without my permission...They escorted students...They are always roaming around the area.” A school official in a North Side beat indicated that while there is potential for trouble in schools, the biggest problems are just outside. “There’s lots of trouble with gangs inside the school. Gang activity happens both inside and outside of school. We control it inside. We have cameras and security. We have fights among gangs. The problem is once they leave school, especially if they live on the other side of the boundary.”

Our informants voiced a litany of related concerns about their schools. According to them, the schools are overcrowded, and new schools are needed. Drop-out rates are very high among Latino youths. A city employee commented that “the city suffers from substandard education, with many kids dropping out of school, causing the cycle to repeat. Also, teen pregnancy is another problem. They are younger than ever before.” As a priest in Little Village describes it, “children dropping out of school is really affecting the community. There are many

bad schools in this neighborhood. Only 4 percent of kids can read at their grade level.” The pastor gave an example of a sixth grader in the after school program who did not know her vowels. “When you can’t read, there’s a whole world closed to you. So you turn to gangs and drugs.”

**Public Drinking.** Concern about public drinking dropped among African-Americans during the 1990s but rose substantially among Latinos. At the high in 2001, almost 40 percent of Latinos reported that public drinking was a big problem in their neighborhood.

There is a particularly high concentration of problems associated with establishments selling alcohol in the port-of-entry beats. As one city CAPS employee observed,

The Little Village area does have problems with night clubs. Both the larger venues and smaller corner bars that get packed with people getting drunk, cruising the neighborhoods and potentially getting in trouble because of drunk driving. The bars are also selling liquor to minors.

But bands of men can also be observed drinking along the commercial arterials and in residential areas. One port-of-entry DAC member thought “. . . public drinking might be something cultural, since people in Pilsen tend to drink outside rather than inside a bar.” Another DAC representative indicated that “drinking on the public way, urinating on people’s property, and gambling on the corners (shooting craps) are all main problems in the neighborhood.” Another city CAPS worker referred to public drinking as a social issue: “Once [men] have drinks they’ll leave glasses outside and, in their buzzed condition they’ll be intolerant of the spouse and kids,” adding that such scenarios could lead to domestic violence.

**Graffiti.** Reports of serious graffiti problems declined among all groups during the 1990s, but jumped again sharply for Latinos 2001 and 2003. In recent surveys the largest gap between Latinos and others in their views of neighborhood problems was for graffiti, which now appears primarily to be a problem plaguing Latino neighborhoods.

Graffiti is importantly a gang phenomenon. In the port-of-entry beats the most important gangs are the Latin Kings, the Two Sixers, the Bishops and the Ambrose. As a top police official described it, gangs in the Little Village area are strongly territorial. While they all are involved in the drug trade, they still retain the tradition of fighting for control of turf, over women and to act out their “machismo” self image. Gang violence starts with the marking of territory with graffiti, then enforcing the boundary if crossed by a member of another gang – by a drive-by shooting, if necessary.

Residents read the emergence of new graffiti carefully, pondering its significance for the community. One activist in our north side study area described her routine after she noticed gang symbols that had not been around before:

I do rounds through the area, taking note of where new graffiti has popped up and reporting it to the police, as well as following up with the Graffiti Blasters. I do this once every week without fail. Even if it's not my property I'll call and wait for the Graffiti Blasters to show up.

Graffiti can also appear as a reaction to police enforcement efforts. A community organizer on the north side commented, "Sometimes cops agitate them. A cop will search and humiliate a gang member. Once a kid is humiliated, the kid is angry. [The kid] is gonna go off, get high and turn against the cop. His reaction will be graffiti or something else."

### **Distinctive Latino Concerns**

As we have seen earlier in the city surveys, an important feature of Chicagoans' views of the police is that there is almost no gap between the views of English- and Spanish-speaking Latinos. Unlike fear of crime, concern about neighborhood problems or involvement in CAPS activities, both groups expressed the same views of the police. In general, their views most closely resembled those of the city's African-Americans. On every dimension, blacks and Latinos were more negative than were whites, usually by about 15 percentage points. Like African-Americans, the views of Latinos were strongly affected by their experiences. We have also seen above that high stop rates; no attempt to explain to people why they are stopped; not paying attention to what they have to say; and impoliteness all shape the views of too many Chicagoans, and especially African-Americans and Latinos.

One focus of the field work in port-of-entry and more established Latino communities was to gather more in-depth information about the kinds of issues that alienate Latinos from the police who serve them. Many of the complaints Latinos registered can be heard in every corner of the city. This includes the perception that police response to 911 is slow or that they do not come at all; that officers do not honor their commitment to confidentiality when callers ask for anonymity; that there are too few officers on patrol; and that there is so much turnover among officers attending beat meetings that they cannot get to know them. These are all important issues, especially because concern about them is widespread. However, this section focuses on more distinctive concerns of Latinos. While our informants in the two study areas had much to say, what they told us mostly touched on three topics: immigration-related issues, police attitudes and behavior regarding neighborhood residents, and police relations with area youths.

**Immigration-related issues.** Three issues that are closely associated with immigration affected our informant's views of police-community relations in these communities. First, newcomers reportedly arrive with a set of expectations about the police that are rooted in their home-country experience. Once here they face language and communication problems when they deal with the police. Third, fears about their legal status – some of which may be unfounded – lead immigrants to avoid contact with police and involvement in CAPS.

Expectations that newcomers bring with them are twofold – that the police are corrupt and potentially abusive. When it comes to fear of police brutality, a DAC leader from the more established study area put it this way:

Latinos that arrive from their own country are petrified of the police because of the treatment they used to receive in their homeland. Both the Latinos and the Polish are afraid of the police, and this inhibits any relationship-building that could take place.


There is also an expectation that police are corrupt. A community outreach worker for a health care institution in a port-of-entry beat observed, “Culturally we [Mexicans] don’t ask anything from the police. They [the police] are corrupt in Mexico, as bad as thieves. We bring this assumption over and believe the police are part of the problem, not the solution.” A priest serving the area noted, “in Mexico people pay bribes or *mordidas* to the police. Here [in the United States] personal relationships [with the police] and bribes do not matter.” (The Spanish word “mordida” literally translates as “bite,” but in Mexico it also means “payoff.”) Another priest in the port-of-entry area thinks that most people do not trust the police. “Residents think that the police are in the same league with drug dealers and gangs. Residents cannot speak due to fear of retaliation. Whenever there’s a police scandal people say, ‘See!’ ” A third priest noted, “In Mexico the police abuse people, and they are thieves. Mexicans who come here think the police here are the same. The police suffer because of this ignorance.” A professional community organizer in Little Village said that she “spoke to gang members who said that some police officers have ties to gangs. Unless they change the police, the police and gangs are united.”

The depth of some of these concerns is illustrated in Figure 33. It presents the results of questions that were included in the 2003 city survey. Respondents were asked about the use of excessive force by police in the community, and about their perceptions of police corruption. They were asked to rate whether these were a big problem, some problem, or no problem in their neighborhood. The left side of Figure 33 charts the percentage of respondents rating excessive force and corruption as either some problem or a big problem, and the right side the percentage rating police corruption as some or a big problem. Figure 33 presents the percentage of respondents indicating that these are “big problems” in the upper portion of each bar.

At least two issues of relevance are apparent in Figure 33. One finding is not surprising: the big gap between white Chicagoans and others on these two measures of perceived police misconduct. Compared to whites, all other ethnic groups are unhappy. More important, Figure 33 documents the very high level of dissatisfaction reported by Spanish-speaking Latinos. They are almost twice as likely as African-Americans or English-speaking Latinos to think that excessive force is a big problem in their neighborhood, and twice as likely to suspect big corruption problems. As noted above, this is not the general rule for Latinos. On many measures there are few differences between English- and Spanish-speakers in their views of the police. This includes reports of general police courtesy and their ability to maintain order and control crime. But for the twin issues of excessive force and corruption, the gap between Spanish-speakers and

others is very large, confirming the fears of our informants about the cultural baggage that the city's newest immigrants bring with them.

Figure 33  
Perceptions of Police Corruption and Excessive Force, 2003



Language barriers are a second immigration-related issue affecting police-community relations. Our informants presented a mixed picture of the extent to which language barriers are a problem in the study areas. Some noted that many Spanish-speaking officers work there, and that translation can somehow always be arranged. Others lamented the limited linguistic capability of the Chicago force. Police Department records indicate that perhaps 800 officers speak Spanish, but the Department's approach to personnel assignments in the Patrol Division does not allow this to be taken into account in determining where they serve.

Whether residents are fluent in English also creates distinctions in power relations among them. A savvy police officer specializing in domestic violence reported:

Many Latinos are afraid of the response or treatment they'll receive from an English-speaking officer. In a domestic violence situation in which the husband speaks English and the wife does not, the husband will manipulate the facts and there won't be any action taken by the police officers. And because they see that no action is taken, Latinas tend to report domestic violence incidents less.

We had no independent way of judging the ability of police serving our study areas to speak Spanish. However, during the 2002 beat meeting observation study and our field work in 2003, we observed beat meetings and surveyed officers and residents who attended. Based on those figures, the representation of Latino police officers at the meetings was quite high, especially in light of their numbers in the Department as a whole. Across the eight port-of-entry beats, 53 percent of police officers surveyed indicated that they were Latino in background. Observers attending meetings in the area guessed that somewhat fewer were Latinos (42 percent), but between the two studies it appears that “about half” of officers attending beat meetings in the area were Latinos. Given the difficulty of actually assigning officers in the Patrol Division based on their language skills, this is a significant achievement. And they often try hard to involve Spanish-speakers. As a Pilsen activist described it, “At CAPS meetings there are interpreters. That’s impressive and it’s making a statement that they understand that there’s more than one language here.” A priest serving a port-of-entry beat agreed: “Language is not an issue. There’s always someone to translate. It [a beat meeting] takes more time [when it has to be translated]. The perception that language may be a problem might keep people [away from beat meetings]. [The beat meeting] just needs to be set up in two languages.”

In addition to their expectations and communication problems, many people mentioned the divide that legal issues create between the police and community residents. Their most elemental concern is fear that contact with the police will somehow threaten their status in the United States. This is one issue that divides Chicago’s Puerto Rican community from others. As a priest put it,

Puerto Ricans do not fear the police that much because they are citizens. In Pilsen, people confuse police with *la migra* or Immigration [officials]. Residents of Pilsen are afraid that the police will ask for their papers like they do in Mexico when drivers get pulled over. Hence, another obstacle is the fear of police. The biggest obstacle to CAPS participation is not a language barrier, but where the person was born. Long-time residents of Chicago learn the system. They’re not too afraid of culture and not afraid of the police. Undocumented children may know English but are still afraid. It doesn’t mean police are bad. People are afraid of the uniform. For effective community and police relationships residents must know that the police are not seeking to deport them. We tell people in church that you don’t have to answer questions about immigration [when you get pulled over].

While newcomers from Puerto Rico may struggle with cultural and language barriers, their Commonwealth status means that they do not face many of the legal and bureaucratic issues facing other people from Latin America. However, we saw earlier that their numbers are small in Chicago and only 1 percent of the residents of our port-of-entry beats claimed Puerto Rican birth in the 2000 census. During the 1990s, the absolute number of Puerto Ricans declined, as did their percentage of the Latino population. The growth of the Latino community in Chicago, with all of its attendant problems, is driven by conditions in Mexico, and this fact in turn determines the fears and concerns of those who come here. Because undocumented immigrants in particular flock to areas of ethnic concentration, the neighborhoods represented in this study are home to

many of them. These are neighborhoods where they can find work and keep a low profile. Their numbers are unknown – estimates of the number of illegal immigrants may be the most shaky number published by the federal government – but everyone we talked to knew they are there. Remaining anonymous is somewhat easier than in the past, for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (and its post-9/11 successor agency) has not conducted aggressive raids of workplaces around Chicago in some time, but undocumented immigrants certainly continue to avoid attracting attention to themselves.

We are told that this affects their involvement in CAPS. A senior police manager observed that one reason residents in his area do not attend beat meetings is the fear that their immigration status might be revealed at a beat meeting. He said, “They fear that police would be ‘agents of deportation,’ they are afraid to jeopardize their legal status, and have difficulty communicating with the police.” As a long-time resident of Pilsen put it, “Latinos have a feeling that by going to the Police Department they are turning themselves in.” He switched to Spanish and said, “I’m from Mexico. I don’t have papers – I don’t go to the Police Department.” A Pilsen activist advised, “The police need to make it clear that they are not here to deport people. The police need to reassure people that involvement in CAPS won’t impact negatively their lives and also to create confidence in people to participate.”

Concern about immigration status also influences Latinos’ crime reporting. Our informants indicated that newcomers fear calling the police even when they are victimized and in need of assistance. A DAC representative stated, “If residents are here illegally they are frightened to call the police. They don’t realize they are offered the same protection from crime as legal residents.” A health care center outreach worker noted this is “due to their legal status, language ability or lack of information about what police can offer them when crime has occurred. They don’t know what will happen to them if they file a report, they don’t report crimes for fear of deportation and they don’t feel competent in defending themselves in front of the police.” An outreach worker for the city said, “often times, people leave the scene of traffic accidents such as fender-benders for fear of getting caught and deported.”

An earlier section of this report documented that Spanish-speaking Latinos are not contacting the police with the frequency we would expect, given the condition of the communities they live in, the levels of crime there and their fear of crime. Interviews in the two study areas point to the same conclusion. They identify the important – and negative – influence of immigration issues in the lives of many who live there. Another important corollary to the reluctance of people to get involved in CAPS or report crimes to the police is that it can be concern about the status of their family members, not just the personal vulnerability of individuals, that leads them to shy away from involving the police in their problems. This multiplies the influence of immigration-related concerns, further expanding the network of people for whom “the protection of the law” is elusive.

In this post-September 11<sup>th</sup> era, the relationship between the police and people who are concerned about the legality of their resident status is a sensitive issue. However, Executive

Order 88 issued under the Harold Washington administration (and now superceded by other policies) protects persons who have not committed a felony from much investigation by local police. The current set of rules is described in the Chicago Police Department's "Procedures for Responding to Incidents Involving Illegal Aliens." It points out that "... enforcement of immigration law rests with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and not with state and local police." Under the City of Chicago's general rules, all employees, including police, are instructed not to routinely inquire about the citizenship status of persons they deal with. The police in particular "... **will not** (emphasis in the original) stop-and-question, detain, arrest, or place an immigration hold on any person that is not suspected of committing a crime or based solely on the grounds that the person may be an alien subject to deportation." Officers are further instructed to not request information about, or otherwise investigate or assist in the investigation of the citizenship or residency status of any person, without explicit statutory authorization. Further, their supervisors are not to contact the INS unless a suspect in a crime exhibits some positive sign of being an illegal alien.

These restrictions on police investigations and contact with immigration authorities are widely known among activists and service providers in the Latino community, but they are perhaps not so widely recognized in less sophisticated circles. As a sergeant in an established beat noted, "The CAPS program and Police Department have to do a better job of addressing the fears that many Latino residents have around the issue of immigration. They need to be reminded that they shouldn't fear immigration when dealing with the police."

**Demeanor.** Another issue that arose in the interviews was police demeanor. Many informants indicated that officers serving in their area are sometimes rude or unresponsive to the concerns of residents. One community organizer in Little Village observed that "... the police are indifferent; they come across as being superior to the residents. They don't really interact with the community or residents." A school principal reported that in his community police are seen as "confrontational. Police are seen as reactionary ... not seen as preventive to crime. The police are also seen as bullies not helpers." A Protestant minister on the North Side who has spent a lot of time developing neighborhood relations said, "I typically encounter negative police who are demeaning, disrespectful and treat residents without dignity or compassion." In complaining about police performance, a lay Catholic youth worker exclaimed, "They don't resolve anything. They don't accept suggestions easily. When you ask about what they've done, they get angry." Finally, one long-time resident of a port-of-entry beat recalled a visit to the police station. "At the Police Department they don't speak Spanish. They made fun of me and my relative when they went to the station last time and wished to speak Spanish."

Even a police sergeant we interviewed admitted there is a problem in his area on the police side of the police-community equation. "They don't expect any great service from us, and a lot of the officers are, frankly, a little racist. There are many officers that, once they have a negative stereotype formed, they treat all people with the same attitude." He added that this happens with both the Latino and African-American communities, but that it is hard to not have

these stereotypes because police officers are always dealing with members of ethnic groups in negative situations and they start to generalize to all situations.

**Relations with youths.** One group with whom police apparently have difficult relations is Latino youths, and especially young males. We saw in an earlier section of the report that young Latino males are stopped by the police with high frequency. With a stop rate of just over 50 percent in the course of a single year, they are second only to young African-Americans. A lay Catholic youth worker in Pilsen observed:

The biggest problem in the area is the threats given by the police to the youths. They stop and check the kids even on the streets while they're just standing.... Two months ago the kids were badly treated – verbally harassed and pushed around. The police told kids to “shut-up” in Spanish. Latino police who speak Spanish can be some of the most abusive ones.

On the other hand, fear of gangs can also undermine relations between police and the community – because residents fear retaliation if they become too closely associated with the police. A youth coordinator for a community organization in Little Village observed:

A common police practice in Pilsen is to knock on people's doors after they've called the Police Department to report something. Gang members are watching, so it's dangerous to report suspicious activities. There's mistrust. People are afraid to say things due to gang retaliation.

Others complained about police noncompliance with the official policy of allowing those calling the police to remain anonymous. According to a youth coordinator for a community center in Pilsen: “They were not as confidential about information as they promised to be . . . They would say, your neighbor just called about you. People began to mistrust the confidentiality they said they'd adhere to.” Finally, fear of gangs keeps people from attending beat meetings. A community organizer on the north side noted, “Many fear retaliation from gangs that may be attending the meetings, since it's a public meeting and they're not barred from entering.”

## **Involvement in CAPS**

We have seen in previous sections of this report that Latino involvement in beat meetings and other CAPS-related activities is particularly low. This is especially true of Spanish-speaking Latinos, but even English-speakers are under-represented in many ways. One goal of this field study of CAPS in action was to learn more about why Latinos are not participating and the obstacles to their involvement. In this section, we examine Latino awareness of CAPS and participation in CAPS activities, Latino involvement with non-CAPS organizations, leveraging community resources, and the relationship between Latinos and the police. The section will conclude with recommendations for increasing Latino involvement in CAPS.

It is important to note again that one of the most significant barriers to CAPS involvement among Latinos relates to demography. Age is among the most significant barriers. In every community in Chicago, beat meeting attendance – and especially frequent attendance – is higher among older residents, and Latinos are the youngest of Chicago’s large demographic groups. Chicago’s Latinos also move frequently, and the length of time that people have invested in a neighborhood is also a powerful predictor of CAPS involvement. Latinos are also the most likely to both be in the labor force and to have children living at home – two competing demands for their time. As a north side community organizer noted, “Parents have limited [financial] resources so they have to work one or two jobs in order to survive. Since they have to work so many hours, they are unable to attend either because they are at work or because they aren’t able to leave their children with someone so that they can attend the CAPS meetings.” All of these demographic disadvantages are redoubled among the city’s Spanish-speaking Latinos. They are even more likely to be young, poor, less educated and renters than are their English-speaking counterparts. On the other hand, it is not to be forgotten that Latino culture builds on many important strengths. As a priest in Pilsen put it, “They have great faith, family life, lots of kids, willingness to believe, spirit of survival, industriousness and craftsmanship.”

**Awareness.** Awareness of CAPS is the prime prerequisite for involvement. Our surveys have shown that, over time, recognition of CAPS increased steadily among whites and African-Americans. However, although it grew among Latinos through the 1990s, in the 2000s some of those gains were erased. In the 2003 survey, African-Americans were most aware of the program (89 percent knew of CAPS), while the comparable figure for Spanish-speaking Latinos was only 56 percent. Of course, many in both groups knew about CAPS but did not participate. However, if residents are unaware of the program, or do not understand its purpose or the benefits to them for becoming involved in the program, then involvement will be necessarily limited. While they were divided in their opinions, many would agree with the community leader who opined, “. . . There’s no effort to let Latinos know about CAPS or what it could do for them.”

Publicizing CAPS is the responsibility of the CAPS Implementation Office. This has been carried out via promotional spots on radio and television, ads in local newspapers, posters at rapid transit stops and high traffic areas, refrigerator magnets and pens with the CAPS logo; and information booths at city events and neighborhood festivals staffed by Implementation Office staff. Most materials are written in both English and Spanish, and ads have appeared on Spanish-language radio and TV stations.

As noted earlier, during the summer of 2003, we interviewed 96 individuals with ties to three of Chicago’s predominantly Latino neighborhoods. Those interviewed included residents, representatives of organizations that serve the community (churches, schools, health centers, social service agencies, etc.), community leaders, police officers working in those areas, public officials and other community stakeholders. We asked how Latinos in their neighborhoods learned about CAPS. According these informants, the most common ways were through word-of-mouth (12 percent), media ads (10 percent) and through involvement in the community or with community organizations (8 percent). The least likely ways for Latinos to hear about CAPS

were by attending CAPS activities (3 percent), through flyers or elected officials (2 percent each) and by going door to door (1 percent). Latinos also learned about CAPS by attending beat meetings, being personally affected by crime, through church or school and through contact with police officers or CAPS Implementation Office staff.

Those we interviewed had suggestions for improving awareness. Many supported the promotion of CAPS through partnerships with community organizations and co-sponsorship of events. In particular, churches and schools were often mentioned as places both where residents heard about CAPS and where more residents could be reached. Another common suggestion was increased publicity through ads on Spanish-language TV and radio. Activists mentioned Channel 44 (Telemundo) and Channel 66 (Univision) as widely watched sources of information in their communities. A priest in Pilsen recommended radio stations such as “La Ley” and “Tremenda” for reaching his parishioners. In the course of this study, it became obvious that the literacy rate among Spanish-speaking Latinos is much lower than other groups, so ads in newspapers are reputedly less effective. In spite of this, La Raza and Exito, both Spanish-language newspapers, were mentioned as possible sources for bolstering Latino awareness of CAPS.

Many interviewees proposed personal contact through door-to-door efforts, street interaction or face-to-face follow-up after other strategies (like flyer distribution). A North Side youth services coordinator stated that, “officers should be community organizing too! They should be in plain clothes, mingling with the residents, talking to them, like in ‘un café’ – building relationships and getting to know what’s really going on in the area first hand.” Some felt the police were not targeting the right places for publicity and recommended flyers and posters in area businesses, such as grocery stores, highly frequented by Spanish-speaking Latinos. Speaking of turnout efforts in his area, a priest working in Little Village noted,

This needs to be done in areas where the majority of the people hang out. It is okay to advertise in the libraries, but not everyone goes to the library. I’d like to see more advertisements at the supermarkets, which is where adults go. People stop to read the bulletin board before or after leaving the store.

**Participation.** As noted above, a large number of Chicagoans are aware of the CAPS program, but fewer are actually involved. Residents can participate in many ways. They can attend beat meetings, participate in CAPS-initiated activities such as marches, cleanups and educational fairs, or serve on court advocacy committees. Or they can step it up a notch and become leaders, facilitating a beat meeting or serving on the district advisory committee. Each level of involvement involves effort and commitment.

**Beat meeting turnout.** Beat meeting turnout is lower for Latinos than for other groups. In addition to the demographic factors mentioned above, there was widespread agreement that language is a big barrier – 23 percent of those interviewed volunteered that Latinos do not attend beat meetings because they are not conducted in Spanish or because no (or poor) translation is provided at meetings. As a north side community organizer put it, “The beat facilitator should

not make statements like ‘Nobody needs translation here, do they?’ because that automatically intimidates many people or they think that it sets them apart for asking for help.’ Fear of the police – learned in their country of origin or as a result of negative experiences with Chicago police – was also frequently cited as contributing to low turnout, as was immigration status. A recurring theme in these study areas is that police need to make more of an effort to assure people that they can participate in CAPS or call them in an emergency without fear of deportation.

Also common is fear of gang retaliation for speaking up or even just attending beat meetings. A nun working in Little Village described it this way:

There’s a fear factor of the gangs retaliating against the person and his or her family. There’s also the belief that CAPS is in cahoots with the gangs. I heard a rumor from a CAPS attendee at \_\_\_\_\_. People had gone in good faith to talk about a homicide that took place. When they arrived they immediately recognized the beat facilitator as a close relative of the gang member that was responsible for the killing, and they noticed his lack of interest in the matter.

Many Latinos do not participate because of lack of knowledge or understanding of CAPS, or ineffective outreach. Other explanations for low turnout among Latinos included work commitments and childcare constraints; having family members who are involved in gangs or crime; disinterest in becoming involved unless personally affected by crime; and not seeing any results of CAPS. Regarding not going to beat meetings unless personally affected by crime, one school official explained, “When you’re well, you don’t see the doctor.”

***Other forms of involvement.*** While beat meetings are the most obvious way in which residents can get involved in CAPS, there are other avenues for becoming active in the program. Each district sets up its own activities, but most residents have a chance to participate in such initiatives as neighborhood marches, rallies, prayer vigils, clean and green sessions, neighborhood assemblies, CAPS anniversary events, vote-dry efforts, school safety initiatives, educational events (e.g., theft prevention, domestic violence), Youth Explorer programs, block clubs and court advocacy.

Interviews showed that while Latinos do participate in some CAPS activities – cleanups and block clubs were specifically mentioned – it is more common for them not to be involved in many of the activities described above. Several reasons were cited for this. One is lack of knowledge of opportunities to participate. A long-time resident noted that she attends beat meetings, but not other activities because “I don’t get letters about them.” Informants often expressed the belief that the police do not encourage Latinos to become involved in CAPS. Even when Latinos are aware of opportunities to participate, they often choose not to become involved. We know that Latinos are often involved in schools and churches, so the decision not to take part in CAPS activities is a matter of priorities: if Latinos don’t see the need for and the benefits of their involvement in CAPS, they remain unmotivated to participate.

Finally, many of our informants emphasized the importance of personal relationships in mobilizing the Latino community. As a social service agency staff member in Little Village put it, “Latinos tend to put a face to programs.” He said that face-to-face interactions between CAPS liaisons and residents would be essential to reach Spanish-speaking Latinos. One of our staff researchers summarized what she learned from a summer of interviewing:

One of the essential cultural characteristics of the Latino culture is the importance placed on relationships and friendships. CAPS representatives must meet people face-to-face and personally invite them to come out to beat meetings. This summer I often heard people say “I never got personally invited” to attend beat meetings.

During the course of the study, we found that interviewees were more likely to talk with us when we had a connection to someone they knew. In interviews, the desire for police to put forth effort to really get to know Latinos in the community was strongly expressed. As one North Side community activist put it,

The Police Department needs to inform the community in another manner, like door knocking. Beat officers need to be out there interacting with the people. They may be afraid at first, but they need to start the relationship building somewhere. Officers need to get out of their cars and talk directly to the people about the CAPS program. It means a lot to people when they see that.”

A priest in Little Village reiterated this theme.

It’s not enough to just see beat officers at the beat meetings every month. The officers need to park their cars and walk through the neighborhoods. I think this would work because Latinos are very relational. They might begin to trust the officers if they see some effort in connecting with them.

**Community leaders.** Low Latino participation at the grassroots level may also be linked to an absence of visible Latino leadership. There are many opportunities for community residents to take on a more active role in CAPS. Effective DACs represent the diversity of the area they serve, and our research has shown that Latinos are especially under-represented on advisory committees in districts with significant Latino populations. Having Latinos in leadership positions is one way to get more Latinos involved; this is related to the concept of personal contact just described. Many of our interviewees bemoaned the dearth of Latinos in the management ranks of the Police Department or the lack of bilingual officers and beat facilitators. Role models are very important in minority communities, and currently there are few to motivate Latinos to become active in CAPS. Some of our interviews were with Latino beat facilitators who were quite active in their community, but it was often difficult to find Latino community leaders who were involved in CAPS.

Many of those interviewed agreed on four main strategies to increase participation. The first is to increase publicity of CAPS on Spanish-language radio and TV. The second is for the police to engage in relationship-building. With the commitments of work, children and church in their lives, many Latinos have chosen not to make involvement in CAPS a priority. Add to this the antagonistic relationship between police and Latinos, and there is little incentive for Latinos to become involved. More positive relationships need to be created and trust needs to be established before Latinos will “buy in” to the worth of CAPS. Also impacting lack of involvement is the described “passivity” of Spanish-speaking Latinos who tend not to get involved unless personally touched by a problem, so there must be an effort to get them, as one social service provider put it, to feel “comprometidos,” or obligated to participate. Another strategy is increased and more effective bilingual outreach. The last strategy is to induce churches and other community institutions to increase their own involvement and get their constituents more involved in CAPS. According to interviewees, participation could also be increased by having Spanish translators at beat meetings; having better beat meetings (e.g., more focused, with materials in Spanish); having more events or educational workshops for residents; and reporting more on positive CAPS outcomes.

**Other organizations.** Research has shown that those who are active in CAPS are also active in other organizations, and sometimes participation is linked. For example, residents might hear about CAPS through neighborhood associations; these organizations encourage them to attend beat meetings to bring up safety concerns that the organization is unable to address. Key organizations in the Latino community are churches, schools, advocacy/activist organizations and social service agencies. In interviews, some organizations were repeatedly mentioned as important to the Latino community. However, as discussed earlier in this report, Latinos are much less likely than other groups to be involved in community-based organizations. This trend toward noninvolvement within the Latino community presents a challenge to police efforts to engage this community in the CAPS process.

**Leveraging community resources.** While poorer communities may have fewer formal resources to draw on, every community has some resources that can be used for the benefit of the entire community. There are two ways to get residents “to the table”: by involving them in problem-solving, and through their ties to neighborhood businesses and key organizations.

**Problem-solving.** One of the interview questions asked whether Latinos in the community were involved in problem-solving. Most people who answered this question answered in the affirmative; some of the problem-solving was even occurring at beat meetings. This was encouraging to hear, but unfortunately our research has highlighted the fact that little problem-solving actually occurs at beat meetings, and this was reinforced by many comments that information-sharing seems to be the main purpose of the meetings. One member of a community organization stated, “The CAPS meeting is the initial place where the problem-solving could begin if the resident is motivated enough and linked up with the right officer.” They also opined that not only do police not encourage problem-solving, they actually discourage it by withholding information from participants. Seven percent of interviewees

thought that problem-solving was occurring, but only outside of the CAPS process. Ten percent thought that residents and police were doing problem-solving but that more was needed. And 10 percent felt that no problem-solving was occurring at all.

Residents bring much to the problem-solving process. Clearly if they are present and participating, they are motivated to improve the current situation. They also bring their knowledge of neighborhood conditions and fellow residents; their skills and abilities; and new ideas and new perspectives. But for problem-solving to occur, the environment must support it, and this is the responsibility of the police and the beat facilitator. Latinos we interviewed believe that, in general, the police discourage them from becoming involved in problem-solving. As they see it, the police want information from residents and nothing more, which hardly promotes a mutually beneficial relationship between the two groups. The police are losing opportunities to engage the Latino community as long as it continues to emphasize information-sharing over problem-solving. Participation in problem-solving needs to be strengthened and should be a focus of the police to engage more Latinos in CAPS. Doing so would also address Latinos' contention that nothing seems to get accomplished and no one ever sees positive results from CAPS.

***Organizational involvement.*** Though Latinos do not participate in organizations as readily as do other groups, there is no doubt that community organizations and neighborhood businesses play a prominent role in the Latino community. Churches, for example, are at the heart of the community, though how active a role they play varies tremendously from church to church. Several churches were frequently mentioned as important institutions which were invested in the community and involved in community life, with social-service and community programs augmenting parishioners' spiritual needs. Others felt that churches were not involved to the extent they could be. While some churches work in partnership with CAPS – pastors or their representatives attend beat meetings, churches host meetings, notice of meetings is printed in church bulletins or announced – church involvement in promoting CAPS is still a largely untapped resource.

Schools are another underutilized resource for getting the word out about CAPS. Latinos have more children per family than other groups, and many of these children are very young; thus, Latino involvement with schools is very high. When interviewees were asked to name important organizations in the community, they named many elementary and high schools. Parents spend time at schools, are members of local school councils and are concerned that their children receive a good education and are safe at school. There is a natural intersection between CAPS and schools, and safety programs like parent patrols and walking school buses (and to a certain extent, peer juries), have resulted from this. But more collaborations could be developed with schools to make Latinos aware of CAPS and more willing to participate, from distributing CAPS information with report cards to scheduling daytime beat meetings at schools.

With a lack of major chain stores in many areas of concentrated Spanish-speakers, residents patronize neighborhood businesses for all their needs. Many of those interviewed

believed that CAPS could be developing relationships with these local businesses for mutual benefit. CAPS could target residents where they shop and hang out. By using neighborhood businesses, they could capitalize on personal relationships already formed. The business community, in turn, would be giving something back to the community – a place to hold a meeting, a donation of refreshments or an effort to improve their community. This presents a challenge, since participation of businesses in CAPS has always been low (usually they consider themselves to be lesser stakeholders than residents, because they leave the area at the end of the day). Businesses, however, know their customers, and that knowledge is invaluable.

Finally, community organizations play an important role in organizing residents around certain issues and providing them with needed resources. In Latino areas, they can be particularly helpful as advocates due to issues unique to many Spanish-speaking Latinos, such as language and immigration status. Organizations such as The Resurrection Project, Logan Square Neighborhood Association, UNO, Pilsen Neighbors Community Council and Little Village Community Development Corporation are examples of community-based organizations that are working to improve their areas (not without controversy, for some). Some of these organizations are in direct conflict with the Police Department, so partnerships can be difficult to develop. Antagonistic relationships between some community organizations and the police make it difficult to get some residents on board. For example, one organization encouraged residents to attend its meetings instead of beat meetings, thus putting up obstacles to the CAPS process. Overall, though, organizations are generally open to collaborations with the police, and those we interviewed expressed an interest in seeing the police increase their efforts to create partnerships with community organizations.

### **Relationships Between the Police and the Latino Community**

Involvement in CAPS is affected by the relationship that residents have with the police. If residents do not trust the police, or if they perceive police as corrupt, abusive or racist, then it follows that they will have nothing to do with CAPS, believing at best that CAPS is ineffective and, at worst, participation puts them at risk. Latino views of the police are affected by many factors, including the language barrier and immigration status, but are mostly shaped by personal experience with police and how they are treated. How the police view the relationship impacts their strategies for outreach and involving the Latino community.

**How Latinos view police.** In our interviews, people were almost equally divided over whether their relationship between the police and Latinos is positive or negative, a finding that mirrors the results of our citywide surveys. However, an officer had this to say: “I think it’s very good. When we drive around the area, they wave to us. They’ll stop and speak to us.” A resident agreed: “I think that they really care, they seem concerned like they want to resolve the problem.” But even when the relationship was seen as good, it was common for interviewees to voice the opinion that the relationship could be better. Many interviewed said that a relationship now exists or was better than it had been, but that it still had a long way to go. When the view of police was negative, it usually had to do with the issues of lack of trust, police prejudice or

racism, or problems with communication. Most agreed that the situation could be improved with more bilingual officers and better attitudes on the part of the police. One social service agency representative noted that, often, as soon as good working relationships had been developed with officers and commanders, they were transferred from the area.

In addition to preconceptions about police, experience with police shapes perceptions, and minorities often have more police-initiated encounters. Many of those interviewed or their family members and friends had experiences with police officers who were unfriendly, hostile, impatient, dismissive or otherwise unpleasant. Add to this the discomfort and misunderstanding that comes with a Spanish-speaker trying to communicate with an English-speaker, and the relationship between police and residents becomes even more strained.

Lack of trust on the part of residents, suspicion on the part of police and a poor relationship between them makes for a weak CAPS link. In order to get Latinos involved, major efforts need to be devoted to building trust between the two groups. Personal relationships are crucial to Latinos, and currently police have generally failed to create and maintain these relationships. These two groups are very much at odds with each other, so it is not surprising that they have not been working together.

**Police strategies for Latino involvement.** The Police Department has been aware for some time of the changing demographics in the city and has made efforts to target Latinos. CAPS marketing materials are produced in both English and Spanish, and some officers and community organizers for the CAPS Implementation Office are bilingual. Some beat meetings in heavily Latino areas have people translating for Spanish-speakers. A few districts have even begun holding meetings in Spanish. One Police Department initiative involved asking Catholic churches to publicize CAPS in bulletins and announcements to increase beat meeting attendance. While Latino churches were not targeted specifically, it was bound to affect Latinos since they are so involved in church activities.

All of these efforts are commendable, but more work needs to be done. The CAPS Implementation Office is mainly responsible for outreach efforts, but it has limited resources. The CAPS Implementation Office already distributes flyers, canvasses blocks, helps set up block clubs, organizes events and gets the word out to residents about CAPS. While some of its efforts will have to change – for some are not as effective at reaching the Latino community as others are – our interviewees believe that police officers also need to be doing more outreach. Informants believe that officers should be out on the streets, knocking on doors, speaking to residents and making personal contact with them in a friendly, nonconfrontational way. Officers need to expand current efforts – or lack of efforts – to better convince the Latino community to become involved.

## Recommendations

Our research shows that involvement in CAPS by Latinos, especially Spanish-speaking Latinos, is lower than in other groups. This is partly due to less familiarity with the program, disincentives to participate and a tense and strained relationship with the police. There are strategies the Police Department can use to increase involvement by Latinos in the CAPS process.

**Awareness.** There are two things police can do to increase awareness. Publicity must specifically target Spanish-speaking Latinos, and the best ways to reach them seem to be through Spanish-language TV and radio. And police should target Latinos where they live, work and play; flyers should be distributed in grocery stores, community organizations, schools and churches.

**Participation.** There are three ways to increase participation. While going door-to-door is time consuming, there was agreement among interviewees that personal contact is important to Latinos; flyers and announcements do not have the same impact and will not neutralize the negative experiences Latinos have had with police. This is what relationship building is for. Much work is needed to break down stereotypes on both sides. Police and Latinos often meet in adverse situations, so opportunities need to be created for interactions of a more positive nature, where both can meet in a friendly and supportive environment and trust can be reestablished. This is probably the most difficult of recommendations to implement, but it is probably the most important one. Until Latinos feel that they can trust the police, there will be little improvement. Finally, beat meetings should be modified to better serve the needs of the Latino community. At minimum, this means guaranteeing a Spanish-language translator at meetings where Spanish-only speakers are present. It also means having bilingual officers at meetings and out in the community so that communication is less of an issue. Other beat meeting recommendations are relevant to all beat meetings, and include facilitating problem-solving at meetings; seeing and reporting positive results of CAPS; keeping residents informed; and making meetings convenient for attendees.

**Other organizations.** The police need to develop more partnerships with community organizations. Efforts with schools and churches need to be broadened, and police need to work with key organizations and community leaders to bring more residents into the CAPS process.

**Leveraging community resources.** There are two suggestions here. Residents need to be educated about the purpose of CAPS and how involvement will benefit them. And residents and police need to be (re) trained in problem-solving. Our research continues to see less and less problem-solving occurring at beat meetings; residents themselves claim that not enough problem-solving is happening there.

**Relationships with police.** Police need to work on three strategies to improve their relationship with the Latino community. As noted above, they need to work hard with Latino

residents to reestablish trust and build more positive relationships. This will involve going out into the community to talk with adults and youths as well as promoting positive interactions at police-sponsored events, beat meetings and so on. The police also need to recruit Latinos for leadership positions as beat facilitators and DAC members. Latinos would then have opportunities to work more closely with the police, possibly helping break down negative preconceptions. This might also help with participation by other Latinos, as Latinos in leadership positions would serve as role models and the personal contacts would encourage others to become involved. Finally, more Spanish-speaking officers need to be recruited so that the language barrier is no longer a problem.

**Resident recommendations.** Although we have focused here on what the police need to do, the Latino community must also take some action. CAPS is a police-community partnership, and both sides must be engaged for the program to work. CAPS needs to be publicized by Latinos; they must continue to spread the word of its utility among family and friends, and explain why it should be a priority for Latinos. They need to use their personal relationships to strengthen participation. Residents also need to be aware that CAPS is a process that takes time and patience, for complex problems do not have quick remedies. Latinos need to attend meetings and be prepared to engage in problem-solving rather than simply presenting their problems and expecting something to be done.

### **Management Accountability**

The Chicago Police Department's focus on management accountability began in February 2000 with the creation of the Office of Management Accountability (OMA).<sup>11</sup> OMA is charged with numerous responsibilities, but its main goal is to ensure that all CPD personnel and resources support and carry out strategies that address chronic crime and disorder problems identified as priority problems. The last evaluation report described the structure of OMA and detailed the management accountability process from its inception through 2002.

This section briefly summarizes key points in the accountability process. It then discusses changes that have occurred in the process over time, including changes in leadership, focus and the development of a new offshoot of the accountability process – Violence Initiative Strategy and Evaluation (VISE) reviews. Next the report turns to the expansion of management accountability beyond its original home in the Patrol Division, noting how it has affected other parts of the Police Department. An analysis of the relationship between management accountability and two other Department initiatives, technology and community policing, follows. The section concludes with a summary and recommendations on improving the process.

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<sup>11</sup> In November 2003, the Office of Management Accountability's name was changed to the Office of Crime Strategy and Accountability, but here we use the previous name for consistency.

## **Overview of the Management Accountability Process**

As its name implies, the management accountability process focuses on unit managers. At the district and area levels, unit managers are area deputy chiefs, district commanders, watch commanders, tactical lieutenants, CAPS management team leaders and community policing sergeants. They make up the district and area teams charged with identifying priority problems based on their analysis of crime data and community input. They then develop strategies that address the problems, using district and area resources in a planned and targeted manner. These strategies are detailed in written district and area strategic operational plans (SOPs). The task that follows is to execute these plans and monitor their effectiveness. OMA oversees this process, providing feedback primarily through meetings at which these plans and their apparent impact on priority problems are reviewed.

The planning process begins in the districts, at which management teams are to gather monthly in formal sessions known as Level 1 planning meetings. The managers are to identify district priorities, plan their responses and evaluate results of their efforts. Level 2 meetings are held quarterly at the area level. These sessions usually focus on two or three districts, but all five comprising the area may be included in a single lengthy meeting. At Level 2 meetings, both district and area plans are reviewed and resources are allocated to help districts with their efforts. The penultimate venue for management accountability is the headquarters, or Level 3 meeting. These call a single district before the Department's most senior managers to assess the effectiveness with which the organization's core missions are being addressed. We will discuss these meetings in more detail later.

Underlying the meetings is a vision of the way in which the organization should function on an ongoing basis. Every unit must set priorities and stick to them, for they cannot address all problems that fall in their jurisdictions. Priorities should be established based on a systematic analysis of the Department's rich databases, supplemented by concerns expressed by the public at beat meetings; through the district's advisory committee; and through its community policing office. Management teams must be able to justify their choices while continuing to work within the framework of the Department's broad mission statement. They must focus their work on problems that they themselves have identified. Above all, managers must "execute." That is, they must do what they laid out in their plan. They should continually monitor events in the field and be prepared to change plans if their strategies do not work. Finally, the process should include a sharing of "best practices," learning from the successes of others and sharing what works for a particular problem.

From November 2002 through November 2003, our evaluation staff interviewed police personnel and observed the accountability process in action. Nineteen planning and review sessions were observed, including all levels of accountability meetings and a few VISE meetings. Twelve interviews were conducted with personnel in various units, including some units outside the Patrol Division that were likely candidates for change. Most of those interviewed were queried about the impact of the accountability process on their work. These

interviews and observations built on similar work conducted for our last report, positioning us to assess changes in the process over time. Many conclusions and recommendations presented here reflect almost four years of continuous attention to management accountability in Chicago.

## **Aspects of Management Accountability**

For each district, all roads lead to the headquarters review meeting. The district management team prepares furiously when an upcoming date of their meeting is set. When team members arrive they are put on the “hot seat” to discuss how effectively they carried out strategies they identified to tackle district problems. The district must justify its allocation of resources, defend the implementation of its plan and be prepared to address a range of management issues. Here we examine the meetings’ format and participants, as well as the issues that arise at headquarters sessions.

### **Attendance**

Headquarters review sessions are run by the deputy superintendent heading up OMA, assisted by four or five OMA staffers armed with reports, computer printouts and PowerPoint slides. The deputy superintendent has traditionally been the most active participant in this process, leading the meeting, asking the main questions, facilitating discussion, and calling the district to task when it is not on the ball.

Typically the meetings are attended by the superintendent and his first deputy, and four or five deputy superintendents or their representatives. Commanders of various specialized units are also in attendance, along with the chief of patrol and the area deputy chief. District representatives include all management team members, sometimes accompanied by the district administrative manager and other district personnel. Other regular attendees are CAPS Implementation Office representatives; attorneys assigned to the area to prosecute drug- and gang-house cases; representatives from City Hall; and, recently, prosecutors from the state’s attorney’s office. Usually the district advisory chair is there, as are representatives from city service Departments or 311, visitors from other police departments and visiting dignitaries. Finally, though their numbers have dwindled considerably since every district has been through these meetings, district personnel preparing for their own headquarters session can be seen taking careful notes.

### **Format**

Headquarters meetings follow a familiar script. The deputy superintendent opens the meeting with introductions and a reminder of the meeting’s purposes: evaluating the execution and effectiveness of area and strategic plans to address chronic crime and disorder problems; confirming that the district is able to identify newly emerging crime trends; ensuring that the district is responding to community concerns; and addressing management issues. Everyone present has sufficient opportunity to absorb the PowerPoint slide that appears on giant LCD screens that dominate the front of the room. It is reproduced here as Figure 34.

Figure 34  
OMA Functions



Discussion is generally organized around each of the four core functions of the meeting. First, district statistics are reviewed, including changes in district crime rates, the number of calls handled per officer and clearance rates. At each step the district is compared to citywide averages. Then components of the area's plan that affect the district are reviewed, followed by discussion of district SOPs and their strategies. If any emerging crime trends were identified for the district, they are presented next, followed by a brief discussion of community concerns. Next comes a review of management issues and analysis of the area detective unit's work. There


is time at the end of the agenda for the management team to bring up its own concerns, but this is rarely done. Throughout the meeting, the deputy superintendent (or other managers) may call on anyone in the room to answer to a question or to receive an assignment. The meetings generally last about two hours.

### Context

Most headquarters sessions follow the same format. While details vary from district to district – each has different problems, chooses its own strategies and experiences different levels of accomplishment – OMA usually focuses on the following questions:

1) *Are districts doing what they said they would do?* Because districts chose their own strategies OMA looks for evidence that these strategies are being carried out. If they are not, OMA wants to know why. One of its jobs is to assess the implementation of district plans. At one meeting, OMA's analysis revealed that compared to the previous year, the district had achieved a very large increase in foot patrol, traffic stops and field interrogations in the targeted area. OMA examines a broad range of implementation measures. Depending on their strategies, districts have been held accountable for their issuing of parking tickets and moving violations, administrative violation notices, as well as field interrogations, recovered guns, cars seized from drug market customers, and the number of persons dispersed – but not necessarily arrested – in officially designated gang and drug hot spots. The left panel of Figure 35 presents a chart displayed during a review of a district's efforts to combat a street drug market using a combination of intensive enforcement tactics.

Figure 35  
OMA Analyses of District Crime and Plan Implementation



2) *Are districts conducting their enforcement efforts in the right places?* “Right places” include specific sites named in their strategic plans, officially designated gang and drug hot spots, and areas of concentrated violence targeted by the new Deployment Operations Center (see below). There should also be coordination efforts on all fronts in these areas. For example, officers should be writing tickets and doing foot patrol there; inspection teams and city prosecutors assigned to the areas should be focusing on target buildings; and the CAPS Implementation Office should be organizing block clubs and holding rallies and prayer vigils at the targeted sites.

3) *Are districts alert to new trends in crime?* In Chicago’s accountability model, the districts are responsible for monitoring their own situation, and they often are called to a headquarters session for a specific reason, such as to address a spike in crime or an emerging crime pattern. One focus of the meeting is what the district is doing about such a situation. OMA expects managers who attend to have already identified the problem. A new generation of user-friendly software fueled by the Department’s data warehouse has been developed that enables the districts to conduct in-depth investigations of crime trends and patterns, and district managers are expected to use it. The right panel of Figure 35 was displayed at a headquarters meeting to bring a new spike in robbery to the attention of one district management team. Another chart presented at the same meeting tracked the extent of data warehouse use by members of the district management team. They were exhorted to make better use of the tools available to identify large one-year increases like this on their own.


In addition, OMA asks what districts are doing about a number of topics affecting them all, such as vehicle impoundments related to gangs and drugs; open warrants and warrant arrests; use of contact cards; data warehouse usage; maintaining “Rogues Galleries”; increasing beat meeting participation; felony upgrades; and mechanisms for addressing community concerns.

4) *Are districts using the resources at their disposal?* Districts are asked directly about strategies involving units outside the district. Outside units that are to be supporting district efforts are quizzed on their contributions. Sometimes assignments are given to them on the spot.

5) *What's working?* Sharing best practices with other districts is an important goal of OMA, because there is a variety of approaches to assessing whether things are working. When district crime levels appear to be going down, OMA wants to know why – what strategies seemed to work best? Figure 36 was displayed at a headquarters session to document a decline in narcotics activity in and around targeted areas in one police district. Depending on the site, the problem reduction ranged from 19 percent to 31 percent, and overall it was down by 25 percent compared to the previous year.

6) *Are there notable management issues?* The time has passed when OMA would go over every management issue in detail. Now it takes time only to point out positive or negative trends in the issues it monitors, among which are overtime expenses and medical absences, both big-ticket items in the Department's budget. OMA also monitors the amount of time officers spend on each assignment; 911 calls that go unanswered because no cars are available; crashes and damage to vehicles; and complaints about excessive use of force and verbal abuse.

Figure 36  
OMA Analysis of Trends in Crime



7) *How are the detectives doing?* The Detective Division is expected to take an active role at headquarters meetings. OMA scrutinizes its clearance rates; how cases are assigned (they do not want too many to go without field investigations); how long detectives take to complete cases; overtime; and their use of the data warehouse. These numbers are compared to area and citywide figures.

It is reasonable to expect that over time the accountability process will further evolve; as keeper of the process, OMA learns from its experiences – what works and what does not, what new issues must be addressed, where training is still needed, and the like. What we have observed in meetings, a view reinforced by interviews, is a gradual refinement of the process as it was originally envisioned rather than sudden change in direction. However, during the last year we have observed several notable changes in OMA leadership, focus, institutionalization, components and the role of area deputy chiefs.

### **Change in Leadership**

In October 2002, OMA's founding director retired, and an interim deputy superintendent was appointed.<sup>12</sup> This new head of OMA was hesitant to make major changes in the process, because of his temporary status. Regardless, he had his own way of looking at things and his own style for conducting headquarters meetings. According to one CPD staffer, "The guy running the show has a different flavor." Comparisons between the "new guy" and the old were inevitable, and mostly irrelevant, but for our purposes there were two major changes in the focus of the process. One was a shift away from the initial focus on bringing the districts into the process. For more than a year, the previous director had been engaged primarily in proselytizing for the new program and educating everyone in the Department about their new roles. By 2002, it was safe to assume that everyone was familiar enough with the process to be engaging in it properly. The second change was a shift to a more confrontational mode during the meetings. For example, at one meeting there was a discussion of concern expressed at beat meetings about illegal drug sales at various locations throughout the district. One of these locations had already been officially identified as a "hot spot" – a priority district focus. When the commander was pressed about what he was doing in response to these resident concerns, he indicated that they were "looking into it." The deputy superintendent snapped, "One [of the drug sale sites] is a hot spot! You need to do more than look. Send a car to disperse." In this and other cases, OMA came to expect managers to be on top of what was going on in their districts and to be doing something about it.

### **Focus of the Meetings**

When the accountability process was first introduced, almost everything about it was new, and the first 18 months were devoted primarily to training. District management teams were trained as a group, seemingly a revolutionary concept in a Department that usually trains by

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<sup>12</sup> In mid-November 2003, when this report was written, a new permanent deputy superintendent for OMA was appointed.

rank. A district's first headquarters session was mostly spent familiarizing it with OMA's expectations. Over the course of attending several meetings, however, their familiarity with the process should have increased, so the focus of the meetings evolved – in this case, from “this is how to do it” to “are you doing it?” After four years, districts are presumed to know what is expected of them and what they should be doing. At current meetings there is less tolerance of mistakes and more criticism if districts are not doing what they said they would do. In the words of one observer, the focus is now to be “less forgiving, more mature.”

One example of this shift in focus involves community concerns. When headquarters meetings began, commanders were asked if they had a mechanism in place to track concerns raised by residents at beat meetings. At least half did not, and they were told to come up with something that worked for them. In subsequent rounds, commanders are not asked whether they have a tracking mechanism – they are asked how the mechanism works. OMA's independent review of beat meeting reports is designed to test whether problems identified there are being addressed. It is a shift from asking “yes or no” to “prove it” or “how's it working?”

Also, some of OMA's priority topics have changed over time. For instance, when the process began, OMA looked at vehicle impoundments and open warrants. Now felony upgrades and data warehouse use are considered. This shift may be related to districts having learned that these issues are priorities and consequently addressing them so that the questions no longer need to be asked. Or, it could be that as the organization's priorities change, elements that OMA examines change as well.

### **Institutionalization of the Process**

The last evaluation report argued that accountability “must become part of the [Department's] regular way of doing business” in order for managers to be held effectively and fairly accountable. Lasting institutional change in such a large, bureaucratic organization is a challenge. After four years, resistance to the required meetings and paperwork remains, and this will likely never change. But according to a senior manager, the outlook is positive:

Feelings have changed. In the beginning they looked at it as a draconian view . . . [A general order has been redone to] establish [management accountability] as part and parcel of the Department. I'm very confident that it will stay with the next superintendent, and the superintendent beyond that, and the one beyond that. It has improved the operations of the Department and has made people better managers, and I can't see any reason why it would change.

Interviews with other sophisticated managers indicate that support for this kind of systematic management review has broad and deep support.

## **New Forums**

There has been a prominent addition to the accountability process since July 2003. Called VISE (Violence Initiative Strategy and Evaluation) meetings, they were instituted, under tremendous pressure from the media, as a strategy to combat Chicago's homicide problem. Shorter in duration than other headquarters meetings, these focus narrowly on district homicides, aggravated battery with firearms and other forms of public violence involving firearms. One of the city's five policing areas is chosen weekly and every district in the area is scrutinized regarding those crimes and the time of day crime occurs. Perhaps two districts are chosen for more detailed analysis, including a review of all arrests for these crimes. Districts are chosen for review because of upward spikes in crime there, or because they promise to be examples of something that works.

Preparation for these meetings by OMA staff is very time-consuming, and lead time is very short. Unlike regular headquarters review sessions, for which staffers typically have a few weeks to prepare, VISE meetings are held every week. Thus, accountability meetings such as those reviewed here currently occur less frequently, perhaps once a month or less. One criticism of VISE is that it replaces in-depth scrutiny about a longer and more diverse list of strategic issues with crisis-of-the-day management, and that many of the issues once discussed at meetings have been put on hold.

Typically VISE meetings are followed by sessions run by the Deployment Operations Center (DOC). The DOC is run out of the first deputy's office; it analyzes crime data and gives weekly assignments to the tactical response units.

## **Roles for Area Deputy Chiefs**

Area deputy chiefs have always played a key role in the accountability process, but with the addition of VISE and special-team deployment by the DOC, which analyzes crime data, areas have been placed in the spotlight. Area deputy chiefs have taken a more active role in coordinating resources and accounting for district and area activities. Area-level accountability meetings have taken on more importance as area plans are carefully developed to coordinate with other Department initiatives and emphases.

## **New Roles for "The Support Units"**

This year's evaluation took a closer look at the impact of management accountability on some of the Department's many specialized units, which include the detectives, the narcotics and gang investigations section, the special operations section (SOS), vice control ("Vice"), bomb and arson, public housing, public transportation and organized crime. While in the past some of these units have considered themselves separate from – and perhaps superior to – uniformed officers working the streets, OMA's message has been that they are to work in concert with the districts. The joking reference to them at many headquarters meetings as "the support units" was a calculated blow at their special status. In addition to watching for how the headquarters review sessions involved the units, we selected three for careful study through personal interviews –

detectives, Vice and SOS. Based on our observations, it appears that commitment to the accountability process varies from unit to unit, and from unit head to unit head, but in general they have adapted to their new role and the new expectations imposed by management accountability.

**Accountability meetings.** As the most obvious manifestation of the accountability process, area and headquarters review meetings involve planning and strategizing about the best use of resources at hand. The involvement of specialized units in these meetings is one important consequence of the management accountability system now in place.

There are many specialized units in the Chicago Police Department, and not every district will have the types of problems in which some of these units specialize. For example, prostitution is concentrated in only a few districts, so Vice focuses its attention in those. Units come to the meetings when need for their service is identified. The attendance of representatives from specialized units also depends on the level of the meeting.

We observed a number of district-level planning meetings and found that specialized units are rarely represented there. This may be appropriate because often these meetings involved evaluating the previous month's strategies and determining what still needed to be done; often the need for specialized units was expressed, so presumably interDepartmental support service requests (IDSSRs) were filed afterward. A major exception to this was the presence of the Detective Division. After a reorganization of detectives (described later), lieutenants and sergeants began to attend district meetings for the purpose of getting to know their districts and to offer their assistance. Occasionally, representatives from the area deputy's office, the CAPS Implementation Office and a city Law Department attorney attended as well.

Special units more regularly attended area-level meetings. It was common to see representatives from detectives, public housing, special operations and the narcotics squad. However, rarely were commanders of these special units there; instead, a lieutenant or sergeant was present and participated in discussions. On the other hand, there is no question about attendance by specialized units at headquarters meetings. They are all there, with most unit heads sitting opposite the district management team, while area representatives sit with the district under review. Unit commanders are required to attend these meetings; only on rare occasions will a lieutenant sit in for a commander.

While attendance at these meetings is relatively consistent, participation varies widely depending on the type of meeting, the unit itself and the unit members. For some, providing numbers is the extent of their involvement. Others actively engage in discussion of district problems and strategies. When specialized units attend district planning meetings, their participation tends to be quite intense, with the unit often telling the district what it can provide. Information-sharing and problem-solving may occur. The beginnings of collaboration may develop.

On the other hand, participation at area meetings varies tremendously; sometimes this depends on how the area deputy chief leads the meeting. In some cases, unit representatives are called on for information or explanations of events; at other times, they volunteer information without being asked. Perhaps half the time they go beyond information sharing to actual problem-solving. Infrequently, someone from a specialized unit attends but does not participate. Detectives, on the other end of the spectrum, always play an active role at these meetings, with much interaction among them, district managers and area chiefs. One problem we observed at area meetings was the lack of involvement of specialized units at times when it was necessary. In one instance, for example, the issue of narcotics was often brought up, but the representative of the narcotics squad was never called on, and he volunteered no assistance. At another meeting prostitution was discussed but no one from Vice was there. This is more common than it should be, given OMA's stance that specialized units should be at meetings when districts might need their assistance.

Clearly headquarters meetings are the main venue for participation by specialized units. Most units in attendance are called on at some point during the meeting. Sometimes the unit is simply asked to report a few statistics about their activities – SOS and Vice are typically asked this. Other units get actively involved in the discussion. Detectives talk about plans and strategies, as well as provide updates of the status of their work. Again, not all units attend all meetings. If there is little or no public housing in a district, the public housing unit need not attend. But when the unit commander is present, he or she is usually called upon for comment.

We learned through interviews of a shared view of the role of specialized unit commanders at accountability meetings. One commander expressed it this way: “. . . to explain what we do to assist the district and how our unit responds to crime – what we do to clear it, how we use our manpower.” This was evident at headquarters meetings – reports of the efforts of specialized units show that they are working and communicating with the districts. These meetings would benefit from suggestions of new ways of doing things or critical assessment of whether chosen strategies actually work. Specialized units can certainly be more active in this process; currently most mainly report rather than strategize.

**Impact of accountability on specialized units.** Attending accountability meetings is only one part of the process. There are other ways in which specialized units can be affected by accountability. To understand the impact of management accountability on these units, we focused on three main questions: How has management accountability changed the way units do business? How has it changed the relationship between the units and the districts? And has it changed how the units measure what matters?

*Changing the way specialized units do business.* Management accountability can impact the way units work, from their structure to the creation of new forms and procedures that focus on priority activities. Staffers from every unit we interviewed acknowledged that management accountability has had an impact on the way they do business.

- 1) Structure. One specialized unit has been reorganized since the institution of management accountability, though that was not the only impetus for reorganization. Detectives were already organized along area lines, but units within the areas have been reorganized. Specialized teams now focus on the investigation of murders, aggravated batteries and gang-related aggravated batteries, and sexual assault and abuse. Responsibility for robbery, burglary and theft went to other teams, along with auto thefts and financial crimes. In addition, the Youth Division was reintegrated into the area detective structure, and a special victims unit was established to investigate physical abuse or neglect of children, missing persons, domestic violence and elder abuse.
- 2) Forms and Procedures. Most units have instituted new paperwork or reports in addition to those required by OMA. SOS developed a new reporting system. Vice control revised its management of internal requests for its support and generates monthly activity reports. In addition, some long-time procedures of these units were revised and, in some cases, new ones were added. The Detective Division began holding its own internal accountability meetings focusing on homicide reduction in spring 2002. However, these meetings were suspended by the summer of 2003 due to position vacancies, and we have been unable to actually observe one in progress since our last report. SOS changed the way it conducts missions from shorter, less district-specific ones to those that are longer and more targeted. Most examples of changes in the specialized units were not dramatic; rather, they involved slight tweaking of current forms and procedures that already served the units well.
- 3) Activities and Priorities. Perhaps the most significant impact of the accountability process on these units was a shift in priorities. Most specialized unit commanders confirmed what we heard from district personnel – that these units had begun to focus on problems that are priorities for the districts. Units still had their own priorities, based on unit missions and internal expectations, but they were now making room for district priorities as well. As one unit commander put it, units’ responses “reflect the priorities of the district.”

Another result of the accountability process has been a unit focus on problems or activities specifically related to OMA concerns. For example, one unit commander knew that OMA’s head always asked about warrants, so when time and manpower allowed, this commander ran warrant missions. Specialized units appear to be quick to react to OMA priorities as well as to those of the districts.

*Changing the relationship between the units and districts.* Here, too, there have been significant changes due to management accountability. Positive developments in this area relate to communication, collaboration and adoption of district priorities.

- 1) Communication. A common sentiment expressed both by districts and specialized units is that there has been increased communication between them since the inauguration of management accountability. From the unit commander point of view, communication with the districts is easier and more frequent. One commander explained that districts now know how to get help from the specialized units, and as a result they are being more specific in their requests to units. It is now common for units to write up activity reports for the district commander; at the very least, this occurs prior to headquarters meetings. One commander explained that, because of accountability, districts now know what his unit did. “Ninety percent of these reports [sent to the district] were developed after experience attending OMA meetings.” Districts have also begun to provide specialized units with feedback on the effectiveness of their efforts in the district. But mainly units and districts are talking more; heads and staffers often speak on the telephone weekly, and sometimes daily, in an effort to “be on the same page.” This is crucial because it is a significant focus at headquarters meetings.
  
- 2) Collaboration. This was another common refrain expressed by both districts and units. A commander stated: “I think the working relationships with the districts are much better.” Another credited OMA with forcing unit and district commanders to collaborate closely. Specialized units accomplish this by training districts in their areas of expertise, participating in joint missions with the district, identifying roles in working on priority problems and sharing information.

Barriers to collaboration include unit reputation and unit versus district tension. In the past, specialized units were less responsive to district requests, and some districts remain skeptical about the units’ willingness to help. In addition, there is inherent tension when an “outside” unit comes into the district: district personnel, who are familiar with the area, are suddenly being told what to do by outsiders. Complicating this is the issue of credit. Both the district and the unit want credit for arrests because they are evaluated on this measure; though with detectives, at least, this is less of an issue, since they are evaluated by case clearance rather than by number of arrests.

Another facet of collaboration is the development of new relationships or strengthening of existing ones. A new intensive prosecution program has forged a relationship between police and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. And, as OMA pressures districts to increase the participation of the Implementation Office, drug and gang house attorneys, and other agencies, the result has been a more collaborative effort on all fronts.

- 3) Adoption of district priorities. Though mentioned above, it is worth noting again that the relationship between districts and units has been enhanced by the fact that specialized units increasingly view themselves as support units for the districts. The result is a shift for the specialized units to district priorities. Like many, the

Chicago Police Department is still mostly a reactive organization, and resources get shifted in response to unanticipated crises, leaving the best-off districts with the least outside help. However, where possible, units are attempting to synchronize their priorities with the district's, because it is a sure bet that they will be asked at the next headquarters meeting how their activities are supporting the districts.

*Measuring what matters.* For the most part, “what matters” has not been changed much by management accountability, neither for the districts nor for specialized units. Most likely this is because the accountability process continues to use traditional measures such as enforcement activities, calls for service, case clearances and number of arrests. What has changed is that there is increased documentation that units are in fact doing what matters. Thus, OMA can monitor unit activities, and hard-working units can get the credit they deserve. What matters to OMA is what matters to the units, as this is what they are held accountable for at meetings.

One of our research goals was to see whether management accountability expanded beyond the Patrol Division. The general consensus is that all units are involved in the accountability process to varying degrees, as appropriate. While there is certainly room for improvement, and some units must be pulled in still deeper, the reality is that management accountability has limits of relevance throughout the Department. Though every unit in every bureau has some role to play, many units are more directly connected to CAPS than others, and they must be active players in the process. The relevance of the accountability process is confirmed by the high buy-in among current unit commanders, who believe in the importance of the process and see its utility. They are committed to their role as support unit for the districts.

## **Management Accountability and Technology**

Management accountability is dependent on technology, which defines and sets limits on the organization's analytic capacity, and thus impacts how districts and specialized units do their jobs. According to one OMA staffer, “We wouldn't be able to do what we do without it . . . it's a tremendous tool, for us and actual operations.” Technology has facilitated data being more available, accessible and transparent, resulting in raised expectations. No longer do districts and units have to make special requests to get needed reports; most data can be accessed readily. Personnel are expected to be technically savvy.

Data analysis forms the base of OMA – its two major jobs are crime analysis and management analysis. Over time, OMA's technological capabilities have grown, and its analyses have become more sophisticated and detailed. OMA's analyzing abilities are bound only by the limits of the Department's constantly evolving data systems. Technical decisions that get in the way of district and unit personnel and OMA staff needs sometimes lead to frustration. From time to time the issue of access to data is raised at headquarters meetings. In one case, a system change removed a helpful screen, resulting in no one having access to it any longer. Another time, supervisors complained that they could not access a screen that their subordinates could, so they could not check their work. OMA supports and advocates using technology to make jobs

easier, so when these issues come up, OMA brings them to the attention of the appropriate unit for resolution.

Technology development is now a major focus of the Department. As the last evaluation report indicated, the Chicago Police Department is committed to integrating new technology to support the broader goals of CAPS, and OMA is a beneficiary of this technology. However, there is concern that OMA – a key technology user – has not been as involved in the development and testing process for new data systems as it ought to be. Though OMA often provides feedback when it uses new systems, it would be more effective to solicit OMA input earlier, when changes are easier to make.

### **Management Accountability and Community Policing**

OMA's mantra is "management accountability equals community policing," meaning that accountability supports community policing as the way the CPD does business. While one could argue that community policing has still not been fully implemented in, and integrated into, the Department, the accountability process has forced major units to begin working together on related projects. By its definition, community policing involves the public playing an active role in neighborhood safety. The issues we address here focus on community concerns, the role of the community in accountability meetings and the inauguration of VISE. From these perspectives, it is not clear that management accountability has had a positive impact on community policing.

**Community concerns.** Community concerns are directly addressed at every headquarters meeting. OMA focuses on two main issues: Does the district know what residents are concerned about? And, what procedures does the district have in place to handle concerns raised at beat community meetings and to provide feedback to residents at subsequent gatherings? At accountability meetings, charts listing community concerns that have not made it onto formal plans are displayed, and district managers are quizzed about what they have been doing to resolve them. This is an opportunity for districts to demonstrate that they are aware of those concerns and are addressing them in some way.

Each district is also expected to show that it has a mechanism in place to deal with concerns brought up at beat meetings. Districts were encouraged to develop their own tracking procedures rather than being told to adopt a standard form, but examples of good forms were also shared among them. A closely related issue is how results of police efforts are communicated to residents. Feedback is necessary, for police need to demonstrate that they are taking complaints seriously, and they can hope to gain credit for a job well done in this regard as well. As noted above, feedback is also important for sustaining resident involvement in the meetings, for residents can lose interest when they do not see any police response to their issues. Attention to the ways community concerns are handled reflects the evolution of the accountability process toward one that focuses on results.

However, beat meeting logs are OMA's major source of information on resident priorities. They are the basis of lists displayed at headquarters meetings to which the districts must respond. But in truth, even district managers suspect that they only capture a fraction of

what is discussed at beat community meetings. During one personal interview the commander bemoaned the fact that information presented at the meetings does not make it on to the beat logs and believed that officers who attend are simply “going through the motions.” The commander attended meetings in every beat and noticed that while he took pages of notes about residents concerns every time, he saw them reduced to only a line or two on the form.

To examine this commander’s observation more generally, the 2002 study of meetings in a sample of 130 beats was designed to compare what observers saw at meetings with what appeared on written reports filed by the officers who attended. The 2002 study involved observations of 291 beat meetings, and we were able to match 289 of those to the official meeting paperwork. At the meetings, observers kept track of issues raised by residents. They noted whether there were brief or more lengthy discussions of each issue. Table 7 compares the results to a classification of the issues identified on the official forms.

Table 7  
Match of Issues Brought Up at Beat Meetings and Beat Meeting Reports

Issues discussed at beat meetings	Percent recorded on beat meeting report	Number of meetings at which discussed	Issues discussed at beat meetings	Percent recorded on beat meeting report	Number of meetings at which discussed
drugs			physical decay		
brief discussion	53%	47	brief discussion	42%	79
long discussion	74	126	long discussion	42	52
gangs			social disorder		
brief discussion	36	31	brief discussion	71	51
long discussion	59	49	long discussion	75	97
personal crime			parking & traffic		
brief discussion	20	35	brief discussion	48	56
long discussion	19	31	long discussion	59	66
property crime			complaints about policing		
brief discussion	22	50	brief discussion	0	53
long discussion	50	54	long discussion	10	74

Table 7 presents two columns of problem categories. Next to each problem is the percentage of meetings at which the problem was discussed and for which we could find a parallel reference in beat meeting reports. It is most instructive to focus on issues that were the subject of more lengthy discussion at the meetings. For example, observers noted a lengthy discussion of drug problems at 126 meetings (that number is also given in Table 7), but according to the paperwork, drugs were mentioned as a problem that had been discussed at only 74 percent of those meetings. Table 7 indicates that, in general, there is considerable slippage between what comes up at meetings and what makes it to the OMA office via reports. Drugs and social disorder, two very frequently discussed issues, were best represented in beat meeting reports. Ironically, two issues that are the traditional focus of the police were fairly poorly represented, violent crime (19 percent) and property crime (50 percent). Discussions of physical-decay problems surfaced in only 42 percent of meeting reports, and parking and traffic issues in

just 59 percent of the paperwork. The logs almost never reported any dissatisfaction with police service, while our observers noted reports of dissatisfaction at about one-quarter of all meetings.

Other important community concerns go almost completely unmeasured. The Chicago Police Department's 1993 mission statement, *Together We Can*, stressed the importance of factors for which there are currently no data to assess the organization's success or its mid-level managers' effectiveness. Two of these factors are reducing fear of crime and enhancing customer service. Other cities are addressing these issues directly. Washington, D.C. has now joined the ranks of Departments that are routinely surveying victims to help gauge the quality of service they receive, and New York City conducts monthly surveys of residents who contact the police for assistance.

**Community role in accountability meetings.** We have occasionally noticed the presence of community members at accountability meetings at all levels. Most often these are DAC chairs attending headquarters review sessions, but occasionally DAC chairs and even beat facilitators are present at district and area meetings. To some extent, staff members from the CAPS Implementation Office represent the community as well. They are always present at headquarters sessions, but they do not consistently attend other meetings.

In addition, the role of community residents at these meetings is inconsistent and ill-defined. In most – but not all – of the headquarters meetings they attended, DAC chairs were called on for comment. However, they had little to add. Not much is required of DAC chairs at these meetings; in only one instance was a DAC chair asked a specific question, and the questioner joked that he would get in trouble for putting the DAC chair on the spot. If chairs are only expected to observe, they should do so from the vantage point of the audience. However, if they are expected to participate, their contribution should be meaningful, perhaps being held accountable for community efforts in the same way that police are held accountable for their efforts. That being so, DAC chairs should have the right to ask police managers about police efforts and distribution of resources. As it stands now, DAC chairs appear to be present only for show. Their presence alone does not equal participation, and it does not substitute for community involvement.

**The rise of VISE.** As noted earlier, VISE was instituted to focus resources on Chicago's homicide problem, in response to tremendous pressure from the media. Prior to VISE, headquarters meetings were held frequently; now they occur less often because VISE meetings are conducted almost weekly. OMA staffers must now handle preparations for VISE and headquarters review sessions, and the former have taken precedence in the schedule. The focus of VISE meetings differs greatly from those of other accountability meetings. VISE meetings are shorter and more focused on a small set of specific crimes, and they review crime statistics and arrest numbers. Management issues and community concerns are not discussed, raising concern that the Department may be moving away from community involvement toward a more traditional, police-driven prioritizing process.

## Findings

The adoption of management accountability in the Chicago Police Department has been very successful. The last evaluation report concluded that OMA faced a herculean effort in implementing management accountability, but that it did so with determination. Signs point to the institutionalization of the accountability process, and all relevant specialized units have begun to accommodate the process. Levels of participation vary, but all specialized units have been changed in some way by management accountability. The process has caused managers to be better keepers of their districts, and it has helped foster communication and new partnerships between districts and specialized units. Accountability meetings continue to be settings for discussion, explanation, analysis and strategizing, though some are more like status reports than problem-solving sessions. There has always been talk in the Department of “taking it to the next level,” and in this case, it appears to be true. The accountability process has evolved into a component of the regular business of the Department, and managers have grown with the process.

Headquarters meetings are a big part of this process, and much that happens there is done very well. But there are three issues about these meetings that concern us: community involvement, management concerns and meaningful contributions.

**Community involvement.** Management accountability is principally an internal process, and most believe that community involvement should be minimal. Perhaps that is why DAC chairs are allowed to attend most meetings but usually do not have any input. Their participation in meetings is generally limited to praising their commander and providing recognition that the meeting was informative. We believe, however, that mere presence is not enough. Meetings could provide a forum in which DAC chairs (or other community representatives) could ask questions, advocate for the community and make suggestions. Though meetings seem intimidating for new participants, and DAC chairs rarely know what to expect or what is expected of them, this could be their chance to have the ear of top police officials in the context of critical discussion of district performance.

It is interesting to note that, though accountability is an internal process, OMA originally envisioned having a third unit – a community analysis unit. Though never developed, the community analysis unit might have been charged with observing beat community meetings and interacting with the community to form opinions of CAPS independent of the beat meeting reports described above.

**Management concerns.** There is time on the formal agenda of each headquarters review session for the management team in the hot seat to express their concerns or to make suggestions or comments. The time allowed is brief, and usually rushed, as attendees are eager to leave. This has not changed significantly during the life of the project. There is rarely any meaningful discussion at this point; like the outpouring of appreciation from DAC chairs, commanders often use the opportunity to thank their management team. While commendation is an appropriate part of the sessions, the bigger issue – barriers districts face in trying to address problems – is seldom broached. Perhaps commanders think this is fruitless due to the Department’s budget crunch, or because there has been no response to their complaints in other venues. Or perhaps they are afraid that rocking the boat might impede their advancement opportunities. Regardless, rarely have managers raised issues that needed the attention of the top brass. If management concerns

are an important topic for discussion, ways need to be found to make it a genuine agenda item. As yet, no one appears to take it seriously.

**Constructive dialogue.** There is great potential at area and headquarters meetings for real problem-solving. In many cases, managers and unit heads discuss what can be done to impact priorities they have identified. But usually the discussion is dominated by questions about districts efforts and their results. We observed numerous missed opportunities for real analyses of what works and why. For example, we observed an interchange concerning a decline in a district's medical roll. The commander was commended for this reduction and asked how it came about. He did not know – nor did anyone else – and the questioning moved on. Frequently foot patrol numbers are down, but rather than asking questions to determine why this is, it is usually assumed that officers simply forget to register their effort with the dispatcher.

Occasionally districts were advised to discontinue strategies that were not working or that were no longer needed, but there should be more of this. At one session a district reported the same 14 strategies for each of its priority problems. With limited resources, districts should be choosing strategies wisely and be more discriminating. Not every strategy works for every problem. Strategies should not be chosen simply because categories need to be filled. While OMA stresses problem-specific strategies, districts too frequently rely on tried and true generic strategies.

Finally, participation by senior Department executives must be strengthened. A few almost always ask questions, but others seldom speak. When senior managers participate, districts always gain fresh insights or learn something new. There should be much more of this dialogue. The OMA director should not be the only one asking the hard-hitting questions; this should also be the role of the deputy superintendents. Headquarters sessions were never intended to be “the OMA Deputy's show” – they are a dynamic, collaborative process that needs the involvement of all stakeholders. Audience members there strictly to observe are the only ones who should not be participating. Everyone else should be actively engaged in making headquarters sessions a productive experience for all involved.

### **Other Recommendations**

Overall, management accountability is working well. OMA has done a lot of things well, and our recommendations will include many of those elements.

**Increase OMA staffing.** OMA does much with little. It has a very talented staff, but it could and should be doing more to enhance the accountability process. A staff increase would allow for more community emphasis and data analysis helpful to the district. The quality and quantity of headquarters review meetings should not suffer because of the new burden imposed by VISE meetings.

**Continue the focus on implementation and outcomes.** The key questions are, “Did the district do what it said it would do and, if so, did it work?” By now, all districts should be familiar with the process and should not be surprised by what occurs at meetings. Managers must

come to meetings prepared to show that they have carefully considered district problems and available resources, and that they have targeted their activities to make the greatest impact.

**Continue to strengthen specialized units' involvement in the accountability process.**

OMA has successfully held specialized units accountable for their efforts in the districts. While specialized units have become district partners, they need to become more active participants in the problem-solving process.

**Involve senior managers more actively in headquarters meetings.** As noted above, more senior executives should be questioning strategies, making suggestions or being otherwise actively engaged at these meetings.

**Train non-police partners on the accountability process.** Only police personnel have been trained on the process, yet many others attend and participate in these meetings. DAC chairs, CAPS Implementation Office staff, and drug and gang house attorneys frequently come to these meetings, but they are less familiar with the process and only learn what to expect after attending repeatedly. Training need not be as detailed as that received by the police, but some education and training on the process might make it easier for non-police partners to contribute meaningfully at these meetings.

**Have specific, focused community involvement.** We described above the problems with community involvement in the accountability process. There should be meaningful community participation – not merely community presence – at accountability meetings. Community representatives should also have responsibilities to account for – perhaps increasing beat meeting attendance – and accompanying that should be their right to ask questions or request more resources. With the CPD's current emphasis on the use of more traditional police strategies to deal with current crime problems, there is a risk of losing ground on the community side of community policing.

## **Conclusion**

We have been monitoring Chicago's community policing initiative since January 1993, before the program was even announced to the public. The evaluation was designed to encompass the entire city and all of its communities, and as a result we have gathered a great deal of data. Since the beginning we have surveyed about 48,500 residents, about two-thirds of them at home and one-third at beat meetings. Several thousand of these respondents were CAPS activists and DAC members, and another 5,000 were problem-solving training participants. We also surveyed about 13,600 police officers, either at roll call or when they gathered for training sessions or beat meetings. Over the years we held more than 1,000 in-depth personal interviews with police officers and residents, and our observers conducted detailed observations of 1,079 beat meetings. Our computers store more than 8 million crime reports and almost 37 million records of 911 calls (and that is only since 1999). More than 65 people have worked on the evaluation project.

We have been impressed by several things during the course of the evaluation. Perhaps most important is the dynamism of the city. Its people and their problems do not stand still, and

our data collection has documented seismic shifts in both just since the early 1990s. Wherever big city policing is heading, Chicago is at the forefront. Another notable factor is the sheer difficulty of mounting any significant project in a city the size of Chicago. The task of making all of the many programs that make up CAPS come together in coordinated fashion is a huge one, particularly because it requires the commitment of neighborhood residents, the police and their many agency partners. An important point affecting everything that has happened is that CAPS is not simply the Police Department's program, rather it is the city's program. This is not true in most places, and community policing is vulnerable in many cities because of it. Here, every city agency pitches in, and the personal involvement of hundreds of thousands of citizens ensures that community policing is deeply embedded in the civic and political life of the city. This is important because there are distracting pressures on the city's leaders. Concern about terrorism is real, although what this city can do about it is not clear. Recent attention to violent crime has taken its share of energy that could be directed at responding to some of the program's weak spots. Finally, the Chicago Police Department is to be commended for its unwavering cooperation and interest in the evaluation over the past decade. Our evaluators were afforded broad access to the Department's documents, meetings and personnel. In addition, the CPD has been receptive to feedback, using evaluation findings to make enhancements to CAPS and to change Department policies and procedures to better support CAPS.

The following is our assessment of Chicago's first decade of community policing. Because CAPS is a sprawling collection of agencies and projects, we are giving its various parts individual ratings. Like graders everywhere, we tend to give a little extra for effort, and we recognize that some tests are harder than others. We also kept an eye on how other cities have done while making these judgments.

**Public Involvement:** This is one of the defining elements of community policing. Chicago's beat meetings are unique and the subject of intense scrutiny from around the world. Residents continue to turn out in large numbers, confirming that they see something in it for their community, and in many ways the meetings have improved over time. This notwithstanding, we were not able to assign a top mark to public involvement, because several issues plaguing CAPS for years have not been effectively addressed. The first such issue is the limited (and apparently declining) action component of beat meetings. As one community policing sergeant put it, "A lot of residents think that CAPS is like a laundry. Drop off the shirts, come back in a week and they are done." The turnover in officers attending the meetings continues to defeat one of the purposes of holding them, which is to build relationships between police and the public. We also found that the issues raised at beat meetings are not very well represented in the paperwork that officers later file, so no one above the beat level can monitor what citizens are really concerned about and what is being done about it. Another issue is the rudderless drifting of too many district advisory committees; they need new blood and a clear role. **Grade: B**

**Agency Partnerships:** Agency partnerships are another key feature of an effective program. In cities where community policing is the police department's program there is not much partnering going on. In those cities, police and residents typically address only a narrow range of issues, rather than broad range of problems that CAPS has taken on. In Chicago, CAPS is the city's program, and every relevant agency is making an effort to support problem-solving at the beat and district level. The CAPS Implementation Office provides the inter-agency

coordination that is required to address the most significant problems. Past reports have documented the effectiveness of the city's anti-graffiti program. The Department of Law and a multi-agency inspection task force support district efforts to deal with bad buildings. **Grade: A**

**Reorganization:** Chicago also effectively reorganized to support community policing. The daily work of thousands of patrol officers was reshuffled so that newly formed beat teams could concentrate on their assigned neighborhoods, and a sergeant is assigned to generally supervise their problem-solving activities. A very smart management move concentrated responsibility for all aspects of CAPS management in the hands of a district lieutenant, the "CAPS management team leader." District community policing offices have taken on a lot more work. The management accountability system set in place in 2000, coupled with the newer Deployment Operations Center, has shifted the focus of headquarters to day-to-day crime fighting. This seems to happen everywhere when agencies adopt New York-style "Compstat" systems, but the focus of Chicago's management accountability process has remained broader than most. The headquarters review sessions continue to put some pressure on the districts to respond to the public's concerns, coordinate with the mobilization efforts of the CAPS Implementation Office, and sustain attendance at beat meetings. Internal inspectors routinely review community policing aspects of the Department's operations. **Grade: A**

**Problem-solving:** CAPS gets its lowest grade for problem-solving. To be fair, every police department has trouble making problem-solving work: it requires a great deal of training, close supervision, strong analytic capacity, and organization wide commitment. An analysis of hundreds of beat-level plans (the study was detailed in our January 2003 report) found that efforts to solve local priority problems have not been very effective. District-level priorities get more sustained attention, but the same problems, in about the same locations, persist year after year. Over time the effectiveness of beat meetings in setting problem-solving agendas for the public has declined. Officers have had no refresher training in problem-solving, and most of a decade has passed since resident activists were offered any training opportunities. Refocusing on problem-solving could provide an opportunity to re-engage the community in the active partnership promised by CAPS. **Grade: C**